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ABSTRACT
Beneficiary participation has become popular in international development gener-
ally, and it is an essential feature of  sustainable development. But there are diverse
definitions of  and motivations for using beneficiary participation, and empirical litera-
ture on its effects is underdeveloped. This dissertation aims to clarify what beneficiary
participation is and whether there is empirical support for claims about its benefits.
I review historical trends in international development that led to the popularity
of  both sustainable development and beneficiary participation. This review identifies
central themes in defining beneficiary participation and motivations for using it.
I also developed a new typology of  beneficiary participation based on a literature re-
view of  how scholars define beneficiary participation. I found that the main dimensions
of  beneficiary participation are (1) participants, (2) channels, (3) types of  inputs, (4) tim-
ing, and (5) goals. By making these dimensions explicit, this work helps researchers and
development practitioners more clearly describe the types of  beneficiary participation
they study, employ, and advocate for.
To contribute to empirical literature about beneficiary participation, I conducted a
case-study of  two urban development projects in Bhopal, India. I collected data with a
structured survey of  project beneficiaries in four slums (two slums from each project)
and semi-structured interviews with each project’s organizers. And project documents
provided secondary data on both projects. The results indicate that local elites did
not capture a disproportionate share of  either project’s benefits, at least with respect
to individual household toilets. Because project organizers rather than beneficiaries
selected households that would receive toilets, both cases serve as counterexamples
to the claim that beneficiaries must intensely participate for projects’ benefits to be
distributed equitably.
i
Finally, I review academic literature for empirical evidence that supports claims
about the advantages of  beneficiary participation. There is relatively strong empirical
support for the claim that beneficiary participation improves project outcomes, but em-
pirical support for most other claims (i.e., that it helps make projects more efficient,
distribute benefits equitably, and sustain project benefits) is weak. And empirical re-
search suggests that one claimed benefit, empowerment, rarely materializes. In general,
more empirical research about beneficiary participation is needed.
ii
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem Statement
The modern era of  international development began with the Bretton Woods in-
stitutions, which were created in July 1944 during the United Nations Monetary and
Financial Conference, usually called the Bretton Woods Conference (Nayyar and Court
2002). In subsequent decades, an “alphabet soup” (Easterly 2006, 25) of  development
agencies sprang into existence and into action.
In the 1970s, three criticisms of  development approaches and outcomes coalesced.
First, the earth faced serious environmental problems, and development seemed to
exacerbate them. Building and using industrial infrastructure (e.g., railways, roads, and
power generation facilities) provided jobs and encouraged economic growth but also
consumed natural resources and polluted the environment. Second, development had
failed to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor; moreover, the gap was growing
(Du Pisani 2006). Third, development projects were overly technical, expert-driven, and
top-down. This line of  criticism held that some development projects were ineffective
because intended beneficiaries did not participate in the projects that aimed to help
them. One consequence, critics argued, was projects that were poorly suited to their
local contexts (e.g., Platteau 2008). For example, even though tractors can increase
agricultural yields dramatically, poor rural farmers cannot use tractors if  fuel or repairs
are too expensive. In the 1980s, sustainable development became popular as a response
to these criticisms (Lélé 1991).
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Sustainable development aims to improve people’s ability to meet their basic needs
without damaging the environment and without discriminating against marginalized
people. Beneficiary participation is an essential feature of  sustainable development, so
the lack of  clarity about what constitutes participation and its effects are major weak-
nesses of  sustainable development (Lélé 1991). Before beneficiary participation even
entered mainstream development theory and practice, scholars were concerned that it
could not support the weight of  claims about its benefits. As early as 1980, Cohen and
Uphoff  voiced concerns that participation was becoming a “panacea” for development
problems. Since then, cautionary voices and outright criticisms have led to two diver-
gent views of  participatory approaches: (1) their popularity reflects the success of  a
new vision for international development, and (2) they legitimize the status quo, fail to
change power relationships, and, therefore, fail to address the causes of  poverty (Brock
2002).
Despite long-standing scholarly debate on the benefits of  participatory approaches,
beneficiary participation has grown in popularity, and today, it is virtually mandatory
in development projects (Mansuri and Rao 2004). But there are diverse definitions of
and motivations for using beneficiary participation (Nelson and Wright 1995; Pelling
1998; Narayan 1995; Chambers 1995), and empirical literature on its effects is under-
developed (Mansuri and Rao 2013; Pozzoni and Kumar 2005). Because a significant
amount of  money and other resources is invested in providing for beneficiary participa-
tion in development projects, determining whether it actually achieves its stated goals
is important: wasting resources does not advance sustainable development.
2
1.2 Aim and Scope
This dissertation aims to clarify what beneficiary participation is and whether there
is empirical support for claims about its benefits.
The scope is limited to international development with a particular, though not ex-
clusive, focus on sustainable development. Although beneficiary participation is an
essential feature of  sustainable development, beneficiary participation occurs in many
international development projects that can also shed light on participation’s definition
and effects. Beneficiaries refers to the people a project explicitly aims to serve. Devel-
opment projects often have indirect beneficiaries, such as the contractors who build
a given piece of  infrastructure, but indirect beneficiaries are not considered beneficia-
ries in this research project. Beneficiary participation refers to beneficiaries’ contributions
to a given development project. Chapter 3 discusses in detail what constitutes benefi-
ciary participation. The case-study presented in chapter 4 focuses on two development
projects’ efforts to improve access to sanitation. In this case-study, sanitation refers to
the “safe disposal of  human excreta” (Mara et al. 2010, 1). This definition excludes solid
waste management, which is sometimes considered to be part of  sanitation.
1.3 Overview of  the Study
There are diverse definitions of  beneficiary participation and many motivations for
employing it in development projects. The definitions and motivations are rooted in
historical trends in international development theory and practice, so chapter 2 provides
an overview of  these trends and describes how they relate to beneficiary participation
and sustainable development. The chapter explains the context of  the rise in popularity
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of  beneficiary participation and its relation to sustainable development. The chapter
also outlines general themes in definitions of  beneficiary participation and motivations
for its use. Key terms related to beneficiary participation, including empowerment and
citizen participation, are defined and delineated from beneficiary participation to clarify its
meaning in this dissertation.
Chapter 3 examines beneficiary participation in greater detail. Researchers and devel-
opment practitioners use beneficiary participation with different meanings and sometimes
do not clearly define it. I argue that researchers need a clear, comprehensive, and com-
monly held typology of  beneficiary participation, so they can compare their findings and
support or discredit claims about beneficiary participation through empirical research.
I present a new typology of  beneficiary participation, which I developed by synthesizing
existing definitions, and I show that my new typology is comprehensive by comparing
it to existing typologies.
Chapter 4 investigates one particular claim about the effect of  beneficiary
participation—that it improves the equitable distribution of  benefits—in two urban de-
velopment projects in Bhopal, India. I collected primary data with a structured survey
of  project beneficiaries in four slums (two slums from each project) and semi-structured
interviews with each project’s organizers. Project documents provided secondary data
on each project’s background, organization, implementation, and outcomes. I used my
new typology of  beneficiary participation to define how beneficiaries participated in
each project.
The case-study expands empirical research about beneficiary participation, but be-
cause it includes only two cases, it does not conclusively address even the claim it in-
vestigates. Chapter 5 reviews empirical literature about a variety of  claimed effects of
beneficiary participation and their empirical support. There is a sharp divide among
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scholars as to whether beneficiary participation helps beneficiaries. This chapter helps
explain why some scholars are so critical of  beneficiary participation while others are
positive about it. The chapter concludes with guidance on employing beneficiary par-
ticipation in development projects.
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Chapter 2
A BRIEF HISTORY OF PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND
PRACTICE
2.1 Introduction
Today, the term beneficiary participation has many definitions, and there are diverse mo-
tivations for including intended beneficiaries in development projects. The definitions
and motivations are rooted in historical trends in international development theory and
practice, so this chapter reviews the main debates about the use of  participatory ap-
proaches in development projects, not just for and against, but also why. I provide a
brief  overview of  trends in international development theories and the role of  benefi-
ciary participation in each. In doing so, this chapter glosses over tremendous diversity
in development theories and practices over the past sixty or so years. I adopt the view
expressed by Simon (1997) that there is no monolithic development project. Development
captures the activities of  organizations diverse both in type (e.g., non-governmental or-
ganizations [NGOs], aid agencies, and government agencies) and in their approaches
to development. This chapter mostly excludes the roots of  development theories, as
well. Trends in development theory tend to originate at least one or two decades before
their rise to prominence, and they usually draw on even older ideas. But this chapter
does not chronicle the historical and philosophical genealogy of  popular development
theories and practices.
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2.2 A Brief  History of  Development
In the context of  international development, development is “a process of  directed change”
(Lélé 1991, 609; emphasis original). As such, any theory of  development should define
both the goal of  development (where it is headed) and the means of  development (how
to get there). So I discuss both for each popular approach to development theory and
practice.
2.2.1 Origins of  Modern Development Theory and Practice
The modern economy emerged from European capitalism, which started in the six-
teenth century and expanded geographically through colonization (Preston 1996; Rich
1995). As capitalism spread, the field of  classical economics developed to explain the
production and consumption of  goods and their prices. One of  the themes of  classical
economics was the labor theory of  value, which held that commodities’ values were
determined by the amount of  labor needed to produce them. Neoclassical economics
emerged in the 1870s with the marginal revolution. Marginal in marginal revolution referred
to neoclassical economists’ view that marginal utility (the benefit of  incremental con-
sumption), rather than labor, determined commodity prices. Neoclassical economists,
such as Léon Walras (1834–1910), tried to develop complete models of  markets that
would explain production (supply), consumption (demand), and prices (Schabas 2001).
The Great Depression confronted economists with an unexpected situation: stagnant
economic growth combined with persistent high unemployment in competitive market
economies (Skidelsky 2001). By World War II, geographic expansion was no longer the
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main driver of, or barrier to, economic growth (Escobar 1995). This chapter focuses on
post-World War II development thinking, called modern development or simply development.
The end of  colonialism played a large role in shaping modern development. Follow-
ing World War II, characterizations of  former colonies, at least by those in the industrial-
ized West, shifted away from racial inferiority and toward poverty: “The West exchanged
the old racist coinage for a new currency. ‘Uncivilized’ became ‘underdeveloped.’ ‘Sav-
age peoples’ became the ‘third world’ ” (Easterly 2006, 24). The new discourse held
that former colonies needed to raise their standards of  living through modernization
and industrialization just as wealthy, Western nations had (Escobar 1995; Porter and
Sheppard 2009). Economic instability was seen as a major cause of  World War II, so
modern development also aimed to maintain post-war peace through global economic
stability and prosperity (Leys 2005). Modern development also served the economic
and geopolitical interests of  World War II’s Western victors in former colonies: supply-
ing Western economies with raw materials, opening markets for Western goods, and
preventing the spread of  Communism (Harris 2001; Escobar 1995).
John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) was particularly influential in early theories of
modern development (Leys 2005). He was a British economist, who more or less in-
vented one of  the two main branches of  economics, macroeconomics, which investi-
gates the behavior of  economies as a whole. And he is regarded by many as “the most
influential economist of  the twentieth century” (Skidelsky 2001, 8082).
Keynes’s neoclassical contemporaries held that competitive market economies
would naturally move to full employment. To increase employment, policymakers
needed to make markets more competitive by, for example, reducing the cost of  la-
bor. Keynes believed that even perfectly competitive markets could have unemploy-
ment when private investment was insufficient to generate demand for labor; therefore,
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government intervention (specifically government spending) was necessary to maintain
full employment (Skidelsky 2001).
Keynes’s ideas were also influential in the Bretton Woods agreement of  1944. Dur-
ing the conference to negotiate the agreement, World War II seemed to be turning in
favor of  the Allies (Steil 2013). The Bretton Woods agreement aimed to maintain the
anticipated peace through economic growth and full employment (Nayyar and Court
2002). The means to achieve these aims were an international system of  economic co-
operation that inhibited countries from manipulating their economies (especially their
exchange rates) to win trade gains at the expense of  other countries. This new sys-
tem of  economic cooperation would avert new military conflicts by prohibiting the
kind of  economic warfare that countries had employed in the run-up to World War II
(Steil 2013). At the same time, the Bretton Woods agreement facilitated national gov-
ernments’ managing their own economies: “Capital was not allowed to cross frontiers
without government approval, which permitted governments to determine domestic in-
terest rates, fix the exchange rate of  the national currency [within limits, as noted above],
and tax and spend as they saw fit to secure national economic objectives” (Leys 2005,
110).
Other significant influences on modern development included the Marshall Plan
and Truman’s Point Four Program. The Marshall Plan (1948–1951) was a massive US
aid package to help Europe with its flagging post-war economies, stave off  the Soviet
Union from making inroads in Europe, and dampen Europeans’ interest in electing
their own Communists to power. The plan and related programs, such as the Mu-
tual Defense Assistance Act and the Mutual Security Act, helped to stabilize European
economies and to prevent the spread of  Communism in Western Europe. The Marshall
Plan’s success was seen as evidence that foreign aid could promote economic growth
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and prevent the spread of  Communism. Truman’s Point Four Program (which Pres-
ident Truman first proposed in the fourth point of  his inauguration speech in 1949)
aimed to achieve the same goals as the Marshall Plan’s but in developing countries. The
Marshall Plan and the Point Four Program were formative events in using foreign aid to
achieve economic development in developing countries (Kunz 1997; Lancaster 2008).
In subsequent decades, a plethora of  agencies—what Easterly has called “an alphabet
soup of  agencies” (2006, 25)—would be created to manage foreign aid to developing
countries.
The Harrod-Domar model served as one of  the key justifications in economic theory
for foreign aid as economic stimulus. The model held that, “GDP growth will be proportional
to the share of  investment spending in GDP” (Easterly 2001, 29; emphasis original). In other
words, the overall level of  investment in national economies could be used to control
macroeconomic growth rates, like turning the volume up or down on a stereo. The
Cold War and fears of  the spread of  Communism served as key political justifications for
Western nations to send foreign aid to developing countries. Foreign aid for investment
in developing countries was seen as a way to keep developing countries on capitalist
development paths. Unfortunately, the Harrod-Domar model used assumptions based
on economic conditions in the US after the Great Depression—assumptions which
did not hold in the developing countries where the model was widely applied. More
importantly, the model aimed to explain short-term economic growth, but it was used
to plan long-term economic growth. Even though one of  the authors of  the model,
Evsey Domar, retracted it eleven years after publishing his version of  it, the model
continued to be widely used (Easterly 2001, 1999).
The initial decades of  development were essentially Keynesian: national govern-
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ments used macroeconomic policy to achieve macroeconomic growth (Leys 2005).
Nation-states were both the objects and agents of  development (Mitchell 2002).
2.2.2 Modernization Theory
Modernization theory was also popular in the initial decades of  modern develop-
ment. Modernization theorists, such as Walt Rostow, believed that development oc-
curred on a linear path. The path to progress was clear because (rich) Western nations
had already walked it: economic growth through industrialization (Leys 2005). But dif-
ferent modernization theorists characterized the obstacles to modernization (and devel-
opment) differently. Some emphasized economic conditions, such as a lack of  capital in
developing countries, which could be overcome through foreign aid (Rapley 2002; East-
erly 2001). Others focused on values and institutions. A lack of  modern (i.e., Western
Enlightenment) institutions and values, especially rational decision-making and increas-
ing production and consumption through industrialization and free markets, was what
prevented some countries from developing quickly (Rich 1995; Leys 2005; Du Pisani
2006). The solution was to remove cultural obstacles that seemed to prevent develop-
ing countries from following in the footsteps of  Western nations. The goal was still
economic growth, but the means was no longer government intervention. Instead, the
means was disseminating modern values through education of  and technology transfer
to elites in developing countries (Leys 2005). Modernization theorists viewed technol-
ogy as having special power in the modernizing process: “Technology was theorized as
a sort of  moral force that would operate by creating an ethics of  innovation, yield, and
result” (Escobar 1995, 36). It was as if  technology acted as its own missionary.
Modernization theorists, whether they emphasized economic obstacles or cultural
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ones, also had an ideological bias toward capitalism and against Communism. Countries
should not only industrialize but their economies should also be capitalist rather than
Communist (Rapley 2002).
By the start of  the 1970s, and despite lackluster growth in certain countries, the world
as a whole had enjoyed roughly two decades of  sustained economic growth. Most peo-
ple attributed this remarkable period of  growth to Keynesian economic policies—both
stabilization policies within countries and cooperative arrangements, such as the Bret-
ton Woods system, among countries (Skidelsky 2001). But stagflation—high inflation
accompanied by a slowdown in economic growth and high unemployment—replaced
widespread economic growth during the 1970s. At the same time, economists such as
Milton Friedman landed successful attacks on Keynesian economic theory, and Keyne-
sianism fell out of  favor (Salais 2001). Two new development theories became promi-
nent: left-leaning dependency theory and right-leaning neo-liberalism.
2.2.3 Dependency Theory
Dependency theorists argued that the relationship between rich, developed nations
and poor, developing nations was fundamentally exploitative (Du Pisani 2006; Valen-
zuela and Valenzuela 1978; Kaufman, Chernotsky, and Geller 1975; Frank 1971). Na-
tions were either at the core or on the periphery. Nations at the core structured (capitalist)
economic relationships to extract resources from countries on the periphery and, in
doing so, prevented countries on the periphery from developing (Wise 2001b). Depen-
dency theorists still aimed for macroeconomic growth, but the means was termination
of  developing countries’ relationships with wealthy capitalist countries. Striking out on
their own, developing countries could pursue a more effective socialist agenda with gov-
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ernment control of  key industries (Du Pisani 2006). Dependency theory became more
and more popular during the 1960s and peaked in popularity in the 1970s (Leys 2005).
2.2.4 Neo-liberalism
Neo-liberalism became popular during the 1970s and was the main development
paradigm in the 1980s. Where Keynesians and dependency theorists argued for the
benefits of  government intervention, neo-liberals argued that government intervention
was harmful because it distorted prices and reduced market efficiency. Neo-liberals
recommended that developing countries increase exports and encourage foreign invest-
ment by reducing trade barriers and softening labor regulations (Todaro and Smith 2009;
Harris 2001; Gallagher 2001).
The global economic downturn in the 1970s left many developing countries in need
of  loans to keep their central governments afloat, and a debt crisis emerged in many
developing countries in the early 1980s. The International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank made loans on the condition that countries adopted neo-liberal reforms.
This strategy was called structural adjustment (Harris 2001). Structural adjustment pro-
grams “usually included such elements as fiscal austerity and disinflationary policies, the
privatization of  state-owned enterprises, trade liberalization, currency devaluation, and
the general deregulation of  the economy, including financial and labor-market deregula-
tion” (Rapley 2002, 66). Structural adjustment programs were successful at stabilizing
many developing countries’ economies (Gallagher 2001), though there were few suc-
cesses in Africa (Rapley 2002). But the benefits of  structural adjustment often failed to
reach—or even worsened economic conditions for—the poorest of  the poor in devel-
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oping countries (Reed 1996). And residents in many developing countries responded
to structural adjustment programs with protests and riots (Rapley 2002).
2.2.5 Sustainable Development
2.2.5.1 Origins of  Sustainable Development
A common assumption among economists, including neo-liberal economists, was
that macroeconomic growth could and should continue indefinitely. Forebears of  sus-
tainable development1 disagreed and argued that there are limits to growth. In The Lim-
its to Growth (1972), Donella Meadows and her co-authors made an essentially Malthu-
sian2 argument: humanity’s exponential population growth could eventually exhaust the
world’s finite natural resources and with them the potential for economic growth (not to
mention the grim ramifications for humanity). In contrast, neo-liberals believed that hu-
man ingenuity, especially via innovative technology, would allow humans to use natural
resources more efficiently and to develop substitutes for resources that became scarce
(Munda 1997). Meadows’s work was informed by writings from the 1960s which made
1The origin of  the term sustainable development is unclear. The word sustainable was adopted from
ecology, where it referred to stable ecological systems. Du Pisani (2006, 91) writes, “At the start of  the
1970s the term ‘sustainable development’ was coined, probably by Barbara Ward (Lady Jackson), founder
of  the International Institute for Environment and Development,” a non-profit research institute.
2Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834) was a British scholar who wrote most famously about the
conflict between the increasing demands of  growing human populations and limited supplies of  natural
resources. Subsequent writers often summarized his main argument as follows: there is an inevitable
conflict between people and natural resources because population grows at an exponential rate while the
“means of  subsistence” (e.g., food production) grows at a linear rate. Subsequent writers often imagined
this conflict would lead to tragic, sometimes apocalyptic, scenarios wherein humanity is unable to feed
itself. However, Malthus himself  did not think that population had to grow exponentially, and he thought
the means of  subsistence could increase much more rapidly than it did at the time (Dupâquier, Smelser,
and Baltes 2001). Malthusian refers to the way people use Malthus’s ideas more than Malthus’s own ideas,
just as Keynesian refers to the way people use Keynes’s.
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clear that human activities were causing significant environmental impacts. One particu-
larly significant work was Rachel Carson’s 1962 book, Silent Spring, on the environmental
effects of  pesticides (Simon 1997). In Silent Spring, Carson used graceful prose to make
a scientifically informed argument that excessive pesticide use was harming people and
animals, especially birds, which (along with their birdsong) were disappearing from the
American landscape.
Throughout the 1970s, the discourse about sustainable development coalesced and
was bolstered, at least in the United States, by environmental disasters, such as illegal
dumping at the Love Canal. In developing countries, concerns about environmental
pollution were raised by citizens and international organizations (Leonard and Morell
1981).
The environmental problems that engendered these concerns were rooted in the
industrial mode of  production that characterized development in the 1950s and 1960s.
This mode not only created significant environmental problems but also failed to close
the gap between the rich and the poor within and among countries. Dependency theo-
rists, in particular, wanted to show that capitalist forms of  development, such as those
advocated by modernization theorists, had not actually improved the economic well-
being of  poor countries or poor people (Berry, Bourguignon, and Morrison 1983; Adel-
man 1975). In doing so, they brought equity to the fore of  the development agenda
(Adelman and Robinson 1989).
The development agenda changed, as well. The development theories described
above (i.e., modernization theory, dependency theory, and neo-liberalism) had eco-
nomic growth as their ultimate goal. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, two new
definitions of  the goal of  development gained popularity: (1) to meet people’s basic
needs and (2) to expand people’s capabilities (Wise 2001a).
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2.2.5.2 Basic Needs Approach
The basic needs approach (sometimes called the basic human needs approach) emerged
in the early 1970s and became well-known by the end of  the decade (Hoadley 1981).
Advocates of  the basic needs approach were concerned that poor people in developing
countries were missing out on the benefits of  development and argued that development
programs needed to focus on meeting poor people’s basic needs. Basic needs refers to
essentials, such as food, housing, education, health care, water supply, and sanitation.
Paul Streeten and Mahbub ul Haq, both economists at the World Bank, maintained
that meeting people’s basic needs would improve their well-being, an end in itself, and
support long-term economic growth (Streeten et al. 1981; Wise 2001a).
2.2.5.3 Capability Approach
The capability approach defined the goal of  development differently. Amartya Sen,
an Indian economist, introduced the framework that would later be called the capability
approach in his 1981 book on the causes of  famine, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on En-
titlement and Deprivation. The end goal under the capability approach is greater individual
freedom, people’s ability to pursue their version of  the good life. Capabilities are the op-
tions that a person has, and achieved functionings are actualized capabilities. For example,
mobility is a capability; it is the degree to which people can go where they wish. Riding
a bicycle to the store represents an achieved functioning, a particular instance of  using
a capability to achieve something of  value. Income is one of  several means to greater
capabilities, rather than an end in itself. A bicycle could be purchased with money or ob-
tained through bartering, for example (Robeyns 2005, 2011). The capability approach
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would ask “whether people are being healthy [an achieved functioning], and whether
the means or resources necessary for this capability are present, such as clean water, ac-
cess to doctors, protection from infections and diseases, and basic knowledge on health
issues” (Robeyns 2005, 95-96; emphasis added).
The capability approach differs from the basic needs approach in that the capability
approach does not assume that all people necessarily want to meet all their basic needs
(achieved functionings) at all times. It is more important that people have the ability to
do so. For example, a person may have sufficient access to food but go on a hunger
strike as a political protest. This person is not meeting a basic need but freely chooses
not to do so in order to achieve something he or she values more (Robeyns 2011).
2.2.5.4 Our Common Future
Sustainable development incorporated the shifts in development thinking that oc-
curred during the 1970s and 1980s, namely, that development caused environmental
damage, that it failed to close the gap between the rich and the poor (Du Pisani 2006),
and that it needed to focus more on people’s basic needs and their ability to choose.
These themes are apparent in a landmark of  sustainable development, Our Common Fu-
ture, which was published in 1987 by the UN’s World Commission on Environment and
Development (WCED). 3
3The UN General Assembly passed a resolution to create the commission in the fall of  1983, and
the commission first met in the fall of  1984. The commission’s mandate was to “re-examine the critical
environment and development issues and to formulate realistic proposals for dealing with them” (WCED
1987, 3) along with ways for countries to cooperatively address the issues. The commission’s chairperson
was Gro Harlem Brundtland, a Norwegian diplomat, whose name would become synonymous with
the commission’s final report. (Writers often refer to Our Common Future as “the Brundtland report.”)
The remaining twenty-two members came in relatively equal proportion from developed and developing
countries.
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The commission defines the goal of  development as “the satisfaction of  human
needs and aspirations” (WCED 1987, 43). These goals can be traced back to the basic
needs approach and the capability approach. The commission valued economic growth
as a means to achieve basic needs and greater freedom. It recognized that the activities
that fuel economic growth necessarily involve extracting natural resources and pollution.
But reducing environmental damage is the main theme of  the commission’s canonical
definition of  sustainable development: “Sustainable development is development that
meets the needs of  the present without compromising the ability of  future generations
to meet their own needs” (43). That is, development should neither consume so many
natural resources nor pollute the environment so extensively that future generations
cannot attain the goals of  development. Finally, the commission explicitly makes equity
a criterion of  sustainable development: “Even the narrow notion of  physical sustainabil-
ity implies a concern for social equity between generations, a concern that must logically
be extended to equity within each generation” (43).
After providing its definition of  the goals of  development in general and sustainable
development in particular, Our Common Future proceeds to recommend ways to achieve
them. Economic growth is a means for helping people meet their basic needs and
increase their freedom to choose, but it should be environmentally friendly, and the
benefits should be equitably distributed. The authors note that excessive population
growth could be a hindrance to achieving sustainable development goals. The com-
mission writes, “Excessive population growth diffuses the fruits of  development over
increasing numbers instead of  improving living standards in many developing countries”
(105). Instead of  arguing for heavy-handed approaches to population growth, the au-
thors call for family-planning services that make it possible for people to choose the size
of  their families. The authors also acknowledge that even though population growth
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is faster in developing countries, per capita consumption is much higher in developed
countries. They also discuss obstacles to and strategies for sustainable development in
several sectors, including cities, agriculture, and energy production and consumption.
Their recommended strategies were shaped by their mandate, which explicitly asked the
commission to recommend ways for countries to cooperatively address obstacles to de-
velopment. The authors also view obstacles as crossing traditional sectoral boundaries
and national boundaries:
One important rigidity is the tendency to deal with one industry or sector in
isolation, failing to recognize the importance of  intersectoral linkages. …
These intersectoral connections create patterns of  economic and ecological
interdependence rarely reflected in the ways in which policy is made. Sec-
toral organizations tend to pursue sectoral objectives and to treat their im-
pacts on other sectors as side effects, taken into account only if  compelled to
do so. … Sustainability requires the enforcement of  wider responsibilities
for the impacts of  decisions. (63)
So most recommendations call for new policies, cooperation among sectors of  activity,
international cooperation (e.g., through the UN), and research.
2.2.5.5 Criticisms
Sustainable development is generally seen as ambiguous. Some even call it a contra-
diction in terms (Du Pisani 2006; Lélé 1991). One of  the central tensions in sustainable
development is the conflict between environmental conservation and human activities
that increase economic growth (e.g., natural resource extraction). Environmentalists
and industrialists can both claim that sustainable development aligns with their own in-
terests and values. Du Pisani (2006) argues that the term is actually a false compromise,
satisfying no one and putting off  genuine debate between two opposing positions. But
others see the term’s ambiguity as an asset. Kates et al. write that “sustainable develop-
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ment draws much of  its resonance, power, and creativity from its very ambiguity” (2005,
20). They argue that the term’s flexibility is appropriate given the diverse contexts in
which it is applied and that it encourages diverse interest groups to work together.
A careful reading of Our Common Future resolves some of  the ambiguity. For exam-
ple, the authors make clear that meeting basic human needs and increasing capabilities
(not economic growth) should be the goals of  development. Our Common Future also
prioritizes human interests over environmental ones. Environmental degradation is a
concern because it might inhibit current and future generations from meeting their basic
needs (Hopwood, Mellor, and O’Brien 2005).
Perhaps, the problem with sustainable development is that it is not by itself  a de-
velopment theory. The development theories described above (modernization theory,
dependency theory, and neo-liberalism) were rooted in social (especially economic) the-
ories. They were able to more comprehensively and coherently address development
and how to achieve it, even if  their critics argued they were unsuccessful. Sustainable
development is more a statement of  priorities—or problems depending on one’s per-
spective. It highlights significant development issues in 1960s and 1970s, specifically
that the benefits of  development often failed to reach the poorest of  the poor and that
development often led to significant environmental problems. It should be no surprise,
then, that sustainable development is ambiguous and underspecified in comparison to
other development theories. But Our Common Future succeeded in highlighting the is-
sues of  equity and environmental impact and in arguing that development would have
to address them together.
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2.2.6 Post- Theories of  Development
The 1990s saw a rise in post- theories of  development: postmodernism, poststruc-
turalism, and postcolonialism (Simon 1997). Post-development theorists share depen-
dency theorists’ dim view of  the benefits of  development, but they go quite a bit further
and question “the whole concept of  development itself ” (Rapley 2007, 4). Two popular
lines of  criticism are that (1) development applies universal solutions to problems in
diverse settings and that (2) development is actually harmful in some way (e.g., [2a] it
is a way for governments or other powers to control people rather than help them, or
[2b] it overrides local cultures and therefore harms local people). It would be difficult to
state the general aim or means of  a movement that strongly criticizes general statements,
and therein lies the biggest weakness of  post-development theories. They are strongly
critical of  other approaches but provide little guidance on better alternatives (Simon
1997). Some post-development theorists advocate for people determining their own
paths forward and call for bottom-up, as opposed to top-down, approaches (Rapley
2007). For example, Arturo Escobar, a well-known poststructuralist, writes that there
are no universal solutions, but a good place to start looking is in grassroots movements
and “concrete local settings” (1995, 223).
2.2.7 Cross-Cutting Themes
Development theories vary according to their underlying theories of  justice. One of
the most significant themes in theories of  justice is whether they take individual liberty,
equality, or a mix of  the two as the highest political ideal. According to libertarians, lib-
erty is the highest political ideal: “Every human being has the right to act in accordance
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with his own choices, unless those actions infringe on the equal liberty of  other human
beings to act in accordance with their choices” (Hospers 2003, 22). Several rights are
derived from liberty, including the rights to life, property, and free speech. Many liber-
tarians disdain government, some arguing that all forms of  government violate people’s
rights and should be abolished. One libertarian writes, “Government is the most dan-
gerous institution known to man” (26). But if  there is a role for the government, it
is to retaliate against people who violate others’ rights. Governments certainly should
not collect taxes, which are seen as violations of  property rights because people must
pay them whether they want to or not. It follows that welfare programs, including
those funded by foreign aid, also violate libertarian justice. People who need help can
ask for it, but no one is obligated to help them (Narveson 2003). Many libertarians
maintain that if  the role of  government were reduced, economies would be much more
productive, reducing or eliminating the need for welfare programs.
For socialists, equality is the highest political ideal. Socialist justice, as articulated
by Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), called for the “abolition
of  private property” (Marx and Engels 1969, 22) or, more accurately, the abolition of
private capital. Socialists see capitalism as a unjust economic system—one that exploits
one class of  people, the working class (also called the proletariat), for the benefit of
another, the bourgeois. Capitalism leads to societies in which a small minority benefits
a great deal from the hard labor of  the majority. Feminists also consider equality to be
the highest political ideal, although feminism pivots on gender rather than class (Okin
1989). And as feminists call for an end to male-gendered domination, some environ-
mentalist theories of  justice4 call for an end to human-species domination (Singer 1975).
4Environmental justice often refers to theories of  justice that deal with the distribution of  environmental
goods and bads among people, especially according to ethnicity and socioeconomic status. A common
empirical finding is that poor people are disproportionately affected by environmental bads like pollution
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Theories of  justice that value equality (e.g., socialist, feminist, and environmentalist jus-
tice) essentially ask and answer the question, “Who counts?” That is, to whom does
the theory of  justice (and its corresponding rights and duties) extend? For socialists, the
answer is the working class. For feminists, it is women, and for environmentalists, it is
species other than human (Sterba 2003).
Some theories of  justice, such as utilitarianism, combine liberty and equality. Utili-
tarianism seeks to maximize a society’s utility, the aggregate satisfaction of  its individual
members. That which is just maximizes social utility (Sterba 2003). Some utilitarians,
such as R. M. Hare, argue that utilitarianism supports redistribution of  wealth from the
rich to the poor because, in terms of  utility, the rich lose less than the poor gain from
such redistributions (Hare 1978). Utilitarianism is closely tied to neoclassical economics,
though consumption (e.g., in dollar terms) substitutes for utility in many economists’
quantitative analyses (Robeyns 2005; Harris 2001).
Turning back to development theories, dependency theorists applied arguments sim-
ilar to Marx and Engels’s. Just as Marx and Engels argued that capitalism was an unjust
economic system in mid-nineteenth century Europe, dependency theorists argued that
capitalism was an unjust economic system the world over in the 1960s and 1970s (Frank
1971). Neo-liberals, being mostly neoclassical economists, typically subscribed to some
form of  utilitarianism. Sustainable development, at least as defined in Our Common Fu-
ture, is clearly not based on libertarian justice because it calls for “equity within each
generation” (WCED 1987, 43). But it values some degree of  liberty because one of  the
goals of  development is improving people’s ability to satisfy their aspirations. Therefore,
the theory of  justice underlying sustainable development consists of  a combination of
(Agyeman, Bullard, and Evans 2003). Environmental justice is usually concerned with rights and duties
of  people, whereas the theory mentioned above deals with the rights and duties of  humans and other
species.
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liberty and equality, but its details are unclear. In terms of  equality, sustainable devel-
opment is novel for its inclusion of  future generations in who counts.
Post-development theorists are likely to believe “the justification for rights and du-
ties is local and limited” (Sterba 2003, 3), meaning no particular conception of  justice
is universal.
Development theories also differ according to their stance on the role of  nation-
states. Under Keynesian development, nation-states implemented development
through macroeconomic policies. Nation-states also had a large role under mod-
ernization theory. Under neo-liberalism, nation-states’ role shifted away from planning
and toward creating and protecting institutions that support capitalism (e.g., property
rights). Fueled by the free movement of  capital within and between countries, markets
rather than nation-states were the engines of  development (Harvey 2005). Sustainable
development, at least the version formulated by the WCED, expected nation-states to
play a strong role but not to the exclusion of  private industry. Nation-states would need
to implement policies that would protect the environment and ensure equitable distri-
bution of  the benefits of  development, but industry was a driver of  economic growth,
which was also important for development. Also, nation-states needed to manage the
cooperative arrangements within their own government agencies and between their
own nation and other countries. But under subsequent post-development theories,
nation-states were seen as agents of  traditional development, so their role needed to be
severely restricted.
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2.3 A Brief  History of  Beneficiary Participation in Development
In this section, I describe whether and why each development theory in the previ-
ous section advocated for beneficiary participation. Before doing so, it is important
to distinguish between two types of  participation: citizen participation and beneficiary
participation. Beneficiary participation includes direct beneficiaries of  a given project in
at least part of  the project. For example, in a participatory water project, beneficiaries
might decide where to locate new standpipes (Manikutty 1997). Citizen participation
refers to residents’ participation in democratic processes, especially policymaking and
policy implementation (Pozzoni and Kumar 2005). This dissertation focuses on bene-
ficiary participation, but the two types of  participation are related. Both call for people
to have larger roles in shaping the policies and programs that affect them.
2.3.1 Beneficiary Participation in Keynesian Development Theory
Beneficiary participation was not prominent in early State-led theories of  develop-
ment, such as those influenced by Keynes, because the means of  development was each
State’s control of  its economy. To the extent that participation was a concern, develop-
ment scholars talked about political participation. Political participation usually referred
to participation in democratic institutions, such as elections.
2.3.2 Beneficiary Participation in Modernization Theory
Modernization theorists saw democracy and wider political participation as an effect
of  development rather than a cause. They believed that development occurred on a
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rather set path from a low level of  industrialization to a high one. Democracy was not
so important in the early stages of  development because the later stages naturally led
to democracy. Actually, some modernization theorists saw democracy as an obstacle to
development in its early stages and dictatorships as necessary—as long as they were not
Communist dictatorships (Przeworski 2000).
In subsequent decades, critics characterized modernization theory as having a nar-
row view of  beneficiaries’ role in development. Under modernization theory, devel-
opment professionals focused on transferring technology to developing countries and
building infrastructure. They often designed and implemented projects without a great
deal of  interaction with the people meant to benefit from them (Chambers 1995). Par-
ticipation often meant “participation in implementation of  a project, amounting to the
acceptance and efficient use of  transferred resources and new technology” (Lane 1995,
185). That is, beneficiaries’ role was to receive knowledge and technology from devel-
oped countries.
2.3.3 Beneficiary Participation in Dependency Theory
For dependency theorists, participation usually referred to the participation of  develop-
ing countries in a global capitalist system that exploited them. Dependency theorists did
not see people in developing countries as beneficiaries of  development because develop-
ment was not beneficial to most of  them. If  residents in developing countries had a role
to play, it was through socialist revolutions that would weaken or sever the exploitive
relationship between developed and developing countries (Randal and Theobald 1985).
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2.3.4 Proliferation of  Citizen Participation
In the 1960s and 1970s, there were movements for greater citizen participation in
several Western countries, such as Great Britain, which influenced their international
development policies (Nelson and Wright 1995). In the US, the Foreign Assistance Act
(enacted in 1961) guides international development policy, and a 1966 amendment called
for greater citizen participation in US-funded development projects (Finsterbusch and
Van Wicklin 1987; Cohen and Uphoff 1980).
Early State-led models of  development assumed that politicians in developing coun-
tries represented citizens’ interests. Nation-states were suitable agents for development
because they acted in the interest of  its citizens, but this was an unsupported assump-
tion. Political power tended to concentrate with elites who often used it for personal
gain (Rapley 2002).
The motivation to advocate for greater citizen participation is commitment to demo-
cratic principles and institutions. Advocates of  citizen participation believe that all peo-
ple, whatever their socioeconomic status, should have a voice in political processes
that affect them, through democratic institutions. Phrased another way, governments
should be accountable to their citizens (Arnstein 1969; Pozzoni and Kumar 2005; Nel-
son and Wright 1995).
2.3.5 Proliferation of  Beneficiary Participation
Motivations to advocate for beneficiary participation are considerably more diverse
than those for citizen participation. Development theory before the 1970s emphasized
the role of  nation-states. Today, authors would describe this form of  development as
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“top-down.” In the early 1970s, development scholars began to criticize the top-down
planning model of  development for a variety of  reasons. Some planners were foreigners
working in a foreign language, often English. As a result, foreigners rather than nationals
set the development agenda, and many residents were unable to voice their opinions
because they did not have access to planners and could not have communicated with
them if  they had been able to get access (Stein 2008). Planners also had a narrow focus
on economic growth as the main indicator and goal of  development. Even though
planners at the time might have disagreed, the designation of  economic growth as the
goal of  development is not an objective decision (Seers 1972). Often, planners did not
have enough information about the priorities of  developing countries’ politicians, so
planners could not develop strategies based on politicians’ explicit priorities (Roemer
1976). And planners did not know enough about local conditions to design effective
projects. Finally, development projects funded with foreign aid had to fit the preferences
of  their foreign funders, which did not necessarily align with the preferences of  intended
beneficiaries (Easterly 2006).
The concerns underpinning these criticisms of  the planning model of  development
stem from pluralism, at least in the sense of  values and epistemology. Epistemologi-
cal pluralism refers to the position that different ways of  knowing can be equally valid,
and value pluralism refers to the position that different sets of  values can be equally
valid. Some scholars believed that development, viz. modernization, inevitably harmed
indigenous people because it supplanted their traditional institutions, epistemologies,
and values with modern ones (Goulet 1981). Such a criticism is more persuasive if  tra-
ditional epistemologies and values are deemed to be as valid as modern ones. Pluralism
also underpins democracy and consequently calls for citizen participation.
The desire to empower beneficiaries is another motivation to advocate for benefi-
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ciary participation, but the definition of  empowerment depends on one’s definition of
power. There are two main ways that power is conceptualized with respect to empow-
erment (Nelson and Wright 1995; Allen 2011; Rowlands 1995):
1. Power-to: Empowerment refers to increasing a person’s power to affect the world
to achieve his or her ends. Increasing a person’s power-to is like increasing his or
her capabilities. A person’s power-to does not trade off  against another person’s
power-to; it can grow indefinitely.
2. Power-over : Empowerment refers to increasing a person’s or group’s political power
over others. In this conceptualization, power is a zero-sum game where one per-
son’s or group’s power trades off  against another’s.
In the above definitions of  power, people can gain and exercise power, but in a third
definition of  power, they cannot. Instead, power is a property of  social systems, in-
cluding institutions, events, culture, and economics, and it functions by “systematically
structuring the possibilities for action” (Allen 2011). The social system as a whole deter-
mines the distribution of  power within the system and limits individuals’ capabilities, but
power is not held or exercised by individuals (Nelson and Wright 1995; Rowlands 1995).
Scholars typically adopt the first definition of  empowerment, the second definition, or
a hybrid of  both as exemplified in the following: empowerment is “the expansion of  as-
sets and capabilities of  poor people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control,
and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives” (Narayan-Parker 2005, 5).
Empowerment as a goal of  beneficiary participation stems mainly from two sources
active in the 1960s and 1970s: Paulo Freire, a Brazilian educator, and the feminist move-
ment. Both aimed to break people’s subjugation (a product of  power-over relation-
ships) and increase people’s power-to through empowerment processes. In his most
29
well-known work, Pedagogy of  the Oppressed (first published in 1970), Freire described a
world inhabited by oppressors and the oppressed, investigated the nature of  their re-
lationship to each other, and then proposed ways to end the oppressive nature of  the
relationship. Through prescription, oppressors impose their choices and consciousness
on the oppressed. The oppressed are initially unaware of  their oppression and their
ability to change their situation but eventually recognize their situation and commit to
changing it. Liberation is a process of  recognizing limit-situations as obstacles rather than
as insurmountable barriers and confronting them. According to Freire, who worked in
adult literacy programs, the means of  liberation is education and dialogue. Freire argues
against the conventional “banking concept of  education” (2000, 72), where knowledge
is static and “a gift bestowed” (2000, 72) on the students by the teacher. In contrast, ed-
ucation for liberation is “problem-posing education” (2000, 79). It consists of  careful
reflection on consciousness itself  using concrete, meaningful experiences of  the stu-
dents. Similarly, true dialogue is not depositing ideas into another person; rather, it is
an unconstrained discussion of  the world.
The empowerment process described by feminists was similar: “Empowerment
must involve undoing negative social constructions, so that the people affected come
to see themselves as having the capacity and the right to act and have influence” (Row-
lands 1995, 102-103). Feminists also saw empowerment as both ending oppressive
power-over relationships and increasing individuals’ power-to. And like Freire, femi-
nists held that empowerment could not be a top-down process. Top-down processes
are prescriptive and do not lead to self-sufficiency; people who are dependent on others
continue to depend on others.
Empowerment was one justification for beneficiary participation, but some develop-
ment scholars made pragmatic arguments for greater beneficiary participation. They be-
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lieved, for instance, that beneficiary participation increases beneficiaries’ commitment
to development projects and helps sustain the benefits5 of  development projects (Fin-
sterbusch and Van Wicklin 1987).
Over time, the top-down model of  development planning shifted to become more
bottom-up, which meant a smaller role for nation-states and less central planning. (This
shift coincided with the shift from economic growth as the goal of  development to ba-
sic human needs and greater capabilities as the goals of  development.) Two modes
of  bottom-up development emerged (Stein 2008). One advocated different kinds of
planning, and the other advocated little, if  any, planning. The first mode of  bottom-up
development includes citizen participation, beneficiary participation, and decentralization.
Decentralization is “the devolution of  political decision-making power to local-level,
small-scale entities” (Bardhan 2002, 186). That is, policymaking moves away from
larger, central agencies and toward smaller, local entities. Decentralization is not en-
tirely synonymous with citizen participation because in citizen participation, citizens
are policymakers; in decentralization, local government agencies are policymakers. The
second mode of  bottom-up development is neo-liberalism, which aims to let markets
drive development (Stein 2008).
2.3.6 Beneficiary Participation in Sustainable Development
Our Common Future calls more for citizen participation than beneficiary participation,
but calls for both are present. Its list of  sustainable development principles includes
the following one: “a political system that ensures effective citizen participation in deci-
5Authors of  monitoring and evaluation literature usually use sustainability in its literal sense to mean
the degree to which the benefits of  a project are sustained over time. Because sustainability has a different
meaning in the context of  sustainable development, I use the term sustained benefits instead.
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sion making” (WCED 1987, 65). A significant motive for citizen participation is greater
equity: “Equity would be aided by political systems that secure effective citizen partici-
pation in decision making and by greater democracy in international decision making”
(8). The authors call for beneficiary participation in projects that manage natural re-
sources because beneficiary participation adapts projects to local conditions and, con-
sequently, makes them more successful. On natural resource management in general,
the authors write, “Experience has shown that the most effective efforts of  this type
are small projects with maximum grass-roots participation” (77). And on strategies for
managing wood supplies in rural areas, they write that people “will have to work out
local solutions” (191). The authors also see citizen participation and beneficiary partic-
ipation as ways to improve accountability in resource-management projects. And the
authors see citizen participation and beneficiary participation as ways to reduce costs in
urban development projects.
Since Our Common Future, participation has become entrenched in sustainable devel-
opment, and development scholars and practitioners have continued to advocate for
beneficiary participation in sustainable development projects. As beneficiary participa-
tion became more popular in the 1980s, many development scholars and professionals
began to identify its historical absence as a reason for slow progress in international
development (Nelson and Wright 1995; Sharp 1992). By the early 1990s, influential de-
velopment agencies, such as the World Bank, were requiring and studying participatory
approaches (Nelson and Wright 1995). And by the early 2000s, participatory approaches
were ensconced in the mainstream of  development theory and practice (Mansuri and
Rao 2004). The rise in popularity of  participatory approaches has coincided with a
rise in other bottom-up development strategies, including micro-finance and self-help
groups (Banerjee and Duflo 2011).
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2.3.7 Beneficiary Participation in Post- Theories of  Development
For post-development theorists, grassroots movements are the means of  develop-
ment. Beneficiary participation is an awkward term in this context because it suggests that
beneficiaries participate in another organization’s project. Post-development theorists
see people as conceiving and implementing projects completely on their own (e.g.,
Escobar 1995).
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter explained the context in which beneficiary participation came to be so
popular in international development. I have also defined terms related to beneficiary
participation, including empowerment, citizen participation, and decentralization. Distinguishing
between these terms helps clarify what is meant by beneficiary participation. The next
chapter extends this effort and investigates the definition of  beneficiary participation in
greater detail.
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Chapter 3
A NEW TYPOLOGY OF BENEFICIARY PARTICIPATION IN
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
3.1 Introduction
Development professionals need to know the effects of  beneficiary participation
because significant resources are invested in including beneficiaries in development
projects. I argue that researchers need a comprehensive, commonly agreed-upon ty-
pology of  beneficiary participation in order to develop general conclusions about its
effects (i.e., conduct comparative research about it). In this chapter, I present a con-
ceptual framework for participatory development projects and a new typology for ben-
eficiary participation. And I show that the new typology of  beneficiary participation is
comprehensive by comparing it to other popular typologies.
3.2 The Need for Clarity about Beneficiary Participation
Participatory approaches have entered the mainstream of  development practice, but
literature on beneficiary participation has not produced widely accepted conclusions
about their effects. As early as 1980, Cohen and Uphoff  voiced concerns that partici-
pation was becoming a “panacea” for development problems. One and a half  decades
later, another development scholar noted that there still was “remarkably little informa-
tion and systemic evaluation of  actual cases. The evidence which does exist seems to
be contradictory, and the only consensus in the literature is on the need for more in-
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formation” (Lane 1995, 183-184). Decades after Cohen and Uphoff ’s remarks, reviews
on the advantages of  beneficiary participation still have not identified beneficial effects
that are supported by a preponderance of  empirical evidence. Authors of  recent litera-
ture reviews summarize contradictory evidence and call for more rigorous, widespread
empirical testing (e.g., Pozzoni and Kumar 2005; Mansuri and Rao 2013). At best,
contemporary reviews have identified emerging, but tentative, general findings.
It is important to develop empirically supported, general findings about the advan-
tages of  beneficiary participation because development agencies invest significant re-
sources in it. For example, the World Bank invested roughly fifty-four billion dollars
in participatory development projects between 1999 and 2011 (Mansuri and Rao 2013,
44),6 and the World Bank is only one of  many development agencies that invests in
beneficiary participation.
Beneficiary participation is popular in international development generally and an es-
sential component of  sustainable development projects (Sharp 1992; Lélé 1991; Leach,
Mearns, and Scoones 1997). Therefore, developing empirically supported, general find-
ings about the advantages of  beneficiary participation is crucial for sustainable develop-
ment.
3.3 Obstacles to Comparative Research on Beneficiary Participation
Obstacles to comparative research on beneficiary participation include the complex-
ity of  participatory processes, diverse definitions of  participation, and myriad claims
about its benefits. In the social sciences, comparative research aims to identify con-
6For context, the World Bank’s total lending commitments were roughly $364 billion from 1999 to
2011 (World Bank 2014).
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cepts that are valid across diverse social units, such as nations or cultures, and how re-
search findings vary across those units. Comparative research helps identify the extent
to which strategies, such as beneficiary participation, work in different settings (Sasaki
2004). In this section, I argue that both a conceptual framework of  participatory pro-
cesses and a typology of  beneficiary participation are necessary for useful comparative
research on beneficiary participation. I use conceptual framework to refer to a list of  the
significant sub-elements of  a concept and their relationships with one another. In a
conceptual framework of  participatory processes, beneficiary participation is one im-
portant sub-element among several others (e.g., the cultural context of  the project and
expertise of  the project staff). And I use typology to mean a classification scheme, in this
case for beneficiary participation. My typology identifies the dimensions of  beneficiary
participation and their attributes (c.f., Thomas 2011; Van Notten et al. 2003). Some
researchers use typology to refer to a set of  common types of  a phenomenon that occur
in empirical cases (e.g., Kluge 2000). The typology presented here represents the first
of  four stages of  typology development according to Kluge (2000). In the first stage,
researchers identify the relevant dimensions of  the phenomenon under study: “every ty-
pology is based on an attribute space which results from the combination of  the selected
attributes and their dimensions” (Kluge 2000). In later stages of  typology development,
researchers identify common types of  the phenomenon under study that occur in em-
pirical cases. In the future, researchers can use the typology presented in this chapter
to identify common types of  beneficiary participation in empirical cases.
One obstacle to conducting comparative research on beneficiary participation is ben-
eficiary participation’s complexity. Social scientists regularly argue that the phenomena
they study are complex—complex in the sense that scientists need to use many variables
to characterize the phenomena to truly understand them (Ragin 1989). And beneficiary
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participation is no different (Eversole 2003; Cleaver 1999). Complex phenomena are
difficult to study because researchers may not be able to collect data on all relevant
variables or on enough cases of  the phenomenon to draw sufficiently nuanced, but
generalizable, conclusions from a single research project. To deal with this difficulty,
social scientists typically use one of  two approaches. In the variable-oriented approach,
researchers collect data on the same set of  variables from many cases and apply statis-
tical methods to develop generalizable results. In the case-study approach, researchers
gather data on a large set of  variables from a few cases, and interpret each case holis-
tically, rather than as a set of  variables (Ragin 1989). Case-study researchers often use
multiple research methods, including qualitative ones, to characterize cases and inves-
tigate a phenomenon of  interest (Yin 2003). Because they study fewer cases, results
tend to generalize less, but the case-study approach helps researchers make nuanced
explanations of  complex phenomena (Ragin 1989). Each approach loses either nuance
or generalizability, both of  which are important for understanding complex social phe-
nomena.
One solution is to have many researchers conduct many case-studies, each contain-
ing one or more cases. Periodically, researchers review their combined results in sepa-
rate studies and develop both generalizable and nuanced conclusions. Such an approach
requires collaboration among researchers because each researcher needs to collects sim-
ilar data on each case (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010a). A shared conceptual frame-
work of  the phenomenon under study facilitates this approach because it identifies the
features of  cases that researchers should collect data on.
Research on beneficiary participation has suffered from the lack of  a shared con-
ceptual framework and typology for beneficiary participation. Some areas of  social sci-
ence research have become highly developed over several decades while basic questions
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about the benefits of  participatory approaches remain unanswered. Two examples of
successful comparative research are research on common pool resources and research
on the diffusion of  innovations. A common pool resource is a particular kind of  eco-
nomic good that has both high exclusion costs (i.e., it is costly to prevent people from
getting access to it) and high rivalry (i.e., consuming the resource makes less of  it avail-
able for others to consume). Many natural resources, such as fisheries, are common
pool resources. Fisheries often exist in the open ocean where any group with the nec-
essary equipment can harvest them, and each harvest makes less of  the fishery available
for others to harvest. Research on common pool resources mostly seeks to understand
how the services they provide can be produced and consumed without destroying the
resources themselves (Ostrom 1990). Over time, researchers developed a conceptual
framework for analyzing the institutions that govern common pool resources, and the
framework helped organize comparative research (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994).
After decades of  research, the field has produced design principles for effective man-
agement of  common pool resources and tested whether the design principles hold in
many empirical cases (Cox, Arnold, and Villamayor-Tomas 2010).
Diffusion of  innovations is another area of  social science that has produced general
knowledge about a complex phenomenon through a half  century of  case-study research
and periodic comparative research. According to the field’s originator, Everett Rogers,
an innovation is “an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual or
another unit of  adoption” (Rogers 2003, xx). Rogers sees diffusion of  innovation as a
primarily social process whereby information about the innovation travels through com-
munication networks. Individuals attempt to reduce uncertainty about the innovation
by obtaining information, so they can compare it to the status quo. Many conceptual
frameworks have been developed to describe different aspects of  the diffusion of  inno-
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vations, and there is a well-developed body of  research on the subject, one line of  which
examines the attributes of  innovations that lead people to adopt them.
The fields of  common pool resources and diffusion of  innovations benefited from
dedicated leading researchers (Elinor Ostrom and Everett Rogers, respectively) who
produced original research of  their own and synthesized the findings of  others over
the course of  decades. But it seems clear that their use of  common conceptual frame-
works fueled their progress as it would in any field. The framework and typology that
I present below are, in part, attempts to improve comparative research on beneficiary
participation.
Researchers need a shared typology of  beneficiary participation because it has di-
verse definitions (Pelling 1998; Nelson and Wright 1995; Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin
1987). For example, some scholars do not consider beneficiary contributions of  money
and labor to be participation (Lane 1995), but others do (e.g., Manikutty 1998). Di-
verse definitions of  beneficiary participation hinder comparative research because they
muddle claims about its advantages. If  one person claims that beneficiary participation
leads to a given benefit, and another person disputes that claim, they can only genuinely
disagree if  they use beneficiary participation to mean the same thing. A shared typology
helps researchers position their work in relation to one another, so their results can be
compared.
3.4 A Conceptual Framework for Participatory Processes
A conceptual framework of  participatory processes should list their significant ele-
ments and the elements’ relationships to one another. To identify significant elements, I
reviewed literature on monitoring and evaluation and on beneficiary participation. Mon-
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itoring and evaluation literature deals with how to analyze social programs. A social
program is “an organized, planned, and usually ongoing effort designed to ameliorate
a social problem or improve social conditions” (Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman 2004a, 29).
Because development projects are social programs and beneficiary participation occurs
in development projects, monitoring and evaluation literature has frameworks and con-
cepts that help characterize participatory processes.
According to monitoring and evaluation literature, the key elements of  any project
are its organizational structure, intended beneficiaries, inputs (or resources), activities,
outputs, outcomes, and the context of  the project (i.e., external influences, such as
culture or local history). Figure 1 shows these elements in relation to each other. Orga-
nizational structure refers to the organizations (including their facilities, personnel, and
resources) that organize and implement the project (Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman 2004a).
One possible organizational structure comprises a single, small organization, such as an
NGO. Another possible organizational structure comprises a constellation of  NGOs,
government agencies, and consulting companies that all work together to manage a
given project. The organizational structure provides the inputs for the project, includ-
ing human and financial resources (McLaughlin and Jordan 2010). Project organizers
use inputs to conduct project activities, which are simply the actions they take to design
and implement the project (Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman 2004a). The intended benefi-
ciaries are the people who project organizers aim to help.7 The intended beneficiaries
should, in theory, interact with project activities in some way. For example, in a food
donation program, intended beneficiaries need to collect donated food somehow. The
direct effects of  project activities are called outputs. Outputs are objective, rather than
7Some other names for intended beneficiaries in monitoring and evaluation literature are the target
population (Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman 2004a), direct customers, and program participants (McLaughlin and
Jordan 2010).
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Figure 1. Model of  a generic social program
Note: 1. Arrows other than those explicitly labeled mean “cause” or “contribute to.”
subjective; they are the concrete results of  project activities. For example, an output
of  a sanitation project might be a specific number of  households that receive pit la-
trines. Ideally, a project’s outputs also produce desirable outcomes, which are gains to
intended beneficiaries that can be attributed to the project. Often, monitoring and eval-
uation specialists place outcomes in a causal chain, from most direct or short-term to
indirect or long-term (called proximal outcomes and distal outcomes in figure 1). Monitoring
and evaluation specialists also consider the context of  the project, which includes a host
of  factors, such as history, geography, economic conditions, and more (Rossi, Lipsey,
and Freeman 2004a; McLaughlin and Jordan 2010).
The preceding paragraph describes the key elements for predicting whether a project
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will generate the outcomes that its organizers intend. Such a project fits the top-down
model of  development. Beneficiaries do not have any role in the project other than
making use of  the services it provides; however, in participatory development projects,
beneficiaries contribute to the project. Figure 2 below highlights the role of  beneficiary
participation in such projects. Beneficiary participants are a subset of  the population
of  intended beneficiaries, and they contribute inputs to the project through an orga-
nizational structure. For example, project organizers might help beneficiaries create a
small committee staffed by a few beneficiaries who represent beneficiaries’ interests in
the project. (The following section provides more details about different organizational
arrangements.) Through a given organizational structure, beneficiaries provide inputs
to the project. For example, in a sanitation project, beneficiaries might contribute their
own labor to help build latrines.
Technically, figure 1 and figure 2 show the same information. Taken together, ben-
eficiaries’ organizational structure and inputs plus the project sponsors’ organizational
structure and inputs equal the project’s overall organizational structure and inputs. Fig-
ure 2 shows them separately because beneficiaries’ organizational structure and inputs
are of  special interest to researchers who study the effects of  beneficiary participation.
Figure 2 also shows that beneficiaries help create the project activities that they benefit
from in a distinctly different arrangement from that in a top-down project.
Note that beneficiary participation often plays a supporting role in development
projects. According to many of  its advocates, it improves existing program logic.8 A
participatory sanitation project might result in more latrines constructed, for example,
or those latrines might be more equitably distributed among beneficiaries. But benefi-
8Program logic is “the logic that connects its [a program’s] activities to the intended outcomes, and
the rationale for why it does what it does” (Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman 2004a, 44).
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Figure 2. Model of  a participatory social program
Notes : 1. These are components of  beneficiary participation; 2. Project activities are
partly a product of  beneficiary participation and partly a product of  sponsors’ contri-
butions to the project; 3. Arrows other than those explicitly labeled mean “cause” or
“contribute to.”
ciary participation on its own is often not seen as the primary means to achieve program
outcomes.
3.5 A New Typology of  Beneficiary Participation
To characterize beneficiary participation in a detailed and comprehensive way, I re-
viewed academic literature on beneficiary participation and compiled a list of  its signif-
icant features. The main dimensions that emerged were the following: (1) participants,
(2) channels, (3) types of  inputs, (4) timing, and (5) goals. The dimensions and their
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Elements of  beneficiary participation from scholars of  beneficiary participation
Figure 3. A new typology for beneficiary participation
attributes, when taken together, describe different types of  beneficiary participation.
That is, they constitute a new typology for beneficiary participation. To organize the di-
mensions of  beneficiary participation, I positioned them in the model of  a participatory
project from monitoring and evaluation literature (figure 3). I discuss each dimension
and its attributes in more detail below.
3.5.1 Participants
Participants are beneficiaries who contribute to the project in some way. Scholars
believe participants’ personal attributes are relevant (e.g., age, gender, education level,
and income) as is their status as a local resident or local leader (Cohen and Uphoff 1980;
Hussein 1995; Lane 1995). Their personal attributes hint at participants’ capabilities and
therefore their ability to contribute to the project. Their personal attributes also indicate
their socioeconomic status. In projects where only a small subset of  beneficiaries par-
ticipate, scholars are concerned with participants’ socioeconomic status in comparison
to the population of  beneficiaries as a whole. Some advocates of  beneficiary participa-
tion see it as a way to include the voices and interests of  beneficiaries who are relatively
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worse off  than other beneficiaries (Eversole 2003). With information about participants’
personal attributes, researchers can determine whether a particular group (e.g., men or
the relatively wealthy) is overrepresented. For decades, scholars have been concerned
about local elites (intended beneficiaries who are relatively well off) who may participate
and capture more project benefits, even though they need them the least (Cohen and
Uphoff 1980).
3.5.2 Channels
Channels refers to the ways in which participants contribute to a development project.
Scholars of  beneficiary participation distinguish between direct and indirect participa-
tion (Narayan 1995; Manikutty 1998; Brett 2003; Mansuri and Rao 2004; Cohen and
Uphoff 1980; Hussein 1995; Eyben and Ladbury 1995). Participants contribute directly
when they participate as individuals, but direct participation becomes more difficult as
project size increases (Brett 2003). In indirect participation, either representatives (e.g.,
local leaders) or organizations (e.g., small committees) contribute on behalf  of  benefi-
ciaries. Some scholars believe organizations are a more effective avenue for beneficiary
participation (Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin 1987), while other scholars believe the op-
posite is true (Manikutty 1998; Dill 2009). Still others believe that organizations are only
better if  the project benefits are collective, such as roads or public water taps; otherwise,
individual participation is better (Eyben and Ladbury 1995).
When an organization is the vehicle for beneficiary participation, scholars believe
certain characteristics of  the organization are significant. First, they believe that it is
important how autochthonous the organization type is (Hussein 1995). Foreign orga-
nizational structures are less likely to reproduce beneficiaries’ normal ways of  collective
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information sharing and decision-making (Cleaver 1999). Second, some scholars believe
that formal organizations lead to different outcomes than informal ones. Poorer bene-
ficiaries might have more difficulty participating in formal organizations, and, therefore,
informal organizations could be more inclusive (Dill 2009).
3.5.3 Types of  Inputs
Beneficiaries can contribute information, decision-making, and resources to partici-
patory development projects. They can provide information about local conditions so
that project organizers can, for example, modify latrine designs for high tide as they did
in a water project in Kerala, India (Manikutty 1998). Beneficiaries might also inform
the project sponsors about their preferences. Scholars commonly view beneficiaries’
contributing information about their preferences as weak participation and beneficia-
ries’ making decisions as strong participation. If  beneficiaries express their preferences
to project organizers, organizers might ignore their preferences. But if  beneficiaries
make decisions about some aspects of  the project, they exercise control over these as-
pects, and their preferences cannot be ignored. Therefore, scholars usually characterize
beneficiaries’ attaining control over more aspects of  a project as stronger beneficiary
participation (Narayan 1995; Paul 1987). Beneficiaries can also contribute resources—
labor, money, or building materials—to the project (Manikutty 1998; Platteau 2008;
Chambers 1995). For example, in a water project in rural Malawi, residents provided
the materials and labor for construction and maintenance of  a water distribution system
(Kleemeier 2000).
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3.5.4 Timing
Some authors believe that the timing of  beneficiary participation is significant. Fin-
sterbusch and van Wicklin (1987) categorize beneficiary participation according to the
project stage when it occurs: planning, implementation, or maintenance. Pelling (1998)
believes that beneficiaries should be involved as early as possible in a project, so they
can define their own needs. Participatory rural appraisal is premised on the same claim
(Chambers 1994). Other scholars emphasize that beneficiaries should be involved in
later project stages. Manikutty (1998) argues that the lack of  beneficiary participation
in later stages of  a water supply and sanitation project in Rajasthan, India, nullified the
time and effort invested in beneficiary participation earlier in the project.
One common list of  project stages is (1) planning or design, (2) implementation,
(3) operation and maintenance, and (4) evaluation. Another list of  project stages from
monitoring and evaluation literature has eight stages: (1) assess social problems and
needs, (2) determine goals, (3) design program alternatives, (4) select an alternative, (5)
implement the program, (6) operate the program, (7) evaluate program outcomes, and
(8) evaluate program efficiency (Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman 2004a). I adopted and
slightly modified the eight-stage model because the four-stage model is not detailed
enough, and the level of  detail in the eight-stage model aligns better with the level of
detail that scholars use when writing about beneficiary participation. The eight-stage
model more clearly identifies, for example, the role that Chambers’s participatory rural
appraisal would play in a development project. Participatory rural appraisal is a method
for assessing social problems and needs, so it clearly aligns with the first stage of  the
eight-stage model. In the four-stage model, participatory rural appraisal would facil-
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itate planning (the first stage), but planning encompasses more than assessing social
problems and needs. It also encompasses designing and selecting alternatives.
I combined the last two stages of  the eight-stage model, evaluating outcomes and
evaluating efficiency, into one stage, evaluation. Scholars of  beneficiary participation
do not discuss different types of  evaluations that beneficiaries might be involved in,
only that beneficiaries might be involved in evaluation at all (Lane 1995; Hussein 1995;
Cohen and Uphoff 1980; Lélé 1991).
Some scholars believe that the frequency of  beneficiary participation is important,
too, because more frequent interactions between participants and project organizers
indicate a more intense participatory process (Hussein 1995; Cohen and Uphoff 1980).
Similarly, continuous beneficiary participation signifies a more intense participatory pro-
cess than sporadic beneficiary participation (Hussein 1995).
3.5.5 Goals
Scholars also believe that the goals for beneficiary participation, both from bene-
ficiaries’ perspectives (Eyben and Ladbury 1995) and project organizers’ perspectives
(Hussein 1995; Cleaver 1999), are relevant. Beneficiaries might participate for a vari-
ety of  reasons, including obtaining economic benefits and improving their reputations
(Cleaver 1999). Project organizers also employ participatory approaches to meet a va-
riety of  goals. Some of  the claimed practical benefits of  participation include lower
project costs (Chambers 1995; Nelson and Wright 1995; Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin
1987), better resource allocation (Eversole 2003), more equitable resource allocation
(Narayan 1995), and more effective projects (Eversole 2003; Cleaver 1999).
Strictly speaking, goals are not the same as outcomes, even though goals has been
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mapped to outcomes in figure 3. Outcomes are the desirable results of  a social program,
where as goals refers specifically to the goals for employing beneficiary participation.
3.6 Popular Typologies of  Participation
In this section, I demonstrate that my new typology is comprehensive by showing
that it captures the characteristics of  other popular typologies of  participation.
3.6.1 Arnstein’s Ladder of  Citizen Participation
Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of citizen participation may be the most popular typology of
participation, and, as such, it has influenced later typologies of beneficiary participation.
The ladder of  citizen participation treats participation as a single-dimension variable.
For Arnstein, participation exists on a scale that has eight levels (or rungs in a ladder)
that represent progressively stronger citizen involvement in a given project. The rungs
in the ladder of  participation are:
1. Manipulation—sham participation in any form
2. Therapy—group therapy instead of  genuine participation
3. Informing—one-way communication from power-holders
4. Consultation—one-way communication from citizens (e.g., surveys)
5. Placation—apparent but not influential decision-making power for citizens
6. Partnership—shared decision-making power between citizens and power-holders
7. Delegated power—dominant decision-making by citizens
8. Citizen control—decision-making and project management by citizens only
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Note that Arnstein did not consider the type of  participation described in the first
two rungs to be genuine participation and that she equated stronger participation with
citizens’ having more decision-making power. The goal of  participation is to shift power
from haves to have nots and to equitably distribute benefits.
Arnstein’s ladder of  citizen participation is narrower than the typology I have de-
veloped. Her typology considers only two aspects of  beneficiary participation, benefi-
ciaries’ inputs and the goal of  beneficiary participation, whereas my typology considers
both of  those and three other aspects. Furthermore, Arnstein’s typology only considers
two types of  beneficiary inputs, information and decision-making, whereas mine con-
siders information, decision-making, and resources. Arnstein assumes that the project
sponsor provides all resources regardless of  the level of  citizen participation. But in in-
ternational development projects, sponsors do not always provide all of  the resources.
In fact, many believe beneficiaries need to contribute most of  the resources in order to
sustain project benefits (Korten and Alfonso 1983). One approach to sanitation inter-
ventions, called community-led total sanitation, is based on the view that beneficiaries
need to contribute all the resources for the intervention to succeed (Kar and Chambers
2008). But Arnstein’s typology characterizes citizen participation in developed coun-
tries, and in that context, there is little need for beneficiaries to contribute resources to
government initiatives other than through taxes.
3.6.2 A World Bank Typology of  Community Participation
Samuel Paul, a World Bank consultant, investigated types of  beneficiary participa-
tion and their effects in forty World Bank projects (Paul 1987). As part of  his inves-
tigation, he developed a typology of  beneficiary participation with three dimensions:
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(1) objective, (2) intensity, and (3) instrument. Objective refers to the organizer’s pur-
pose for using beneficiary participation (e.g., share costs with beneficiaries, improve
project effectiveness, or improve project efficiency). This dimension is equivalent to
the goals dimension in my typology. The intensity dimension refers to what beneficia-
ries contribute to the project. In a project with low-intensity participation, beneficiaries
provide organizers with information about their needs and preferences. As intensity
increases, beneficiaries gain more control over the project. At the highest level of  in-
tensity, beneficiaries start and implement their own initiatives within the project. Paul’s
intensity dimension corresponds to the types-of-inputs dimension in my typology. The
types-of-inputs dimension describes the degree to which beneficiaries share informa-
tion, make decisions (i.e., exert control), and contribute resources to the project. The
types-of-inputs dimension captures most characteristics of  Paul’s intensity dimension
plus beneficiary contributions of  resources. My typology does not consider who initi-
ates project activities, whereas Paul’s does. Finally, Paul’s instrument dimension refers
to the “institutional devices” (5) that project sponsors use to organize beneficiary partic-
ipation: (1) field workers of  the project agency, (2) committees staffed by beneficiaries,
and (3) user groups. Paul’s instrument dimension corresponds to the participants di-
mension and channels dimension in my typology. These two dimensions describe who
participates on behalf  of  beneficiaries and how they are organized when they do. Paul
notes that the type of  participation can change over the course of  a project. Therefore,
timing seems to be an implicit part of  Paul’s typology, and the timing of  beneficiary par-
ticipation is also part of  the typology I have presented in this chapter. In summary, the
characteristics of  beneficiary participation captured by Paul’s typology are also captured
in my typology with the exception of  who initiates project activities.
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3.6.3 A Typology of  Participation in Development Programs and Projects
In their 1994 book, Pretty and Shah explore beneficiary participation as part of  their
discussion of  the history of  soil and water conservation. They note its rising popularity
and object to its ambiguous meaning, so they use a typology of  participation in devel-
opment programs and projects to make their discussion more concrete. Their typology
has one dimension with seven steps and is similar to Arnstein’s ladder of  citizen partic-
ipation. A summary of  their typology follows (Pretty and Shah 1994, 26-27):
1. Passive participation—Organizers inform beneficiaries about the project and its
activities.
2. Participation in information giving—Organizers get information from beneficia-
ries through extractive research, such as surveys.
3. Participation by consultation—Beneficiaries inform organizers about their prob-
lems and preferred solutions in an open dialogue.
4. Participation for material incentives—Beneficiaries contribute resources, such as
materials or labor, to receive a material benefit, such as food or money.
5. Functional participation—Beneficiaries form groups, which then contribute to
project activities.
6. Interactive participation—With project organizers, beneficiaries analyze their
problems and potential solutions; during the project, beneficiary groups control
some parts of  the project.
7. Self-mobilization—Beneficiaries collectively start and implement their own initia-
tives autonomously.
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My typology of  participation captures all the salient features of  Pretty and Shah’s
typology. The first four stages in their typology mainly refer to what beneficiaries con-
tribute, corresponding to my typology’s types-of-inputs dimension. In Pretty and Shah’s
first stage, beneficiaries do not actually contribute anything; they only receive informa-
tion from project organizers. In the second stage, beneficiaries contribute information
but only as participants of  conventional research methods, such as surveys. Beneficia-
ries are participants in the sense that they are research subjects but not in the sense of
actively contributing to the development project. In the third stage, beneficiaries’ con-
tributions of  information constitutes active participation in the development project.
In the fourth stage, beneficiaries contribute only resources. These first four stages also
refer implicitly to how beneficiaries contribute, that is, as individuals. How beneficia-
ries contribute is included in my typology under the channels dimension. In Pretty
and Shah’s fifth and later stages, beneficiaries contribute collectively. In the sixth stage,
beneficiaries gain decision-making control over some aspects of  the project, and in the
seventh stage, beneficiaries contribute everything to accomplish the project. They are
the project organizers and beneficiaries, simultaneously. The shift to collective benefi-
ciary participation in Pretty and Shah’s fifth stage is captured in the channels dimension
of  my typology, and the shift in beneficiaries’ contributions in Pretty and Shah’s sixth
and seventh stages is captured by the types-of-inputs dimension in my typology.
3.7 Discussion
A commonly held typology, such as the one proposed here, does not by itself  pro-
vide enough common ground for researchers to collaboratively investigate beneficiary
participation. Researchers also need to agree on how to operationalize characteristics of
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beneficiary participation, projects, and projects’ contexts, but researchers of  beneficiary
participation often operationalize variables differently. For example, the two studies de-
scribed below both operationalized decision-making but did so in ways that are incom-
patible with each other. In a study on marginalized groups’ decision-making control in
Gram Panchayats9 in Rajasthan, India, researchers collected Gram Panchayats’ meeting
notes and coded them for topics of  discussion. Marginalized groups’ decision-making
control was operationalized as the degree to which gender and lower-caste issues were
discussed in Gram Panchayat meetings (Bonu et al. 2011). In a study on the effects
of  beneficiary participation in water and sanitation projects in Kerala, India, Manikutty
(1998) surveyed intended beneficiaries and constructed a community participation in-
dex based on their responses to eight questions. The community participation index
aggregated types of  inputs (including decision-making) and timing of  beneficiary par-
ticipation into a single value. Of  the eight questions, only one asked about beneficiary
decision-making, which was scored as either present or absent if  the beneficiary was
present at certain planning activities. The degree to which beneficiaries contributed
decision-making in both of  these studies cannot be compared because researchers op-
erationalized beneficiary decision-making in disparate ways.
Comparative research would also benefit from a database containing results of
empirical studies on beneficiary participation similar to the Common-Pool-Resource
Database, which contains data from eighty-six common-pool-resource cases (CSID
2014). Such a database would facilitate comparisons of  many cases of  beneficiary par-
ticipation in diverse locations and sectors. But before creating such a database for ben-
9Panchayats are the smallest political units in India, typically consisting of  one rural village. Gram
Panchayats are the governing bodies of  panchayats (Bonu et al. 2011).
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eficiary participation, researchers would have to agree on how to operationalize key
variables, as discussed above.
As noted above, the typology presented here represents the first of  four stages of
typology development according to Kluge (2000). In future research, empirical cases
of  beneficiary participation could be mapped onto the dimensions of  beneficiary partic-
ipation from my new typology to find values of  each dimension that commonly occur
together. For example, intensive beneficiary participation in initial project stages (e.g.,
following Chambers’s participatory rural appraisal) might rarely coincide with benefi-
ciary participation in later project stages. Such patterns in empirical cases might suggest
basic types of  beneficiary participation, which can then be defined according to their
typical attributes and delimited with atypical cases. If  basic types of  beneficiary partici-
pation can be identified, they could also facilitate comparative research on beneficiary
participation.
3.8 Conclusion
It is easy to develop a new typology for a given phenomenon and then declare it as
the one best suited for future research. I am aware that such a typology is only useful to
the extent that many researchers employ it in their work, and there is no guarantee that
my typology will be adopted. Even if  it is not adopted, I hope that I have persuasively
argued for the need for such a typology, and I hope that I have shown that the typology
proposed in this chapter is at least a useful step in the right direction.
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Chapter 4
CASE-STUDY OF TWO PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN
BHOPAL, INDIA
This case-study investigated whether elite capture occurred and why it did or did
not occur in two water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) projects in Bhopal, India, that
employed beneficiary participation.
4.1 Introduction
A popular claim about development projects is that beneficiary participation im-
proves the equitable distribution of  benefits (e.g., Narayan 1995). However, some
empirical case-studies have found that beneficiary participation worsens the equitable
distribution of  benefits (Platteau 2008; Mansuri and Rao 2004). In their literature re-
view of  community-based development, Dasgupta and Beard write, “One of  the most
significant threats to the success of  community-based approaches is their vulnerability
to capture by local elites” (2007, 230).
4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 Capture by Local Elites
A common concern about beneficiary participation is called capture by local elites
because elites within the group of  intended beneficiaries’ may capture a disproportion-
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ate share of  a project’s benefits (Cohen and Uphoff 1980). Local elites are “locally
based individuals with disproportionate access to social, political or economic power”
(Dasgupta and Beard 2007, 230), and they often wield disproportionate influence in
participatory projects (Mansuri and Rao 2004). In general, elite capture refers to any
instance in which elites are able to maneuver a project to their advantage. Elites may
appropriate more than their fair share of  project benefits (sometimes called embezzle-
ment), or they may steer project goals to be more in line with their interests than with
their community’s (Platteau 2008).
One mechanism by which capture occurs is a “natural alliance” (Narayan 1995, 39)
between elites and outsiders. Another is implicitly or explicitly excluding beneficiaries in
marginalized groups from participating. Instead of  the terms implicit and explicit, Pozzoni
and Kumar use formal inclusion and substantive inclusion:
Formal inclusion captures the extent to which community members and cit-
izens are able [to] gain access to decision-making fora. Substantive inclusion
reflects the extent to which participants are able to voice their opinions and
the extent to which these are taken into consideration by other participants.
(2005, v)
But elite capture is different from elite control. Elites do not always capture dispro-
portionate benefits when they have leadership positions in participatory projects (e.g.,
Dasgupta and Beard 2007). And in some cases, beneficiaries are satisfied with projects
when elite capture occurs because elites can increase project benefits for everyone, even
though they capture a disproportionate share of  project benefits (Rao and Ibáñez 2007).
This case-study investigated only elite capture by direct beneficiaries, but another
form of  elite capture, that by indirect beneficiaries, is also an important topic for
research. Indirect beneficiaries of  development projects may include staff  of  non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), government officials, and local contractors (Plat-
teau 2008; Bardhan 2002). This form of  capture can be described as “getting the con-
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tract” or “getting the project.” Elites that win contracts to perform work on develop-
ment projects, such as for toilet construction or even for community engagement, may
benefit more from the project than the intended beneficiaries.
4.2.2 Sanitation as a Development Problem
Sanitation projects aim to increase the number of  people with access to well-
maintained, improved sanitation facilities. An improved sanitation facility captures hu-
man excreta hygienically and prevents untreated excreta from coming into contact with
humans, insects, and animals. Some examples of  improved sanitation facilities include
sewers, septic tanks, and pour-flush latrines (UNDP 2003).
Sanitation is a significant development problem because roughly 2.6 billion people
worldwide lack access to sanitation (UNDP 2009, 5), and poor and non-existent sanita-
tion facilities contribute to illness and death, pollute rivers, and disproportionately harm
women, children, and the poor (Bassani et al. 2010; Planning Commission 2002; UNDP
2009). One reason for slow improvements in access to sanitation is elites’ tendency to
appropriate disproportionate benefits from infrastructure projects (Mara et al. 2010).
4.2.3 Sanitation in India
India is a particularly relevant place to study sanitation projects because many people
in India lack access to sanitation, and there are many sanitation projects in India to study.
South Asia, largely comprising India, has been slower than all other regions except sub-
Saharan Africa to build and maintain improved sanitation facilities (WHO/UNICEF
2010), and two out of  three Indians have no access to improved sanitation (UNDP
58
2006; WHO/UNICEF 2010). There is a stark difference in rates of  open defecation
between rural and urban Indians. Roughly 69% of  rural Indians practice open defeca-
tion, whereas only 18% of  urban Indians do (WHO/UNICEF 2010), although open
defecation is likely more prevalent in urban slums (Pangare, Pangare, and Das 2006;
Government of India 2005).
India’s national constitution assigns responsibility for providing sanitation and drink-
ing water to municipalities in urban areas and panychayats—called villages in figure 4—in
rural areas (Ministry of Law and Justice 1949a, 1949b, 1992a, 1992b). But some state
governments—including the state government of  Madhya Pradesh where the projects
in this case-study were implemented—also claim some control over water and sanitation
provision (Ministry of Information Technology 2013).
After India gained independence, the national government initially emphasized ex-
panding access to water, but starting in 1980—the beginning of  the UN’s International
Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade—India’s national government began to
implement more programs to improve access to sanitation, as well (Pangare, Pangare,
and Das 2006). One of  the more significant programs was the Central Rural Sanita-
tion Program, which began in 1986 (Pangare, Pangare, and Das 2006). The national
government provided an 80% subsidy (2000 rupees) for the cost of  twin-pit latrines
in rural villages, but the program yielded disappointing results. Some of  the problems
included subsidizing only one sanitation technology (twin-pit pour-flush latrines), few
toilets constructed due to the high subsidy, elite capture of  constructed toilets, and very
low rates of  toilet use. Roughly 3% of  constructed toilets were used as intended (Saxena
2005). In 1999, a new version of  the program, called the Total Sanitation Campaign,
began. The Total Sanitation Campaign aimed to be a demand-driven program. The
toilet subsidy decreased to 500 rupees with no restrictions on the type of  toilet, and
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Notes : 1. Some states have divisions which are subdivided into districts. Other states
only have districts; 2. The sub-district level has different names in different states.
organizers attempted to instill a desire for improved sanitation in rural villagers that
would cause villagers to pay for most of  the constructions costs and all the long-term
maintenance costs for household toilets (Saxena 2005; Pangare, Pangare, and Das 2006).
An evaluation of  the Total Sanitation Campaign in Puri district, Orissa, found that 72%
of  households in participating villages had latrines, which is significantly higher than
the baseline of  approximately 8%. In households with latrines, over one-third of  in-
terviewees reported practicing open defecation, but even so, the evaluation provides
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evidence that the Total Sanitation Campaign has been much more effective than its pre-
decessor (Barnard et al. 2013). In 2012, the national government changed the name
of  the Total Sanitation Campaign to Nirmal Bharat Abhiyan and updated guidelines
for the program, which shifted focus from open-defecation-free households to open-
defecation-free communities (Government of India 2012).
One of  the most significant debates in Indian sanitation is on whether or not to
subsidize toilet construction. Advocates of  subsidies argue that poor beneficiaries need
subsidies to afford toilets. But the high subsidy for toilets under the Central Rural San-
itation Program was seen as one reason for its poor effectiveness. Critics of  subsidies
argue that instilling pro-sanitation social norms in rural communities is the key to effec-
tive, sustained sanitation programs (Pattanayak et al. 2010). The community-led total
sanitation (CLTS) approach is the most popular approach for instilling pro-sanitation
social norms. CLTS facilitators conduct triggering exercises with rural villagers (such as
calculating the amount of  human feces from open defecation and medical costs related
to fecal-oral disease transmission) to instill pro-sanitation social norms. After conduct-
ing triggering exercises, facilitators mostly leave rural communities to pursue access to
sanitation however they choose to (Kar and Chambers 2008). One evaluation of  a san-
itation intervention in Bhadrak district, Orissa, found the intervention increased toilet
ownership by 29% with roughly one-third of  treatment effect due to the 85% subsidy
(only available to low-income households) and two-thirds due to the pro-sanitation so-
cial norms created during the intervention (Pattanayak et al. 2010).
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4.2.4 Sanitation as a Sustainable Development Problem in India
As discussed in chapter 2, sustainable development attempts to meet people’s basic
needs and increase their ability to choose while minimizing environmental damage and
ensuring the benefits of  development are equitably distributed. Lack of  access to sanita-
tion in India is a sustainable development problem: it damages both people’s health and
the environment, and it disproportionately harms children, women, and poor people.
Lack of  sanitation contributes to diarrhea, the sixth leading cause of  the loss of
disability-adjusted life years (DALYs)10 in India (NCMH 2005). Diarrhea is a particular
problem for children. Globally, it is the second largest cause of  childhood mortality
(UNDP 2006). Diarrhea also contributes to malnutrition (UNDP 2009), which can lead
to acute respiratory infections—the leading cause of  mortality in developing countries
(Mara et al. 2010). Educational achievement suffers as a result of  related diseases, as
well, with consequences that stretch into adulthood (UNDP 2006).
Lack of  sanitation also has large environmental impacts. According to India’s Tenth
Five Year Plan 2002 – 2007, “Three-fourths of  surface water resources are polluted and
80 per cent of  the pollution is due to by [sic] sewage alone” (Planning Commission 2002,
651). The Ganges as it flows through Varanasi exemplifies this kind of  pollution. The
World Health Organization recommends coliform counts of  10 per 100 mL. In Varanasi,
they have been measured at 100,000 per 100 mL—10,000 times the recommended level
(Sampat 1996).
Finally, sanitation in India is not distributed equitably. Women and children suf-
fer more from lack of  access to sanitation (Government of India 2005; UNDP 2009),
10A DALY combines morbidity and mortality into a single value to help researchers compare magni-
tudes of  various illnesses’ health impacts (Mathers 2008).
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and “the poor, particularly those living in slums and squatter settlements, are generally
deprived of  these basic facilities” (Government of India 2005, 81).
4.3 Background
4.3.1 Background of  Cases’ Location
4.3.1.1 Madhya Pradesh
Madhya Pradesh is located in central India. The state has roughly seventy-three
million inhabitants (Census of India 2011c, 1). The most popular language in the state
is Hindi, followed by Marathi, the official language of  the State of  Maharashtra. The
largest city in Madhya Pradesh is Indore, and the capital is Bhopal (Ayyar and Raju
2013). Madhya Pradesh is a relatively poor Indian state with almost one-third of  the
population below the poverty line (Planning Commission 2013).
Madhya Pradesh’s climate is sub-tropical with monsoons starting in June and end-
ing in September. The winters last from November to February and have temperatures
from 50 F (10ºC) to 70 F (25ºC). The summers last from March to May and have tem-
peratures from the high 70s F (25ºC) to 100 F (40ºC). The state’s landscape has low hills,
plateaus, and river valleys with some forested areas. Its main industries are agricultural,
and most agricultural production is neither mechanized nor irrigated. Important crops
include soybeans, sugar, and grains. The state also has significant livestock and poultry
production (Kaminsky and Long 2011; Ayyar and Raju 2013).
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4.3.1.2 Bhopal
Bhopal is an industrial city that manufactures products such as textiles, electrical
goods, and jewelry (Rothermund 2006; Encyclopædia Britannica 2013). At indepen-
dence (1947), Bhopal was a small town, but it quickly grew after 1956 when it was
absorbed into a new state, Madhya Pradesh, and designated its capital (Rothermund
2006; Kim, Good, and Mayerhofer 2003). Figure 5 shows growth rates in Bhopal and
other major cities in Madhya Pradesh for recent decades. Population growth in Bhopal
has led to a sharp rise in the number of  informal settlements, and poverty is widespread.
By one estimate, 48% of  the city’s population is in poverty (UN-HABITAT 2006a).
Most of  Bhopal’s water supply is surface water from the Upper Bhopal Lake and the
Kolar Reservoir (see figure 6). Tube wells and hand pumps throughout the city supply
groundwater, as well. Even though Bhopal has an ample water supply (roughly 182
liters per capita and day), the city struggles to meet residents’ demand for water because
of  high losses in the water distribution system (UN-HABITAT 2006b).
People living in Bhopal’s slums have poor access to sanitation. One survey found
that roughly 42% of  households in Bhopal’s slums practiced open defecation. These
households either did not have access to a toilet or had access to a communal toilet but
did not use it (UN-HABITAT 2006a).
The city’s governing body, the Bhopal Municipal Corporation, is responsible for
providing the city’s residents with access to water and sanitation. The municipal corpo-
ration has both elected members and administrators who make and implement policy,
respectively. Elected members, or councilors, are led by a mayor, who in turn relies on
a small group of  councilors for advice and oversight of  the administrative side of  the
corporation. The administrative side is led by a commissioner, who is an Indian Ad-
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ministrative Service officer appointed to the position (BMC 2013a; 2013d; 2013b). The
city’s administration has twelve departments, including a Department of  Water Supply
and a Department of  Health and Sanitation (BMC 2013c; 2013e).
4.3.2 Project Origins
4.3.2.1 Project Uday
In 2001, Asian countries made a formal request to UN-HABITAT for a program
similar to its Water for African Cities program. UN-HABITAT started the Water for
African Cities Programme in 1997 to tackle urban water problems in Africa. In response
to the request, UN-HABITAT and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) organized a
consultation meeting in April 2002 in New Delhi. The meeting was attended by “water
sector professionals, utility managers, local authority representatives, national agencies
responsible for urban development, water management and the environment and in-
ternational agencies (multilateral, bilateral and NGOs) active in the water sector” (UN-
HABITAT 2002b, 1). Attendees discussed obstacles and solutions to providing water
and sanitation in Asian cities and developed an initial proposal for a Water for Asian
Cities (WAC) program, which served as the program’s blueprint (UN-HABITAT and
ADB 2007). Though the program was called Water for Asian Cities, attendees wanted it
to improve access to sanitation as much as it improved access to water (UN-HABITAT
2002b).
UN-HABITAT and ADB signed a letter of  intent and announced the program on
August 31, 2002, at the World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg
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(UN-HABITAT and ADB 2007; UN-HABITAT 2002a). The program would be im-
plemented in one city each in five sub-regions, including South Asia.
UN-HABITAT and ADB sent a joint mission to India to select the Indian city where
WAC would be implemented. The mission met with Indian officials from the Ministry
of  Urban Development and Poverty Alleviation in April 2003. The parties agreed to
select a city in Madhya Pradesh because ADB already had a fact-finding mission on
water and sanitation issues there. UN-HABITAT and ADB initially concluded that
Indore—a large industrial city—would be the most suitable place to implement the pro-
gram. But they ultimately decided to implement the program in several cities in Madhya
Pradesh because they were planning state-level capacity building initiatives, and extend-
ing program benefits to more cities would be relatively easy (UN-HABITAT and ADB
2007). The participating cities would be Bhopal, Indore, Gwalior, and Jabalpur (UN-
HABITAT 2005). In December 2003, ADB approved a two-hundred-million-dollar
loan for the program, calling it the Urban Water Supply and Environmental Improve-
ment in Madhya Pradesh (UWSEIMP) program—also known as Project Uday. The
program would also receive funds from the Madhya Pradesh state government and par-
ticipating cities (UN-HABITAT 2005).
4.3.2.1.1 Workshop in Bhopal
In March 2005, UN-HABITAT organized a workshop in Bhopal to determine how
WAC would be implemented in Madhya Pradesh. Workshop participants came from the
Government of  Madhya Pradesh, municipal corporations in the participating cities, uni-
versities, NGOs, and international development agencies (e.g., UN-HABITAT, ADB,
and the Department for International Development [DFID]). Participants advocated
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essentially the same goals and priorities for the program as those discussed during the
New Delhi consultations in 2002.
4.3.2.1.2 Slums Environmental Sanitation Initiative
After the workshop, program organizers implemented a pilot project (WaterAid
2013). The Slums Environmental Sanitation Initiative (SESI) began in October 2005
and aimed to improve sanitation in five slums and five-thousand households in each
of  the four WAC project cities (UN-HABITAT 2006b, 2013; WaterAid 2013). SESI’s
deliverables included one-hundred demonstration toilets in each city, five community
toilets in each city, two-hundred demonstration soak pits, children’s competitions in
schools, and creation of  self-help groups and community water and sanitation commit-
tees (WaterAid 2013).
SESI was undertaken as a partnership between WaterAid India and UN-HABITAT
(Dabrase 2013), and it served as a test-case for the partnership between UN-HABITAT,
WaterAid India, the municipal corporations, and local NGOs (Dabrase 2013; UN-
HABITAT 2013). In Bhopal, the local NGO was Aarambh (WaterAid 2013). This
partnership would be the same one that would implement the slum interventions in
Project Uday.
4.3.2.2 Project Utthan
Project Utthan originated as a complement to Project Uday, but with a different
funding source, DFID, and organizational structure. Both projects had the same general
goal and shared several specific goals. They both aimed to improve urban services in
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cities in Madhya Pradesh, and both projects had components that specifically targeted
slums.
4.4 Research Design and Methods
This research project used a comparative case-study design with two projects,
Project Uday and Project Utthan, serving as cases. Case-studies help researchers explain
phenomena over which they have little control and “when the focus is on a contempo-
rary phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin 2003, 1). (More details about
research design and methods are provided in appendix B.)
Case-study researchers should collect data from multiple sources to improve the
validity of  their findings (Yin 2003). I collected data from project organizers and ben-
eficiaries using semi-structured interviews and structured interviews, respectively.11 I
also collected publicly available documents about the projects and the agencies that
implemented them from the Internet and from agencies’ staff. These sources—semi-
structured interviews, structured interviews, and project documents—all provided data
on beneficiaries’ participation, and each of  them provided data on one or more the fol-
lowing: beneficiaries’ access to sanitation, project context (e.g., government support),
and project characteristics.
11Arizona State University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and approved research meth-
ods involving human subjects (i.e., semi-structured and structured interviews), including cognitive in-
terviews, pre-tests, and translations for structured interviews (IRB protocol #1302008784, approved
February 27, 2013). See appendix A for documentation.
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4.4.1 Selecting Cases
I traveled to New Delhi in October 2012 to begin field research. I contacted orga-
nizations that had recently completed sanitation projects for more information about
their projects. I aimed to find a set of  three to four sanitation projects with the following
characteristics: (1) completed within the past year; (2) greater geographical proximity,
especially in the same city; and (3) greater similarity in project start and end dates. I
aimed to minimize variation in projects’ context (e.g., location and timing) to improve
comparison between cases. I selected cases located in the same city because Indian
states and even cities within states differ in ways that could affect project outcomes. I
also aimed to select sanitation projects that were implemented by organizations willing
to facilitate this research project. Through preliminary discussions with project organiz-
ers, I gauged their willingness to provide access to documents, staff, and beneficiaries.
After gathering more details about several organizations and their sanitation projects,
I selected two projects, Project Uday and Project Utthan. Both projects had sites in
several cities in Madhya Pradesh, and I elected to study each project’s sites in Bhopal.
I included four slums in total—two slums each from Project Uday and Project Ut-
than. Some slums in both projects received community toilets, and other slums received
individual household toilets. I elected to consider only slums that received individual
household toilets because households’ access to sanitation was easier to assess in slums
that received individual household toilets. To select slums from Project Uday, I assigned
numbers to each slum and then selected slums with random numbers.12 Regarding
12I used an Android application, Quick Random Number Generator (version 1.2.2), to generate all
random numbers during field work.
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Project Utthan slum selection, only two slums had completed sanitation work within
the past year, Baghmugalia and Jatkhedi,13 so these two slums were selected.
4.4.2 Semi-structured Interviews with Project Organizers
To build a sample frame of  project organizers, I conducted a snowball sample, which
included staff  from the Madhya Pradesh state government, the Bhopal city government,
and NGOs, and then I administered semi-structured interviews with project organizers.
The list of  topics included background information about each project, beneficiary par-
ticipation, and other determinants of  project success, such as staff  experience, funding,
and land tenure. I conducted fifteen semi-structured interviews from March to May
2013 with organizers of  Project Uday and Project Utthan.
4.4.3 Structured Interviews with Beneficiaries
The structured interviews aimed to provide data on beneficiaries’ participation in
the intervention, their access to water and sanitation, and demographic data about ben-
eficiaries. I invited experts from three NGOs in Bhopal to review the survey instru-
ment for structured interviews, cover letter, recruitment letter, and survey procedures
because subject-matter experts should always be involved in the development of  survey
materials (Fink 2002). The survey was also pre-tested with cognitive interviews. Eleven
cognitive interviews were conducted between May 11 and May 13, 2013.
In each of  the four slums, the field researchers aimed to survey fifty respondents.
13These were not the only Project Utthan slums in Bhopal where individual household toilets were
constructed. Sanitation work in other Project Utthan slums had been completed earlier.
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There were two sample groups in each slum: individuals living in households that re-
ceived a toilet through the project and individuals living in households that did not
receive a toilet. Sampling was a two-step process with households serving as the first
sampling unit. Households were sampled with a systematic random sample. Field re-
searchers included each household at a set interval (e.g., every fifth house), and intervals
depended on the size of  the slum. Field researchers then requested that a random indi-
vidual within each sampled household participate in the survey.
The survey was administered face to face in Hindi by field researchers who were all
native Hindi-speakers. From May to June 2013, field researchers conducted 218 surveys.
One slum from Project Uday, Tagore Ward, was excluded (along with the twenty-three
surveys completed in that slum) and replaced by School Sector.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Project Descriptions
Table 1 summarizes background information about both projects.
4.5.1.1 Project Uday
Project Uday had several components. The portion that received the most funding
improved municipal infrastructure, including that for transportation, water supply, and
sanitation. A small portion of  the budget targeted slums (Lohani et al. 2008) and was
called the community development component of  the project. This component had
two parts (WaterAid India 2009):
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Table 1. Project profiles
Project Uday Project Utthan
Official name Urban Water Supply and
Environmental
Improvement in Madhya
Pradesh (UWSEIMP)
Project
Madhya Pradesh Urban Services
for the Poor (MPUSP)
Funding
organization
ADB, Government of  India,
State of  Madhya Pradesh,
municipal corporations of
participating cities
DFID
Project dates 2005–2013 2006–2012
Targeted cities
for slum
improvements
Bhopal, Indore, Gwalior,
Jabalpur
Bhopal, Gwalior, Indore, Jabalpur,
Ujjain, Dewas, Katni, Rewa, Satna,
Khandwa, Burhanpur, Singrauli,
Ratlam, Sagar
Name of  city
studied
Bhopal Bhopal
Implementing
agency
(Bhopal)
Bhopal Municipal
Corporation
Bhopal Municipal Corporation
Supporting
organizations
(Bhopal)
WaterAid, Aarambh, Gujarat
Mahila SEWA Housing Trust
FeedbackVentures, GHK
Consultants
Names of
slums studied
Shivaji Ward, School Sector Baghmugalia, Jatkhedi
Sources : Lohani et al. (2008, 13); DFID (2012); semi-structured interviews
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1. Area Improvement Fund (AIF)—improve urban services in slums through im-
proved roads, water supply, access to sanitation, and solid-waste management
2. Community Initiatives Fund (CIF)—improve poor people’s livelihoods through
occupational training and formation of  self-help groups
In this research project, data were collected on the AIF part of  Project Uday’s commu-
nity development component.
The state-level department that oversaw the project was the Urban Administration
and Development Department (UADD). The Government of  Madhya Pradesh created
a new entity specifically for Project Uday, called the Project Management Unit, which
was housed under the UADD and was responsible for coordinating the project. The
Project Management Unit was headquartered in the state capital, Bhopal. It hired a
Project Management Consultant for assistance and advice. Each city’s government also
created a new entity specifically for Project Uday, called the Project Implementation
Unit (PIU), which managed the day-to-day affairs of  the project. Each Project Im-
plementation Unit hired a consulting organization, called the Design and Supervision
Consultant, to provide management advice and engineering expertise.
NGOs played important roles in the community development portion of  Project
Uday. UN-HABITAT contracted WaterAid to organize and manage beneficiary par-
ticipation in Bhopal. WaterAid, in turn, contracted a local NGO, Aarambh, to engage
residents in Bhopal’s slums.
Aarambh helped residents in each slum form a committee, called a community
group committee (CGC),14 to represent that slum’s residents in the project. Each CGC
had ten to fifteen members and a president, vice president, secretary, joint secretary,
14Elsewhere in India, community group committees are called community-based organizations
(CBOs).
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and treasurer. CGC members were selected by consensus at a large community meet-
ing in each slum with the restriction that at least half  of  the committee members had
to be women. NGO workers gave CGC members leadership training, information on
the structure of  Bhopal Municipal Corporation, accounting practices, and information
on toilet construction materials.
The Bhopal and Madhya Pradesh governments viewed CGCs as the conduit through
which slum residents participated in the project. CGCs were required to meet at least
twice per month, but they were otherwise left to decide how they would operate. The
CGCs communicated with the Bhopal Municipal Corporation through an intermediary,
an NGO called Gujarat SEWA Mahila Housing. One aspect of  the project that CGCs
decided was the type of  toilets their slum would receive, specifically whether their slum
would receive individual household toilets or a community toilet. In slums that received
community toilets, the CGC influenced the location of  the toilet to ensure it would be
safe for women. In slums that received individual household toilets, residents who
wanted a toilet, had space for one, and could pay the subsidized cost could receive a
toilet. Construction costs for individual household toilets were mostly borne by the
project organizers, but each household that received a toilet had to contribute 10% of
the cost of  the toilet (roughly 1100 rupees). Households could contribute labor instead
of  money if  they were unable to pay. The PIU arranged the tendering process and paid
contractors to construct the toilets.
4.5.1.2 Project Utthan
Project Utthan complemented Project Uday and shared the same general goal of
improving urban services in Madhya Pradesh. Project Utthan was formally called the
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Madhya Pradesh Urban Services for the Poor (MPUSP) program15 (DFID 2012), and
it was funded by an eighty-million-dollar grant from DFID (ADB 2013; DFID 2013).
One component of  project aimed to improve municipal accounting and tax collection
so that cities would be more financially self-sufficient (DFID 2013).
Like Project Uday, Project Utthan had a component that aimed to improve infras-
tructure and livelihoods in urban slums. The work included water supply, sanitation,
roads, drainage, and street lighting. In Bhopal, Project Utthan began in December
2007, ended in December 2012, and operated in twenty-one slums.
The project was led by the commissioner of  the UADD, the same state-level depart-
ment that led Project Uday. Project Utthan had several deputy directors and consultants
at the state-level to oversee the project. The lead officer at the city level was an admin-
istrator in the city government.
Bhopal Municipal Corporation had its own employees and a local consulting organi-
zation, Feedback Ventures, facilitate community engagement. Employees from Bhopal
Municipal Corporation conducted a survey in each slum to determine what infrastruc-
ture improvements would be made. The survey team also explained the background
of  the project and its goals to slum residents. The team attempted to generate interest
in the project among slum residents, but due to the municipal corporation’s past false
promises, it took roughly a year and a half  to gain residents’ support for and participa-
tion in the project. After gaining residents’ support, employees from Bhopal Municipal
Corporation and Feedback Ventures conducted participatory planning activities with
residents to determine residents’ needs.
Feedback Ventures helped residents create Basti Vikas Committees with structures
15At the time of  writing, Project Utthan is the name for both the MPUSP program and its successor, the
Madhya Pradesh Urban Infrastructure Investment Programme (MPUIIP). But in this document, Project
Utthan refers only to the MPUSP program.
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and roles similar to those of  the CGCs in Project Uday. Each Basti Vikas Committee
had a president, secretary, and treasurer and around ten members in total. Feedback
Ventures facilitated participatory planning activities with Basti Vikas Samiti members.
Bhopal Muncipal Corporation employees drafted the requirements for work in each
slum, and engineering consultants at the state level then prepared an engineering plan
for work in each slum.
Bhopal Municipal Corporation conducted a survey to identify households that met
official criteria for poverty, wanted an individual household toilet, had space for it, and
could pay the subsidized cost for it (roughly 1100 rupees). Bhopal Municipal Corpo-
ration then bid out the work to contractors, who constructed the toilets for eligible
households.
4.5.2 Beneficiary Participation according to a New Typology of  Beneficiary Partici-
pation
Beneficiary participation in both projects can be mapped on the new typology of
beneficiary participation presented in chapter 3. In both projects, beneficiary participa-
tion had the same general structure (table 2).
4.5.3 Slum Descriptions
Residents in the slums included in the survey were mostly immigrants from rural
areas in Madhya Pradesh and nearby states (e.g., Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan).
Most residents were wage laborers earning their living, for example, by selling vegetables,
cleaning houses, cooking meals, and working construction (Aarambh 2010a, 2010b).
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Table 2. Structure of  beneficiary participation in Project Uday and Project Utthan
Project Stage Project Uday Project Utthan
Assess social
problems and
needs
Defined by project
organizers
Defined by project
organizers
Determine goals Defined by project
organizers
Defined by project
organizers
Design program
alternatives
Defined by project
organizers
Beneficiary representatives
participated in planning
activities (contributing
information)
Select an alternative Beneficiary representatives
had decision-making control
over the type of  toilet
Selected by project
organizers, taking into
consideration participatory
planning activities
Implement the
program
Mostly by project organizers;
each beneficiary household
contributed roughly 10% of
the cost of  a toilet
Mostly by project organizers;
each beneficiary household
contributed roughly 10% of
the cost of  a toilet
Operate the
program
Toilet operation and
maintenance entirely by
beneficiary households
Toilet operation and
maintenance entirely by
beneficiary households
Evaluate program
outcomes
Evaluation by project
organizers; beneficiaries
contribute only as research
subjects
Evaluation by project
organizers; beneficiaries
contribute only as research
subjects
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Residents in Shivaji Ward had the highest incomes of  residents in all four slums,
and residents in School Sector had the lowest incomes. Residents from Jatkhedi and
Baghmugalia—the Project Utthan slums—had incomes greater than residents in School
Sector but less than those in Shivaji Ward. Shivaji Ward residents tended to have more
expensive housing structures (e.g., stucco-walled, multi-story homes versus informal,
one-story homes with corrugated-steel roofs and wooden walls). School Sector resi-
dents had less expensive housing, and residents from Baghmugalia and Jatkhedi had
similarly expensive housing that appeared more expensive than that in School Sector but
less expensive than that in Shivaji Ward. Residents in Shivaji Ward were the most highly
educated of  residents in all four slums, and residents in School Sector were the lowest
educated. Residents from Jatkhedi and Baghmugalia—the Project Utthan slums—had
education levels greater than residents in School Sector but less than those in Shivaji
Ward.
All slums were predominantly Hindu with the exception of  School Sector, which
had a sizeable Muslim population. Taking all aspects of  diversity into account (e.g.,
religion, caste, and income), the field researchers’ impression was that Baghmugalia was
the most diverse slum, followed by Jatkhedi, School Sector, and Shivaji Ward.
4.5.4 Project Effectiveness
This section discusses projects’ effectiveness at increasing access to sanitation in
Bhopal’s slums. Both Project Uday and Project Utthan shared this goal, although
Project Uday aimed for slums free of  open defecation, and Project Utthan aimed to
provide toilets for low-income households. (More detail about statistical analyses is
provided in appendix C.)
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A Pearson chi-squared test of  independence was used to test the null hypothesis that
the proportion of  households practicing open defecation was the same in households
that received toilets and in households that did not receive toilets in Project Uday. The
Pearson chi-squared test statistic is 2(1, n = 96) = 20, p < .001. Therefore, the null
hypothesis is rejected. The phi coefficient is 0.48, which indicates the strength of  the
relationship is low to moderate (Hinkle, Wiersma, and Jurs 2003).
The same test in Project Utthan yielded different results. The Pearson chi-squared
test statistic is 2(1, n = 98) = 4.6×10-31, p = 1.0. Therefore, the null hypothesis is not
rejected.
These tests suggest that while Project Uday reduced the practice of  open defecation,
and conversely increased access to improved sanitation facilities, Project Utthan did not.
Households in Project Utthan received toilets but did not necessarily use them.
4.5.5 Toilet Condition
Two survey questions asked interviewees who received a toilet through either project
to rate the condition of  their toilets (see table 3). Interviewees rated initial and subse-
quent toilet quality on a five-point scale, from 0 (very poor) to 4 (excellent).
A linear regression model was used to infer whether there were differences in the
quality of  each project’s toilets in different slums. The linear model of  location ac-
counted for 37% of  the variance in initial toilet condition, R2 = 0.39, adjusted R2 =
0.37. The model, estimated from a sample of n = 80 subjects, was statistically signifi-
cant, F (3, 76) = 16, p < .001.
Toilets constructed through Project Uday tended to have higher initial-quality ratings
than those constructed through Project Utthan. The 95% confidence intervals of  the
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means of  initial toilet quality in Shivaji Ward (a Project Uday slum) and Jatkhedi (a
Project Utthan slum) slightly overlap (95% CIs [2.3, 3.0] and [1.8, 2.4], respectively).
Therefore, it is not possible to infer that initial-quality ratings in Shivaji Ward are higher
than in Jatkhedi. Otherwise, the Project Uday slums had higher initial-quality ratings
than Project Utthan slums.
The subsequent-quality ratings of  toilets within each project were similar. A linear
regression model was used to infer whether there were differences in the quality of  each
project’s toilets between slums at the time of  the survey. The linear model of  location
accounted for 29% of  the variance in subsequent-quality ratings, R2 = 0.31, adjusted
R2 = 0.29. The model, estimated from a sample of n = 79 subjects, was statistically
significant, F (3, 75) = 11, p < .001. Toilets constructed in Project Uday tended to be
rated more highly, at least in School Sector, and there is no clear difference in subsequent
toilet-quality ratings between slums from the same project.
Field reserchers’ and my observations support this finding. The feedback we re-
ceived from residents in Project Uday slums and Project Utthan slums was starkly
different. Residents in Project Uday slums, especially in School Sector, felt their toi-
lets were high quality and functioned well. In School Sector, the only complaint re-
searchers received was that the hinges for one resident’s toilet door were on the wrong
side, making it awkward to open and close given the tight space constraints. In Project
Utthan slums, many residents—including those we did not invite to participate in the
survey—volunteered complaints about project toilets. Some complaints included us-
ing low-quality construction materials and not installing septic tanks. These complaints
were not universal; some residents were satisfied with their toilets, but there was a clear
difference in residents’ descriptions of  each project’s toilets.
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4.5.6 Toilet Condition and Open Defecation
I hypothesized that people were more likely to use project toilets they rated as being
in better condition. To test whether self-reports on toilet condition predicted open
defecation, a logistic regression model was used. The logistic regression model used
self-reports of  initial and subsequent toilet condition to predict open defecation as a
dichotomous outcome. Initial toilet condition was a statistically significant predictor
of  the likelihood of  open defecation according to a Wald test, z (76) = -2.0, p = .042.
Subsequent toilet condition was a marginally statistically significant predictor of  the
likelihood of  open defecation, z (76) = -1.9, p = .062. Compared to a model containing
only initial toilet condition, a model with both initial and subsequent toilet condition
reduces deviance by a statistically significant amount, 2(1, n = 78) = 5.1, p = .024, so
both predictors were retained in the final model. The overall model was statistically
significant according to the likelihood ratio test, 2(2, n = 79) = 21, p < .001. The
c index for this model was 0.85, which indicates excellent discrimination according to
rules of  thumb for interpreting the c index from Hosmer et al. (2013).
The odds ratios for both predictor variables—along with 95% confidence intervals
(calculated based on the coefficients’ standard errors)—are provided in table 4. As-
suming the logit is linear in both predictor variables, an interviewee who rated initial
toilet condition one point higher than another had roughly one-fifth the odds (OR =
0.20) of  practicing opening defecation. The reduction in the odds of  open defecation
multiplies with each one-point increase in self-reports of  initial toilet condition (TOI-
LETCOND1.REV). For example, an interviewee who rates initial toilet condition two
points higher than another had 4.0% the odds of  practicing open defecation. The odds
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ratio for subsequent toilet condition (TOILETCOND2.REV) had a similar magnitude
(OR = 0.31) to the odds ratio for initial toilet condition.
Self-reports of  toilet condition helped predict whether interviewees practiced open
defecation. Other predictors, including gender, whether the household already had a
toilet before the start of  each project, and whether someone in the household requested
a toilet, did not make statistically significant predictions of  the likelihood of  open defe-
cation. These results suggest that most people in the slums wanted to use toilets rather
than defecate in the open, but only if  the toilets were built well. Poorer toilet quality in
Project Utthan seems to, at least partly, explain why Project Utthan was ineffective at
reducing open defecation.
The analysis above only considered toilets constructed through either project, but
some households had toilets before the start of  each project. It would be interesting
to investigate whether the relationships between toilet condition and open defecation
hold for non-project toilets; however, such an analysis was not possible. None of  the
households (for which the necessary data were collected) that had a toilet before the
start of  the project practiced open defecation. Some of  the already-constructed toilets
might have come from projects other than the ones investigated, so this finding does
not necessarily mean that self-constructed toilets are better at reducing open defecation.
4.5.7 Individual Participation
Beneficiaries’ individual participation in either project might predict whether they
requested a toilet, received a toilet, used the toilet they received (if  they received one),
and how they rated the condition of  their toilet. However, most individuals did not
participate in the project aside from contributing to the cost of  an individual household
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toilet. Figure 7 shows high rates of  individual participation as contributing resources
in the fifth project stage, implement the program, for people who received toilets. In
fact, everyone living in households that received toilets through one of  the projects con-
tributed resources in the fifth project stage except for two of  the fourteen households
in Shivaji Ward that received toilets.
Slum residents’ lack of  awareness about the community group (CGCs in Project
Uday and Basti Vikas Samitis in Project Utthan) was a factor in low individual partic-
ipation (see figure 8). If  individuals wanted to communicate their preferences during
a given project stage, they would have needed to communicate their preferences to
community-group members, who would then communicate them to project organizers.
For example, individuals who wanted their slum to receive community toilets rather
than household toilets would have needed to communicate that preference to members
of  the community group. But, as shown in figure 8, few residents knew of  the existence
of  their slum’s community group and therefore did not have the opportunity to share
their preferences.
Low individual participation was a surprising finding. Before the start of  the sur-
vey, project organizers had given me the impression that the breadth and intensity of
individual participation was greater than indicated by the survey data. To ensure that
the data were valid, I asked the field researchers if  residents really did not extensively
participate in either project. Based on their conversations with survey respondents and
others in the slums, the field researchers described slum residents in general as being
uninformed about the project and uninterested in having a greater role. Many residents
knew about the projects, but only after construction (e.g., on roads) began. And even
if  residents had been informed earlier, many would not have been able play a greater
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86
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Baghmugalia Shivaji WardSchool SectorJatkhedi
Slum Name
R
at
io
of
re
sp
on
d
en
ts
th
at
k
n
ew
a
b
ou
t
co
m
m
u
n
it
y
gr
ou
p
Sample group
Did not receive toilet
Did receive toilet
Figure 8. Ratio of  residents aware of  community group
87
role because they had to leave the slum for work early in the morning and only returned
later in the evening.
Because individual participation was similar in both projects’ slums, it does not ex-
plain differences in the success of  each project with respect to reducing open defecation.
The main finding with respect to individual participation is that individuals did not par-
ticipate in either project except to contribute money for an individual household toilet,
and a significant reason for limited individual participation is that few residents knew
about their slum’s community group.
4.5.8 Equitable Distribution of  Benefits
4.5.8.1 Need as Predictor of  Receiving a Toilet
The variable HADTOILET indicates whether a household had a toilet before the
start of  either project, so it also indicates whether each household needed a toilet. A
Pearson chi-squared test of  independence was used to test the null hypothesis that the
proportion of  households that already had toilets (HADTOILET) was the same in
households that received toilets and households that did not receive toilets in Project
Utthan. The Pearson chi-squared test statistic is 2(1, n = 98) = 44, p < .001. Therefore,
the null hypothesis was rejected. The phi coefficient is 0.69, which indicates a strong
association between receiving a toilet and not having a toilet already.
A Pearson chi-squared test of  independence was used to test the same hypothesis
in Project Uday. The Pearson chi-squared test statistic is 2(1, n = 96) = 26, p < .001.
Therefore, the null hypothesis was also rejected for Project Uday. The phi coefficient
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is 0.54, which indicates a strong association between receiving a toilet and not having a
toilet already.
4.5.8.2 Socioeonomic Status as Predictor of  Receiving a Toilet
Hierarchical logistic regression models were used to test whether socioeconomic
status predicted receiving a toilet above and beyond needing a toilet. Table 5 summarizes
the socioeconomic status variables.
In Project Utthan, none of  the socioeconomic variables was statistically significant
above and beyond needing a toilet. The final logistic regression model predicted receiv-
ing a toilet with needing a toilet; the model was statistically significant, 2(1, n = 98) =
57, p < .001. The c index for this model was 0.84, which indicates excellent discrimina-
tion. The coefficient of  the predictor HADTOILET, which indicates needing a toilet,
was statistically significant, z (96) = -4.4, p < .001 (see table 6). The odds of  a household
receiving a toilet if  it already had a toilet were about one-hundredth of  a household that
did not already have a toilet (table 7).
For Project Uday, the final model uses both already having a toilet (HADTOILET)
and caste (CASTENG) to predict receiving a toilet in Project Uday. The model was
significant, 2(1, n = 97) = 33, p < .001 (see table 8). The c index for this model was
0.89, which indicates excellent discrimination. The odds ratios for both predictors and
their 95% confidence intervals are provided in table 9. Respondents in households that
already had a toilet had roughly one-hundredth the odds of  getting a toilet as compared
to households that did not already have a toilet. And respondents in a lower caste had
roughly thirty-eight times greater odds of  getting a toilet than respondents not in a lower
caste.
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Table 3. Toilet condition survey questions and variables
Variable
name Survey question
Running text
synonyms Note
TOILET-
COND1-
.REV
What condition was
the toilet in when it
was first built?
initial toilet quality
rating or condition
Toilets constructed
roughly six months
before survey
TOILET-
COND2-
.REV
What condition is
the toilet in now?
subsequent toilet
quality rating or
condition
Self-report of  toilet
condition at the
time of  the survey
Table 4. Estimated odds ratios for open defecation
OR 95% CI
TOILETCOND1.REV 0.1997 [0.042, 0.95]
TOILETCOND2.REV 0.3055 [0.088, 1.1]
Notes : OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence intervals
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Table 5. Socioeconomic status indicators
Variable name
Survey
question Responses Calculations
CASTENG What type of
caste or tribe
do you belong
to?
Five categories of
caste or tribe
The value of  this variable
is binary and has been
calculated based on
membership (or not) in
lower castes.
EDUCATION What is the
highest grade
in school that
you
completed?
Highest grade
completed
Qualitative answers
converted to grade
numbers (secondary
education = 10 years;
higher secondary
education = 12 years;
bachelors = 15 years;
masters = 17 years)
INCOME What was your
average
monthly
income over
the past year?
Value in rupees NA
Table 6. Fitted logistic regression model of  receiving a toilet (TOILETREC) on already
having a toilet (HADTOILET), Project Utthan
Coefficient SE z df p 95% CI
(Intercept) 0.965 0.294 3.28 96 .0010 [0.39, 1.5]
HADTOILET -4.63 1.05 -4.39 96 < .001 [-6.7, -2.6]
Notes : SE = standard error; df = degrees of  freedom; CI = confidence intervals
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Table 7. Estimated odds ratio for receiving a toilet, Project Utthan
OR 95% CI
HADTOILET 0.009768 [0.0012, 0.077]
Notes : OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence intervals
Table 8. Fitted logistic regression model of  receiving a toilet (TOILETREC) on already
having a toilet (HADTOILET) and being in a lower caste (CASTENG), Project Uday
Coefficient SE z df p 95% CI
(Intercept) -0.385 0.324 -1.19 93 .23 [-1.0, 0.25]
HADTOILET -4.49 1.20 -3.75 93 < .001 [-6.8, -2.1]
CASTENG1 3.63 1.06 3.41 93 < .001 [1.5, 5.7]
Notes : SE = standard error; df = degrees of  freedom; CI = confidence intervals
Table 9. Estimated odds ratios for receiving a toilet, Project Uday
OR 95% CI
HADTOILET 0.011 [0.0011, 0.12]
CASTENG1 37.71 [4.7, 300]
Notes : OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence intervals
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The final logistic regression model shows that lower socioeconomic status, at least
as indicated by caste, was associated with greater odds of  receiving a toilet above and
beyond whether the household already had a toilet. Membership in a lower caste by
slum and whether the household received a toilet is shown in figure 9. The slums in
Project Utthan (Baghmugalia and Jatkhedi) show similar patterns between slums and
according to whether the household received a toilet. That is, there tended to be a
higher proportion of  people from lower castes. However, caste did not follow the same
pattern in Project Uday slums. In School Sector, there is a difference in caste between
households that received toilets and those that did not. Households that received toilets
tended to be in lower castes, and households that did not receive toilets were not in
lower castes. Shivaji Ward tended to have households not in lower castes whether the
household received a toilet or not. The results for Project Uday with respect to caste
may have to do with the particular makeup of  the slums included in this study rather
than with Project Uday’s toilet distribution.
4.5.9 Summary
The results suggest that Project Uday was effective at reducing open defecation, but
Project Utthan was not. Respondents in households that received a toilet tended to use
it (as opposed to practicing open defecation) if  they rated the toilet condition highly. In
both projects, not having a toilet (i.e., need) was the best predictor of  receiving a toilet.
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4.6 Discussion
One of  the most significant debates in Indian sanitation is on whether beneficiaries
should receive subsidies for toilet construction. In both projects, beneficiaries received
a high subsidy (roughly 90% of  the cost of  a toilet). Unfortunately, all beneficiaries re-
ceived the same subsidy, so it is impossible to investigate whether lower subsidies would
have reduced open defecation further. One factor which clearly influenced open defe-
cation was beneficiaries’ ratings of  the quality of  the their toilets. The results indicate
that slum residents were much more likely to use their new toilets if  they rated the toilet
quality highly. In general, beneficiaries seemed to want to use their toilets if  they were
high quality and functioned properly. Slum residents informally told field researchers
that there was less and less space for open defecation due to population growth in the
area. The convenience of  open defecation decreases as cities grow and become more
densely populated. A no-subsidy approach might have improved toilet quality because
individual households would have been more invested in and had more control over
toilet construction. Advocates of  the no-subsidy approach argue that it is also the most
sustainable approach in the long-term; they believe that “lasting behavioural change
requires strong intrinsic motivation and that people are more likely to use and value
things they have had to pay for” (Pattanayak et al. 2009, 580). On the other hand, a
no-subsidy approach might have excluded the poorest of  the poor from the program.
It would be valuable to return to the slums in several years to compare toilet condition
and use between households that constructed toilets on their own and households that
received subsidized toilets through these two projects.
Elite capture is a common finding in participatory projects, even though benefi-
ciary participation aims to make development more equitable (Mansuri and Rao 2004;
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Narayan 1995; Pozzoni and Kumar 2005; Mansuri and Rao 2013). There is no evi-
dence that elites captured a disproportionate share of  benefits, at least with respect to
toilets, in either project. On the contrary, there is evidence that toilets may have been
distributed with a bias toward households with lower socioeconomic status. Sample
sizes were relatively small, though, due to limited resources for the project, and it is
possible that larger samples (which would have greater statistical power) would yield
logistic regression models with statistically significant socioeconomic indicators. Even
so, not having a toilet (by itself) yielded logistic regression models with acceptable or
even excellent discrimination for predicting which households received toilets.
One factor in this outcome was project organizers’ role in selecting the households
that received toilets. In both projects, the organizers applied criteria, one of  which was
needing a toilet, to select households that would receive toilets. In fact, need seemed
to be the most influential factor in selecting beneficiaries. Few households that already
had a toilet received another one. In Project Uday, low income was not a criterion for
receiving a toilet, so the finding that income did not predict receiving a toilet is not
surprising. In Project Utthan, low income was a criterion, but income did not predict
receiving a toilet above and beyond needing a toilet. One explanation for this finding is
that the households that needed toilets in Project Utthan slums were those with lower
incomes. Another is that so many households in Project Utthan met the low income
criterion that the criterion did not exclude many households. In either case, need was
the best predictor of  receiving a toilet in Project Utthan.
Low-income households in both projects could have been excluded if  they were
unable to pay the subsidized cost for the toilet. But there is no evidence that such
exclusion occurred in either project. This finding suggests that the subsidized cost of
toilets in both projects was low enough not to exclude households with very low income.
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Community groups approved the subsidy amount, but the amount was determined by
the project organizers and was the same in all slums.
That both projects had sufficient funding likely contributed to the absence of  elite
capture. Sufficient funding allowed the project organizers to make the subsidy amount
high enough that it did not exclude households with very low income. Sufficient funding
also allowed the project organizers to distribute many toilets, and there was little basis
for competition among beneficiaries—competition that elites would likely win—for
toilets.
Both projects created small community groups that served as beneficiaries’ represen-
tatives in the project. Members of  the community group invested more in the project
(at least in terms of  time) and received more from the project in the form of  leadership
training and other kinds of  training. But increasing individual beneficiary participa-
tion would have been challenging. As noted above, many beneficiaries were laborers
with long work hours that precluded them from serving as community group members
and attending the necessary meetings and trainings. But many residents did not even
know about community groups and therefore had little opportunity to voice their opin-
ions. Project organizers and community group members might not have been able to
increase individual participation, but they could have better informed intended benefi-
ciaries about the projects.
The practical challenge of  including many beneficiaries as participants in develop-
ment projects raises the issue of  whether participation or project outcomes are more
important. Individual participation was low in both projects, but there is no evidence
that elite capture with respect to toilet distribution occurred in either project. If  the
motivation for including beneficiaries is following democratic principles, then bene-
ficiaries should participate regardless of  whether their participation improves project
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outcomes. On the other hand, if  project outcomes are more important, beneficiaries
should participate only if  their participation improves outcomes. My aim is not to argue
that beneficiary participation or project outcomes are more important. Rather, I aim to
highlight the fact that deciding which one is more important is a value judgment, distinct
from investigating whether beneficiary participation improved project outcomes.
The findings from this case-study echo Conning and Kevane (2002), a literature
review on community-based targeting mechanisms. The authors found that community
groups were not necessarily better at targeting project benefits: “There are simply no
automatic guarantees that a community group or agent who lives and interacts with the
local population, will perform better than a bureaucrat, across the range of  measures
of  performance” (381-382). Community groups tend to know more about members of
their community and, therefore, who is most in need of  assistance, but communities are
diverse and may or may not prefer to direct project benefits to the poor, even though
they tend to have better knowledge about who is poorest. There is evidence that more
heterogenous communities are less likely to direct project benefits to those most in need
(Conning and Kevane 2002). Project organizers are also diverse and might not target
those most in need, but in the two projects in this case-study, it appears that project
organizers targeted those who needed toilets.
4.7 Conclusion
This case-study had a small project sample size (n = 2), and therefore the results
support no general conclusions. However, the results suggest conditions that facili-
tate equitable distribution of  project benefits. The party that selected beneficiaries, the
project organizer in both cases, aimed to distribute toilets to households that needed
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them. Beneficiaries monitored and approved project organizers’ decisions, including
those made about beneficiary selection and on setting the subsidy amount for toilets.
Sufficient project funding meant that project organizers were able to subsidize toilets
enough that low-income households were not excluded from getting them. Sufficient
project funding also meant little or no competition among beneficiaries for project ben-
efits (i.e., individual household toilets), and households that needed and wanted toilets
tended to received them.
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Chapter 5
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON BENEFICIARY
PARTICIPATION
This review uses a new analytic lens, the conceptual framework and typology of
beneficiary participation presented in chapter 3, to analyze the empirical evidence about
the effects of  beneficiary participation.
5.1 Types of  Empirical Studies
Beneficiary participation is a complex phenomenon over which researchers have
limited control, so its effects are difficult to evaluate in a given study, even if  the study
has a large sample size. As a result, empirical studies of  the effects of  beneficiary par-
ticipation tend to have methodological weaknesses, which do not necessarily invalidate
their results but do serve as limitations.
Empirical studies on the effects of  beneficiary participation vary according to their
sample size. Studies with large sample sizes tend to use statistical methods to evaluate
effects of  participation on outcomes in several projects (Mansuri and Rao 2004). One
method, the systematic case review method, has been employed in Finsterbusch and
Van Wicklin (1987), Narayan (1995), and Paul (1987). Systematic case review is similar
to content analysis (e.g., Ryan and Bernard 2000); researchers assign semi-quantitative
codes to information in reports on many projects and then assess relationships between
variables (e.g., project characteristics, beneficiary participation, and project outcomes),
often with statistical analyses. Systematic case reviews have at least two disadvantages
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related to their use of  secondary data. First, the data are further removed from the
phenomena they represent, so their validity is reduced. Second, case reports may not
contain data on all the variables that researchers are interested in. Finsterbusch and Van
Wicklin identify this problem as one of  their study’s weaknesses. Meta-analyses16 are
similar to systematic case reviews in that they both use findings from existing studies. In
a meta-analysis, researchers estimate an intervention’s treatment effect more precisely
than they could from a single study, which necessarily has a smaller sample size than
many studies combined (Higgins and Green 2011). I found only one meta-analysis that
considers beneficiary participation in the literature. Waddington and Snilstveit (2009)
is a meta-analysis of  the effect of  water, sanitation, and hygiene interventions on diar-
rhea morbidity in children less than five years old. This meta-analysis treats beneficiary
participation as a dichotomous variable (i.e., beneficiaries either did or did not partici-
pate in the project), which limits its value in a detailed discussion about the effects of
different kinds of  beneficiary participation. Impact evaluations use primary data and
can produce valid, generalizable findings, but impact evaluations on beneficiary partic-
ipation are rarely rigorous enough to do so (Pozzoni and Kumar 2005). The authors
of  one empirical-literature review write, “most such [participatory] projects lack careful
evaluations with good treatment and control groups and with baseline and follow-up
data” (Mansuri and Rao 2004, 32).
Researchers who investigate whether beneficiary participation empowers beneficia-
ries tend to use case-studies, which have small sample sizes. These researchers use case-
16Researchers use the term meta-analysis with different meanings. Some researchers use meta-analysis to
refer to the method I have called systematic case review (e.g., Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010b; Mansuri
and Rao 2004). Even though systematic case reviews may use statistical methods, they are not meta-
analyses, at least not as I have defined the term meta-analysis. Systematic case reviews do not, for example,
adjust for the sample sizes of  each study they include to more accurately calculate the pooled effect size
of  an intervention; systematic case reviews are more similar to content analysis, as noted above.
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studies because capabilities and power relations are locally situated and understanding
their local context is essential (Eversole 2003). One disadvantage of  case-studies is
their small sample size, which leads to less variation in dependent variables and makes
generalization impossible or at least much more tenuous.
5.2 A Typology of  Beneficiary Participation
This chapter uses a new typology of  beneficiary participation, presented in chapter
3, as its analytic lens. Figure 10 and figure 11 show the model of  a participatory project
and how the new typology of  beneficiary participation relates to it, respectively.
5.3 Beneficiary Participation for Empowerment
One of  the most prominent debates about beneficiary participation is the reason for
using it in development projects (goals according to figure 11). The most significant de-
bate about the purpose of  beneficiary participation is whether beneficiary participation
is an end in itself  or the means to an end, namely, better project outcomes. Advocates
of  the position that beneficiary participation is an end in itself  view beneficiary partici-
pation as an empowering process or at least as a process that can empower beneficiaries
(Nelson and Wright 1995; Pelling 1998; Clayton, Oakley, and Pratt 1997).
5.3.1 Types of  Beneficiary Participation for Empowerment
According to advocates of  the position that beneficiary participation should em-
power beneficiaries, beneficiary participation should have the following features: par-
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ticipants are representative of  intended beneficiaries (i.e., marginalized groups are not
excluded); more empowerment results from more participant control of  the project
(i.e., they contribute as much decision-making as possible); and more empowerment
results from participants’ contributing decision-making in more project stages. Essen-
tially, as participants gain more control over the project, their empowerment increases.
One author writes, “Empowerment is a result of  participation in decisionmaking [sic]”
(Narayan 1995, 26). Another writes, “A fundamental prerequisite for this [empower-
ment] is a distribution of  power which allows individuals to influence all decisions af-
fecting their lives” (Lane 1995, 189).
5.3.2 Criticism of  Beneficiary Participation for Empowerment
The debate over the true purpose of  beneficiary participation is the basis for a line
of  critical discourse about it, specifically that even though its purpose is empowerment
it rarely leads to empowerment in practice. Nelson and Wright state, “ ‘participation,’ if
it is to be more than a palliative, involves shifts in power” (1995, 1). There are two main
ways that power is conceptualized with respect to empowerment: power-to and power-
over. Empowerment as power-to refers to increasing a person’s self-efficacy, that is, his
or her ability to affect the world to achieve his or her ends. Empowerment as power-
over refers to ending oppressive relationships between the powerful and the powerless
(Nelson and Wright 1995; Allen 2011; Rowlands 1995).
Critics of  beneficiary participation argue that, in practice, it fails to change power
relations between marginalized groups (such as women, the poor, and ethnic minorities)
and those with privileged status. Some also argue that beneficiary participation actually
legitimizes the status quo or even disempowers beneficiaries (Brock 2002; Dill 2009).
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In my view, beneficiary participation is incompatible with, or at least incidental to,
changing power-over relationships. There seems to be consensus among scholars that
empowerment requires shifts in power relations and that such shifts must be initiated
by oppressed people themselves (Freire 2000; Rowlands 1995; Allen 2011). Frederick
Douglass, an American abolitionist who escaped slavery, expressed a similar sentiment
in a rather famous statement from a speech in 1857: “Power concedes nothing with-
out a demand. It never did and it never will” (Douglass 1985, 204). One researcher
ascribed failure in a participatory fisheries project in Zambia to organizers’ failing to
devolve more decision-making to beneficiaries. He writes that there is “an inherent
conflict between the power held by outsiders over financial resources and stated objec-
tives of  ‘empowering’ the intended beneficiaries of  development programs” (Hussein
1995, 170).
Beneficiary participation is structured by the project sponsor, who ultimately con-
trols the project, including the extent to which beneficiaries participate. Project spon-
sors can, and sometimes do, cede power to beneficiaries to make decisions—for ex-
ample, about the design and implementation of  the project. But project sponsors only
cede as much power as they want to. Martena Taliaferno’s words, although written in
the context of  US education, resonate: “True power (empowerment) cannot be benefi-
cently bestowed upon one group by another . . . Moreover, those who propose to ‘give’
power often return to monitor, supervise, or redefine that gift to keep it within their
control or in their own image” (1991, 1). One review of  beneficiary participation found
that project organizers rarely devolve a significant amount of  decision-making power
to beneficiaries (Pozzoni and Kumar 2005). Beneficiaries, as participants in develop-
ment projects, can certainly learn new skills and increase their self-efficacy (power-to),
but beneficiary participation does not fundamentally change power relations between
105
the powerful and the powerless; therefore, beneficiary participation does not empower
beneficiaries in the full sense of  the word empowerment.
5.3.3 Empirical Evidence
Empirical evidence supports the view that beneficiary participation fails to change
power relations between marginalized beneficiaries and others. When elite capture oc-
curs, it indicates that the power-over relations of  marginalized beneficiaries did not
change, and most empirical studies that examine whether elite capture occurred in a
given participatory project find that it did. Elite capture occurs when elites among the
group of  intended beneficiaries shape project goals to fit their interests, exert control
over the project, or capture a disproportionate share of  a project’s benefits (Platteau
2008). One mechanism for elite capture is formal exclusion. Formal exclusion means
disproportionately excluding marginalized people from decision-making fora in a given
project, which leads to the overrepresentation of  local elites (Pozzoni and Kumar 2005).
Formal exclusion can only occur when the channel of  beneficiary participation is indi-
rect (i.e., when a subset of  intended beneficiaries participate on behalf  of  all intended
beneficiaries). A common organizational structure for indirect beneficiary participation
is a small group or council. One review of  beneficiary participation states, “Overall, the
evidence suggests that participants tend to be disproportionately from wealthier, more
educated, and more politically connected households” (Mansuri and Rao 2013, 128).
Another mechanism for elite capture is informal or substantive exclusion. Informal exclu-
sion means marginalized people are formally included as participants in a given project,
but their involvement is less influential than that of  others’. (Informal exclusion can
occur when the channel of  beneficiary participation is either indirect or direct.) Partici-
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patory spaces do not inherently put participants on equal footing. In fact, participatory
spaces tend to do the opposite as power differences among participants outside partic-
ipatory spaces are reproduced inside participatory spaces (Pozzoni and Kumar 2005).
These power differences may be reproduced for a variety of  reasons including the fol-
lowing: marginalized people have less capability to persuasively argue their views (e.g.,
because they tend to be less educated) and therefore have less influence (Johnson and
Wilson 2000; Leach, Mearns, and Scoones 1999); marginalized people might not feel
comfortable opposing those with power in open fora (Kolavalli and Kerr 2002), possi-
bly due to social norms (Bhatia 1999); and marginalized people may work for elites and
thus be reluctant to oppose elites in group discussions (Bhatia 1999; Platteau 2008).
The claim that beneficiary participation can lead to empowerment seems to use cir-
cular reasoning because, in order for beneficiary participation to be empowering, bene-
ficiaries need to be empowered before participating in a given development project. As
shown in the empirical literature cited above, beneficiary participation tends to repro-
duce existing power relations. Whatever causes beneficiary empowerment, then, must
happen outside of  beneficiary participation, or at least the types of  beneficiary participa-
tion that typically happen in development projects. For example, participatory activities
often present beneficiaries with the opportunity to list their interests, needs, capabili-
ties, and assets. Even though listing activities are sometimes assumed to bring about
empowerment by themselves, they do not by themselves address power differences
among beneficiaries or between beneficiaries and project organizers (Masschelein and
Quaghebeur 2006).
Some scholars and beneficiaries do not object to elites’ privileged status in partici-
patory projects because local elites often have the ability to improve or worsen project
outcomes depending on whether they support or oppose the project. Two scholars
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write, “the issue may not be so much how to avoid elite domination . . . Rather, the
issue should be how to best use the power and energy of  the elite to serve the poor”
(Pozzoni and Kumar 2005, 12). Beneficiaries sometimes view elite capture similarly.
Platteau (2008) finds that, in certain cultures, community members view elite capture as
necessary and justified (see also Rao and Ibáñez 2007). But beneficiaries may also view
elite capture negatively. One researcher relates that beneficiaries of  a low-income hous-
ing program in Hyderabad, Pakistan, soured on their leaders’ corruption and adopted
the following refrain: “Put an end to our leaders … we ourselves can do business with
the HDA [the project organizer]” (van der Linden 1997, 88).
Advocates of  beneficiary empowerment should use the term grassroots to describe
the kind of  movements they support. Grassroots has retained its meaning as a descrip-
tor for movements that arise from the initiative of  local people and are truly indepen-
dent of  those in power (Pelling 1998; Escobar 1995). Grassroots movements seems syn-
onymous with the terms community-led development and community-driven development. For
example, Mansuri and Rao define community-driven development as occurring when
“communities have direct control over key project decisions, including management of
investment funds” (2004, 2). But community-led development and community-driven development
are not the same as grassroots movements. Development scholars usually use community-led de-
velopment and community-driven development to describe projects in which project organizers
have given beneficiaries more control, rather than projects that beneficiaries have initi-
ated and organized. For example, a World Bank document holds that community-driven
development “gives control of  decisions and resources to community groups” (Dongier
et al. 2001, 303; emphasis added). Community-led development and community-driven develop-
ment describe a form of  beneficiary participation wherein beneficiaries have relatively
strong control over projects, but as I argued above, such arrangements do not repre-
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sent fundamental shifts in power relations and therefore cannot lead to empowerment
in the full sense of  the term. Beneficiary participation can be an element in social service
programs, whereas grassroots movements are the product of  activism.
5.4 Beneficiary Participation for Better Project Outcomes
Beneficiary participation is also seen as a way to improve project outcomes. Bene-
ficiary participation has been claimed to achieve the following: increasing projects’ ef-
fectiveness (Cleaver 1999; Eversole 2003; Mansuri and Rao 2004); increasing projects’
efficiency (Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin 1987; Chambers 1995; Nelson and Wright
1995); sustaining benefits (Narayan 1995; Cooke and Kothair 2001; Mansuri and Rao
2004; Pozzoni and Kumar 2005); and allocating benefits more equitably (Narayan 1995;
Mansuri and Rao 2004).
5.4.1 Improving Effectiveness
One claim about the advantage of  beneficiary participation is that it improves project
effectiveness (Cleaver 1999; Eversole 2003; Mansuri and Rao 2004). For example, a
project that aims to vaccinate beneficiaries would vaccinate more beneficiaries if  they
participated in the project. One way beneficiaries contribute to project effectiveness
is by contributing information about local conditions, which helps project organizers
adapt projects to those conditions (Eversole 2003; Cleaver 1999).
Two systematic case reviews conclude that beneficiary participation improves
projects’ effectiveness. Paul (1987) examines the effect of  beneficiary participation in
forty World Bank projects in the following sectors: urban housing, health, and irriga-
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tion. He finds that beneficiary participation was associated with a better match between
beneficiaries’ preferences and project goals and greater beneficiary demand for project
services. In other words, beneficiaries’ contributing information about their preferences
led to better-designed and more effective projects. Narayan (1995) evaluates participa-
tion’s influence on project effectiveness in 121 rural water supply projects. She defines
beneficiary participation as unidimensional with beneficiaries’ contributing information
as low participation and beneficiaries’ contributing more decision-making as high par-
ticipation. She finds that, “Beneficiary participation is the single most important factor
contributing to project effectiveness” (1995, 75) and that beneficiary participation in all
project stages is most effective. These two studies find that beneficiary participation
tended to positively impact project outcomes even though context and project charac-
teristics vary.
The meta-analysis of  water supply, sanitation, and hygiene interventions by Wadding-
ton and Snilstveit (2009) finds that beneficiary participation (again, coded only as a be-
ing present or absent) did not have a statistically significant relationship with projects’
effectiveness.
Two impact evaluations authored by Isham and Kähkönen (2002a, 2002b) investi-
gate the effects of  beneficiary participation in water supply projects. Isham and Kähkö-
nen (2002a) investigates water-quality improvement projects in forty-four villages in
Central Java. The authors investigate beneficiary participation in decision-making about
project design (e.g., selecting a well versus a piped water connection) and participa-
tion in operation and maintenance (e.g., contributing money and labor to water supply
construction). They find that, although beneficiaries tended not to contribute to de-
sign decision-making, when beneficiaries did, they tended to prefer private water con-
nections and were more satisfied with project outcomes. And when households con-
110
tributed resources (i.e., money or labor) to water supply construction, the water supplies
functioned better. Both of  these effects of  beneficiary participation were associated
with positive impacts on beneficiaries’ health. The second study (Isham and Kähkönen
2002b) investigates three rural water projects, one in Sri Lanka and two in India, which
comprised a total of  fifty communities. The findings were similar to those in Isham and
Kähkönen (2002a): beneficiaries’ participation in making decisions about project design
and beneficiaries’ monitoring construction increased satisfaction and health benefits.
Other literature reviews identify additional studies that conclude beneficiary partici-
pation improves project effectiveness, but the studies have methodological weaknesses,
so they do not justify general conclusions about the effect of  beneficiary participation
on project effectiveness (Pozzoni and Kumar 2005; Mansuri and Rao 2013).
5.4.2 Improving Efficiency
Another claimed advantage of  beneficiary participation is greater project efficiency,
also called cost-effectiveness (Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin 1987; Chambers 1995; Nel-
son and Wright 1995). Efficiency is the ratio of  a project’s benefits to its costs (Rossi,
Lipsey, and Freeman 2004b). High efficiency is necessary for scaling up (i.e., implement-
ing strategies on a large scale) because successful, but expensive, strategies are difficult
to fund and implement on large scales.
Projects that employ beneficiary participation cost more to organize because inter-
acting with beneficiaries requires additional project resources (e.g., organizing commu-
nity meetings and training community groups). A study of  World Bank projects finds
that participatory projects cost between 10% and 15% more to prepare and required
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more intensive supervision (Hentschel 1994). Narayan (1995) estimates that beneficiary
participation costs between 15% and 20% of  participatory projects’ budgets.
For beneficiary participation to improve efficiency, it must improve effectiveness
more than enough to offset its additional costs. There are several ways that beneficiary
participation might improve efficiency. First, employing beneficiaries as local labor in
the implementation and operation project stages can reduce costs (Conning and Kevane
2002; Narayan 1995; Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin 1987). Second, beneficiaries’ mon-
itoring project implementation can reduce corruption and therefore costs (Kolavalli
and Kerr 2002). Third, beneficiaries’ contributing information and decision-making
throughout a project can reduce conflict between beneficiaries and organizers. For
example, if  beneficiaries helped design a project, it would be more likely to meet their
needs and fit their interests, and they would be less likely to object to the project’s design
in later project stages; if  beneficiaries demand changes in later stages, project organiz-
ers may have to make costly changes to the project design (Narayan 1995; Paul 1987).
Finally, beneficiary participation can directly reduce project costs, at least from the per-
spective of  project organizers, when beneficiaries volunteer their own resources, that is,
money or labor (Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin 1987; Chambers 1995). However, it is
nonsensical to use beneficiary participation for this reason because beneficiary contri-
butions of  money and labor do not necessarily reduce overall project costs. Requiring
beneficiaries to donate money and labor only shifts costs from sponsors to beneficia-
ries, who presumably are in need of  assistance rather than additional financial burdens.
For example, one community health program in Mexico did little more than extract free
labor from beneficiaries under the guise of  participation (Zakus 1998).
The impact of  beneficiary participation on efficiency is even more difficult to study
than the impact of  beneficiary participation on effectiveness. Studying effectiveness re-
112
quires data about beneficiary participation, project characteristics, context, and benefits.
Studying efficiency requires all the same information in addition to information about
project costs.
Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence to support or refute the claim that
beneficiary participation improves project efficiency. In their systematic case review,
Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin (1987) assess the effect of  beneficiary participation in
fifty-two USAID infrastructure development projects.17 They define beneficiary partic-
ipation according to beneficiaries’ involvement in a given project stage but not accord-
ing to what beneficiaries contributed or the channel for beneficiary participation. They
find that beneficiary participation contributed moderately to project efficiency but was
seldom the most important factor. And Paul (1987) finds that participation reduces con-
flict and makes projects run more smoothly. But these systematic case reviews rely on
researchers’ subjective judgments about cases and, therefore, provide limited support
for the claim that beneficiary participation improves projects’ efficiency.
Impact evaluations may yield results with higher validity. One impact evaluation
studied the effect of  beneficiary participation (defined as decision-making authority
over project implementation) on the efficiency of  South African public works programs
(Hoddinott et al. 2001). This study finds that beneficiary participation improved effi-
ciency. The authors attribute cost reduction to beneficiaries’ having better knowledge
of  local conditions than bureaucrats, though the authors did not collect data on bene-
ficiaries’ and bureaucrats’ knowledge of  local conditions. This study is the only impact
evaluation of  the effect of  beneficiary participation on efficiency that was found. One
17Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin define project effectiveness as “the coders’ subjective judgments of
the ratio of  total benefits to total costs, both economic and non-economic” (1987, 14), so even though
the authors use the word effectiveness, they actually studied the effect of  beneficiary participation on project
efficiency.
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literature review (Pozzoni and Kumar 2005) discusses additional empirical studies on
efficiency and beneficiary participation, but those studies either provide anecdotal evi-
dence (e.g., Schmidt 1996), or they do not actually study beneficiary participation. For
example, Van Zyl et al. (1995) evaluates a decentralized rural development program in
northeast Brazil. Decentralization is not entirely synonymous with beneficiary partic-
ipation because decentralization devolves policymaking to local government agencies,
rather than beneficiaries themselves (Bardhan 2002). Van Zyl et al. (1995) finds that
the decentralized program was more efficient than earlier, less decentralized programs
partly because earlier programs were slowed by inefficient bureaucracies in state and
federal governments.
Overall, the claim that beneficiary participation improves efficiency is not well-
supported by empirical evidence.
5.4.3 Sustaining Outcomes
Beneficiary participation is also claimed to help sustain project outcomes (Narayan
1995; Cooke and Kothair 2001; Mansuri and Rao 2004; Pozzoni and Kumar 2005).
Project outcomes would be sustained, for example, if  beneficiaries continued to operate
an irrigation system after the project that created the irrigation system formally ended.
The most popular claim about how beneficiary participation helps sustain outcomes is
the claim that participation increases beneficiaries’ commitment to or sense of  owner-
ship of  the project (e.g., Kolavalli and Kerr 2002; Clayton, Oakley, and Pratt 1997). A
sense of  ownership is usually claimed to result from beneficiaries’ decision-making or
contributing resources (e.g., Okun 1988).
Evaluating the contribution of  beneficiary participation to sustained project benefits
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is at least as difficult as evaluating the effect of  beneficiary participation on project
efficiency. Researchers or project organizers need to revisit projects years after their
formal completion and collect new data. Few projects’ long-term impacts are evaluated
regardless of  whether beneficiaries participated in them. Two comprehensive reviews
of  water supply, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) interventions commented on the lack
of  long-term monitoring and evaluation in the WASH sector. Only three of  thirty-eight
studies in Fewtrell et al. (2005) collected data after the project was completed, and only
five of  seventy-one studies in Waddington and Snilstveit (2009) collected data more than
a year after project completion.
Cleaver (1999) regards the empirical support for the claim that beneficiary partici-
pation helps sustain benefits as being even more tenuous than support for the claim
the beneficiary participation improves project efficiency. And in fact, most of  the avail-
able empirical evidence does not support the claim that beneficiary participation sus-
tains project benefits. Two reviews of  beneficiary participation describe several cases
in which beneficiaries failed to sustain project benefits on their own. Often, a lack of
financial resources or technical know-how was the cause (Pozzoni and Kumar 2005;
Mansuri and Rao 2004). But the idea that beneficiaries should entirely take over and
manage their own public services seems, in many cases, as nonsensical as the notion
that beneficiaries should “reduce” project costs by contributing their own resources.
5.4.4 Equitably Distributing Benefits
The claim that beneficiary participation improves the equitable distribution of  ben-
efits is discussed above in the context of  empowerment and elite capture. In brief,
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empirical studies often find that beneficiary participation fails to achieve an equitable
distribution of  benefits.
5.5 Implications
5.5.1 Policy Implications
I have argued that beneficiary empowerment is unlikely to empower beneficiaries in
the full sense of  the word empowerment. Assuming my argument is persuasive, its policy
implications depend on whether beneficiary empowerment is an ethical necessity. If
beneficiary empowerment is an ethical necessity, it needs to be pursued with strategies
other than beneficiary participation because beneficiary participation typically repro-
duces existing power-over relations. Freire (2000) describes empowerment as the result
of  an open dialogue with marginalized people. Facilitators of  this process do not shape
marginalized people’s views; through marginalized people’s own critical reflection, they
arrive at a new understanding of  the world and their place in it. There is no timeline
for such a process, which makes it fit awkwardly with the mainstream project-based
mode of  development, and it is difficult to imagine how to scale up such a process. But
if  beneficiary empowerment is an ethical necessity then arguments based on efficiency
hold no weight just as ethical requirements constrain efficiency in other arenas. For
example, ethical requirements for conducting research with human subjects reduce the
efficiency of  such research and make some research projects outright impossible. The
resulting delays are accepted because ethical treatment of  human research subjects is
more highly valued than research efficiency. Similarly, if  beneficiary empowerment is
an ethical requirement of  development projects (i.e., development projects that legit-
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imize oppressive power relations are unethical), then other development strategies that
successfully empower beneficiaries should be used regardless of  their efficiency.
Alternatively, beneficiary empowerment may be considered desirable but optional.
Many people in developing countries have unmet, immediate needs (e.g., for health care,
clean water, access to sanitation, and education), and the international development
community can help them improve their well-being even if, in doing so, beneficiaries’
marginalized status does not radically change. If  development only legitimized existing
power relations, it could be subject to the same criticism that it was subjected to in
the 1960s and 1970s, that marginalized groups were disproportionately excluded from
its benefits. But the diversity of  development agencies and approaches almost guaran-
tees that both goals—empowerment and outcomes—will be pursued. Some initiatives
will support beneficiary empowerment, and others will use beneficiary participation to
improve project outcomes without necessarily changing power relations.
Another possible solution to problematic power-over relations among beneficiaries
and between beneficiaries and project organizers is to treat beneficiary participation as
a negotiation process. Arguing for this approach, Leeuwis writes, “If  in practice partic-
ipatory projects emerge as ‘arenas of  struggle,’ and if  stakeholders tend to act strategi-
cally, rather than communicatively, then why not base methodological approaches on
these assumptions? That is: why not organize participatory trajectories as negotiation
processes, in order to be better able to deal with conflict situations?” (2000, 946). Al-
though this approach would not necessarily result in beneficiary empowerment, it would
deal with contentious power-over relations directly, so it could ameliorate some of  the
problems they cause, such as elite capture.
Empirical evidence about the effects of  beneficiary participation on project out-
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comes (i.e., their effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability,18 and equitable distribution)
is lacking. Of  these four project-outcome characteristics, empirical evidence most
strongly supports the claim that beneficiary participation improves project effective-
ness. Project organizers may want beneficiaries to contribute information about their
needs, interests, and local conditions so that projects can be adapted to fit all three of
these. Common sense justifies using beneficiary participation in this way. Private-sector
companies also conduct research to understand consumers’ wants and needs and then
tailor products and services to satisfy consumers’ preferences. Development projects
similarly aim to satisfy the wants and needs of  a particular group of  people, and project
organizers can better achieve that goal when they include beneficiaries’ input.
This form of  beneficiary participation (i.e., contributing information) is widely re-
garded as weak participation. Many authors believe that beneficiaries should not just
inform organizers about their preferences; beneficiaries should have decision-making
control over as many aspects of  projects as possible. But, like projects themselves, ben-
eficiary participation in a given project needs to be adapted to the particulars of  each
project and set of  intended beneficiaries. If  project organizers can faithfully assimilate
beneficiary preferences into their projects, then beneficiaries might not need to have
decision-making control over certain aspects of  a project. However, it might also be eas-
ier and more cost-effective for beneficiaries to decide certain aspects of  projects them-
selves. When deciding how to structure beneficiary participation, organizers should
consider how to help beneficiaries the most for the least possible cost to beneficiaries.
When engaging beneficiaries, organizers should also be vigilant for evidence of  cap-
ture by local elites. As discussed above, local elites often have outsized influence on
18By sustainability, I only mean sustaining projects’ benefits over time (i.e., sustained benefits in the literal
sense).
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projects that they participate in. If  organizers allow local elites to capture their devel-
opment projects, the projects are less likely to address the needs and preferences of  all
intended beneficiaries, and those most in need of  a project’s benefits might gain the
least.
Project organizers may want beneficiaries to participate in other ways (e.g., to take
over operation and maintenance or to subsidize project costs). But project organizers
should be cautious about employing intensive forms of  beneficiary participation that
have high costs for beneficiaries because most claims about the advantages of  these
forms of  beneficiary participation lack strong empirical support. Project organizers
might justify using intensive forms of  beneficiary participation with their own exper-
tise or value judgments about beneficiary participation, but neither expertise nor value
judgments are as valuable as views based on rigorous empirical evidence for pragmatic
decision-making.
Ultimately, designing beneficiary participatory is a value-laden process, and diverse
actors in development projects usually have diverse values. Organizers might value
democratic principles (and therefore representative modes of  beneficiary participation)
more than beneficiaries themselves do. Organizers should not necessarily disregard
their own values, but they should be aware of  how their own values compare and con-
trast to beneficiaries’. Because organizers typically hold more power than beneficia-
ries, organizers can often overrule beneficiaries’ priorities with their own. And because
projects aim to help beneficiaries (not project organizers), organizers should defer to
beneficiaries’ priorities whenever possible. When organizers and beneficiaries have dif-
ferent values, organizers should at least be aware of  those differences and carefully
consider whether they cannot in good conscience defer to beneficiaries’ values.
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5.5.2 Future Research
One avenue for more robust, general findings is using qualitative comparative anal-
ysis (QCA). QCA is similar to the systematic case review method. In both methods,
researchers code cases’ reports for variables and test which, if  any, variables predict an
outcome of  interest. Systematic case reviews often use statistical methods (such as lin-
ear regression), whereas QCA uses Boolean algebra. Because beneficiary participation
is seen by many as complex, one advantage of  QCA is its ability to explore conditional
causality using fewer cases than statistical methods (Ragin 1989). But researchers who
employ QCA often use secondary data (i.e., reports of  research results rather than orig-
inal data), and in those cases, QCA is subject to the same disadvantages as systematic
case reviews. These disadvantages would be ameliorated if  researchers conducted new
case-studies using a common conceptual framework, such as the framework and typol-
ogy presented in chapter 3, and used the same methods to operationalize variables and
collect data. Researchers who study beneficiary participation need to closely coordinate
their efforts in order to produce reliable, generalizable knowledge about the effects of
beneficiary participation.
5.6 Connections with Sustainability Science
Beneficiary participation has been discussed in the context of  international devel-
opment projects and as an essential feature of  sustainable development projects. Par-
ticipation is an essential feature of  sustainability science, as well. Sustainability science
originated with Kates et al.’s (2001) landmark article, Sustainability Science. Kates et al.
define the goal of  sustainability science as understanding human-environment interac-
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tions to help meet human needs. Since the inception of  sustainability science, some
of  its practitioners have drawn a distinction between science for sustainability and sci-
ence of sustainability. Science for sustainability is normal science (Spangenberg 2011, 281)
in the sense that Kuhn (1970) uses the term. In contrast, science of  sustainability is
post-normal science in the sense that Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) use the term. Science
of  sustainability tends to be transdisciplinary, solution-oriented, and critical (Lang et al.
2012; Spangenberg 2011; Wiek et al. 2012).
Science for sustainability aims to solve real-world sustainability problems, and partic-
ipation has become an essential feature of  sustainability-science research projects (Loor-
bach 2010). In a typical sustainability-science research project, scientists and people
who both affect and are affected by a problem (called stakeholders) work together to
define the problem, propose solutions, implement solutions, and evaluate implemented
solutions (Talwar, Wiek, and Robinson 2011). There are a variety of  motivations for
stakeholder engagement in sustainability science (just as there are a variety of  motiva-
tions for beneficiary participation in development projects). Some motivations include
incorporating stakeholders’ knowledge (Talwar, Wiek, and Robinson 2011; Spangen-
berg 2011), taking into consideration stakeholders’ values (Talwar, Wiek, and Robinson
2011; Miller et al. 2014), and improving the impact of  sustainability science research
projects (Talwar, Wiek, and Robinson 2011), for example, through stakeholders’ greater
sense of  ownership of  the research process and its outcomes (Spangenberg 2011).
Empirical literature on the effects of  stakeholder engagement is nascent partly be-
cause sustainability science is a relatively new endeavor. But researchers have developed
typologies for characterizing stakeholder engagement processes (e.g., Talwar, Wiek,
and Robinson 2011), proposed frameworks for evaluating sustainability science projects
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(e.g., Wiek et al. 2014; Forrest and Wiek 2014), and conducted case-studies that examine
the effects of  stakeholder engagement (e.g., Wiek et al. 2012).
Sustainability science and research on beneficiary participation in international devel-
opment projects are both concerned with participation and its effects, and each would
benefit from more engagement with the other. For example, stakeholder values are
a prominent concern for sustainability scientists, but the diverse values of  beneficia-
ries and project organizers receive less attention in international development literature
(although needs and interests are frequently considered). On the other hand, develop-
ment professionals and researchers are interested in whether beneficiary participation
can be scaled up and how it affects project efficiency, but most sustainability scientists
do not examine whether the participatory strategies they employ could be implemented
on larger scales. How costly is stakeholder engagement, and do the benefits outweigh
the costs? Both fields of  research could become more robust by incorporating each
others’ central themes.
5.7 Summation
Unfortunately, I must echo the words of  Cohen and Uphoff  (1980) some three-
and-a-half  decades later that the empirical evidence for most claims about beneficiary
participation is weak. However, in the intervening decades, development scholars and
practitioners have made the concept more empirically grounded and provided greater
clarity about the tensions within it.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION
Beneficiary participation has become popular in international development gener-
ally, and it is an essential feature of  sustainable development, in particular. But there are
diverse definitions of  and motivations for using beneficiary participation, and empiri-
cal literature on its effects is underdeveloped. This dissertation aimed to clarify what
beneficiary participation is and whether there is empirical support for claims about its
benefits.
My review of  historical trends in international development identifies central themes
in defining beneficiary participation and motivations for using it (chapter 2). Beneficiary
participation grew in popularity starting in the 1970s as a response to contemporary
criticisms of  development approaches and outcomes. Citizen participation called for
greater beneficiary participation based on democratic principles (i.e., the view that peo-
ple affected by policies should have a role in shaping those policies and their resulting
programs). Advocates of  beneficiary empowerment argued that beneficiaries needed
to overturn oppressive power-over relations and expand their own abilities (power-to).
Doing so would not be achieved with a predominantly top-down approach to develop-
ment projects. And others advocated for beneficiary participation based on pragmatism.
That is, projects that did not include beneficiaries were thought to be less successful be-
cause, for example, the lack of  beneficiary input led to projects’ being poorly suited to
their local contexts. The diversity of  motivations for popularizing beneficiary participa-
tion helps explain why it has many definitions and why there are many claims about its
advantages.
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My review of  historical trends in international development also clarifies how ben-
eficiary participation relates to sustainable development. In particular, beneficiary par-
ticipation was seen as a way to achieve an important facet of  sustainable development,
ensuring the benefits of  development reached marginalized groups (e.g., the poorest of
the poor).
My review identifies central themes in defining beneficiary participation and moti-
vations for using it but does not by itself  achieve the aim of  defining beneficiary partic-
ipation. To achieve that aim, I developed a new typology of  beneficiary participation.
I found that the main dimensions of  beneficiary participation are (1) participants, (2)
channels, (3) types of  inputs, (4) timing, and (5) goals. These dimension of  beneficiary
participation comprehensively capture the definitions of  beneficiary participation that
other scholars implicitly and explicitly use, and they constitute a new typology of  benefi-
ciary participation. By making these dimensions explicit, my work may help researchers
and development practitioners more clearly describe the types of  beneficiary participa-
tion they study, employ, and advocate for. My new typology of  beneficiary participation
also facilitates comparative research because it can help researchers position their work
in relation to one another, so their results can be compared.
To contribute to empirical literature about beneficiary participation, I conducted a
case-study of  two urban development projects in Bhopal, India. The results indicate
that the benefits of  both projects, at least with respect to individual household toilets,
were distributed equitably. But beneficiaries in both projects did not have primary re-
sponsibility for selecting who would receive a household toilet; the project organizers
did. The case-study serves as a counterexample to the claim that beneficiaries must
participate for projects’ benefits to be distributed equitably. But the case-study does
not show that beneficiaries cannot improve the equitable distribution of  projects’ ben-
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efits. In both projects, the party that selected beneficiaries (project organizers) aimed
to distribute toilets to households that needed them. If  project organizers did not have
that goal or if  beneficiaries did, it is possible that more beneficiary control would have
resulted in an equitable distribution of  benefits, too. But the results suggest that claims
about beneficiary participation need to be more nuanced.
In general, more empirical research about beneficiary participation is needed. There
is relatively strong empirical support for the claim that beneficiary participation im-
proves project outcomes, but empirical support for other claims (i.e., that it helps sustain
project benefits, helps distribute benefits equitably, and makes projects more efficient)
is weak. And empirical research suggests that one claimed benefit, empowerment, rarely
materializes.
A significant issue for policymaking is the degree to which beneficiaries should par-
ticipate. There are at least two sensible reasons to limit beneficiary participation. First,
beneficiary participation, in whatever form, comes with costs for beneficiaries who
participate. Beneficiary participation aims to improve the well-being of  relatively dis-
advantaged people, especially people in marginalized groups, such as women and the
poorest of  the poor. Beneficiaries who are relatively disadvantaged may be those least
able to contribute, and the costs of  participation, especially participation in the form
of  contributing resources, may be highest for them. There is a conflict between ben-
eficiary participation, which aims to help marginalized groups, and the costs of  that
very participation. Second, project organizers may have certain values that beneficiaries
do not share. For example, environmental protection and equity are essential facets
of  sustainable development. If  beneficiaries do not share these values, their participa-
tion (especially in the form of  decision-making) may lead to projects that damage the
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environment and exclude marginalized groups. The dilemma some organizers face is
whether their own values are more important than beneficiaries’.
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This appendix provides more detail about research design and methods for the case-
study discussed in chapter 4.
B.1 Research Design
This research project used a comparative case-study design with two projects,
Project Uday and Project Utthan, serving as cases. Case-studies help researchers ex-
plain phenomena over which they have little control and “when the focus is on a con-
temporary phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin 2003, 1).
Even though a single-case design would require less time, a multiple-case design
should be used whenever possible because, holding all other factors constant, it has
greater external validity than a single-case design. In a multiple-case design, each case
serves as a complete experiment, so additional cases serve as replications (Yin 2003).
Case-study researchers should collect data from multiple sources to improve the
validity of  their findings (Yin 2003). I collected data from project organizers and ben-
eficiaries using semi-structured interviews and structured interviews, respectively. I
also collected publicly available documents about the projects and the agencies that
implemented them from the Internet and from agencies’ staff. These sources—semi-
structured interviews, structured interviews, and project documents—all provided data
on beneficiaries’ participation, and each of  them provided data on one or more of  the
following: beneficiaries’ access to sanitation, project context (e.g., government support),
and project characteristics.
Arizona State University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and approved
research methods involving human subjects (i.e., semi-structured and structured inter-
views) including cognitive interviews, pre-tests, and translations for structured inter-
views (IRB protocol #1302008784, approved February 27, 2013). Throughout field
work, I maintained compliance with ASU’s IRB by submitting survey changes to the
IRB and waiting for its approval before implementing the changes.
B.2 Sampling Cases and Sites
B.2.1 Building a Sample Frame of  Cases
I aimed to build a sample frame of  Indian sanitation projects completed one year
before field research would begin. Candidate projects must have been complete because
I was investigating a claim about project benefits, which are only finalized at the end of  a
project. I only considered sanitation projects that were completed within a year of  data
collection because I planned to use interview methods to collect data. Interviewees’
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ability to recall information about past events decreases over time (Tourangeau, Rips,
and Rasinski 2000), so I minimized this threat to validity by limiting the length of  time
between project completion and data collection.
No sample frame of  Indian sanitation organizations or completed projects was avail-
able, and constructing a complete sample frame would be extremely challenging. Not
only are there many development agencies and government agencies conducting sani-
tation projects in India but there are also hundreds of  small Indian non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) that do so, many of  which do not have websites. Instead of
attempting to build a complete sample frame, I used snowball sampling to identify or-
ganizations that had recently completed Indian sanitation projects.
A researcher conducts a snowball sample by finding an initial group of  sample mem-
bers, called seeds. Then, the researcher expands the sample frame by asking sample
members for contact information of  additional sample members. The researcher con-
tinues to expand the sample frame in this manner until it is saturated (i.e., new sample
members cannot be identified) or time and resources for sampling run out (Bernard
2006). Researchers usually use snowball sampling to identify individuals, such as intra-
venous drug users, but I used snowball sampling to identify sanitation projects.
I searched the Internet in June 2011 for organizations conducting sanitation
projects, including the following: multilateral aid agencies, bilateral aid agencies, in-
ternational NGOs, Indian NGOs, and Indian government agencies. I also searched
Indian universities for faculty researching sanitation, and I requested names of  In-
dian sanitation organizations and contacts from the Dev-Creative Google group (dev-
creative@googlegroups.com). These organizations were seeds in a snowball sample of
Indian organizations conducting sanitation projects. I contacted each organization by
e-mail or telephone and introduced my research. Then, I asked for details about the
organization’s sanitation projects; I asked whether the organization would like to partic-
ipate in my research project; and I asked for contacts to other relevant organizations. By
September 2012, I had contacted nearly one hundred organizations recently involved
in sanitation projects in India and assembled a list of  their sanitation projects.
B.2.2 Selecting Cases
I traveled to New Delhi in October 2012 to begin field research. I contacted orga-
nizations that had recently completed sanitation projects for more information about
their projects. I aimed to find a set of  three to four sanitation projects with the following
characteristics: (1) completed within the past year; (2) greater geographical proximity,
especially in the same city; and (3) greater similarity in project start and end dates. I
aimed to minimize variation in projects’ context (e.g., location and timing) to improve
comparison between cases. I selected cases located in the same city because Indian
states and even cities within states differ in ways that could affect project outcomes. I
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also aimed to select sanitation projects that were implemented by organizations willing
to facilitate this research project. Through preliminary discussions with project organiz-
ers, I gauged their willingness to provide access to documents, staff, and beneficiaries.
After gathering more details about several organizations and their sanitation projects,
I selected two projects, Project Uday and Project Utthan. Both projects aimed to im-
prove urban service delivery, including water and sanitation services, in large cities in
Madhya Pradesh. Both also had project sites in urban slums.
Improving service delivery, including sanitation service delivery, in urban slums was
a relatively small portion of  Project Uday, but a significant portion of  Project Utthan’s
budget was devoted to improving service delivery in urban slums. In fact, Project Ut-
than complemented Project Uday, extending its work in urban slums to additional slums
and cities. Project Uday was largely, though not exclusively, funded by loans from the
Asian Development Bank (ADB), a large multi-lateral aid agency. Project Utthan was
funded by a grant from the Department for International Development (DFID), the
United Kingdom’s bilateral aid agency.
Both projects had sites in several cities in Madhya Pradesh, and I elected to study
each project’s sites in Bhopal. Both projects were implemented by several NGOs and
the Bhopal Municipal Corporation, which is the city government and administration for
Bhopal. Project organizers in Bhopal were open to this research project, and Bhopal was
the location for both projects’ headquarters. Both projects had completed sanitation
work in several slums in Bhopal less than a year before I would collect data about them.
And the timing of  project work in Bhopal slums was similar for both projects.
B.2.3 Selecting Slums
I included four slums in total—two slums each from Project Uday and Project Ut-
than. Some slums in both projects received community toilets, and other slums received
individual household toilets. I elected to consider only slums that received individual
household toilets because households’ access to sanitation was easier to assess in slums
that received individual household toilets. A household with a functioning individual
household toilet had access to sanitation, and a household without a functioning toi-
let did not. But residents living in a slum with a community toilet might not consider
themselves to have access to sanitation even though a functioning community toilet was
available. Factors like the community toilet’s distance from residences, whether the toi-
let is co-ed, and whether women can safely use the toilet influence the degree to which
a community toilet provides slum residents with access to sanitation. Also, individual
households are more responsible for their own access to sanitation when the technol-
ogy for providing access to sanitation is individual household toilets. Each household
is responsible for maintaining its own toilet, for example. The causal links between
households and their access to sanitation are clearer.
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To select slums from Project Uday, I assigned numbers to each slum and then se-
lected slums with random numbers.19 I randomly selected Mahavir Basti for survey
pre-testing and Shivaji Ward and Tagore Ward for the full survey. While implementing
the survey in Tagore Ward, residents were hostile toward the field research team. Some
residents believed the field researchers were from a group that had defrauded them the
previous year, and they wanted the field researchers to leave. To select a replacement
for Tagore Ward, I used the following criteria:
1. The slum is neither Tagore Ward nor adjacent to Tagore Ward.
2. Project Uday only built individual household toilets there.
There was only one Project Uday slum that fit these criteria, School Sector. Regarding
Project Utthan slum selection, only two slums had completed sanitation work within
the past year, Baghmugalia and Jatkhedi,20 so these two slums were selected. Residents
in the poorest section of  Jatkhedi were somewhat hostile to the research team. One
resident in particular was drunk and aggressive, and the team had to leave that section
of  the slum to avoid a physical altercation. For the safety of  the research team, we did
not conduct any additional surveys in that portion of  the slum, so data from Jatkhedi
may underrepresent its poorest members.
B.3 Semi-structured Interviews with Project Organizers
I conducted semi-structured interviews with project organizers, including staff  from
the Madhya Pradesh state government, the Bhopal city government, and NGOs. A
semi-structured interview is “open ended, but follows a general script and covers a
list of  topics” (Bernard 2006, 156). The list of  topics included background information
about each project, beneficiary participation, and other determinants of  project success,
such as staff  experience, funding, and land tenure.
Compared to other interview methods, semi-structured interviewing is the best
when the researcher will only have one chance to meet with the interviewee (157). I
expected that professionals, especially government employees, would have little time to
speak with me, so I opted to use semi-structured interviewing.
I conducted interviews at the participants’ workplaces to reduce the burden on
their time. I also expected that project organizers would be well-educated and English-
speaking, so I conducted the interviews myself  in English. During interviews, I took
19I used an Android application, Quick Random Number Generator (version 1.2.2), to generate all
random numbers during field work.
20These were not the only Project Utthan slums in Bhopal where individual household toilets were
constructed. Sanitation work in other Project Utthan slums had been completed earlier.
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notes on respondents’ statements. I usually paraphrased their responses, but sometimes
I recorded direct quotes. If  interviewees consented, I audio recorded interviews because
audio recordings provide an objective record of  the interview (Bernard 2006).
I did not offer any financial incentive for the interviews because, as a PhD candi-
date researching international development projects, I expected project organizers to
view me as a colleague or at least as a professional working in the same field. Profes-
sionals who are potential interviewees are usually more motivated “by a request from a
respected colleague than to a money-waving recruiter” (Willis 2005, 145).
I conducted a snowball sample of  project organizers to build a sample frame of
interviewees. I had already developed an initial list of  organizers in both projects when
I built a sample frame of  Indian sanitation projects. The initial list of  organizers in
both projects served as the seeds for a snowball sample, which “is an effective way to
build an exhaustive sampling frame in small populations of  people who are in contact
with each other” (Bernard 2006, 163). Because project organizers worked together to
implement each project, I expected them to know each other even if  they worked for
different organizations.
I conducted fifteen semi-structured interviews from March to May 2013 with orga-
nizers of  Project Uday and Project Utthan.
B.4 Structured Interviews with Beneficiaries
The structured interviews aimed to provide data on beneficiaries’ participation in
the intervention, their access to water and sanitation, and demographic data about ben-
eficiaries.
B.4.1 Interviewer Selection and Training
Good interviewers are professional, mature, good team workers, and can handle
working in impoverished neighborhoods. Social science college students tend to be
good interviewers, for example (Bernard 2006). I worked with field researchers hired
by a local NGO to conduct the survey pre-testing and the survey itself. The field re-
searchers had either completed their undergraduate degree or were undergraduate stu-
dents, and all were native Hindi-speakers from Bhopal. I trained them in the principles
of  ethical research with human subjects and in the specific research methods used in
this research project.
When conducting the survey, the field research team split into two groups of  two
with one male and one female in each group. Having a female researcher in each group
was necessary for surveys with female residents, especially when no males were in the
household at the time of  the survey. If  a non-related male were to enter a household with
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no related males present, the womens’ propriety might have been called into question.
At the same time, having a male researcher in each group improved safety for female
field researchers.
B.4.2 Sampling
In each of  the four slums, the field researchers aimed to survey fifty respondents.
There were two sample groups in each slum: individuals living in households that re-
ceived a toilet through the project and individuals living in households that did not
receive a toilet. Sampling was a two-step process with households serving as the first
sampling unit. Households were sampled with a systematic random sample. Field re-
searchers included each household at a set interval (e.g., every fifth house), and intervals
depended on the size of  the slum. Field researchers then requested that a random indi-
vidual within each sampled household participate in the survey.
From May to June 2013, field researchers conducted 218 surveys. One slum from
Project Uday, Tagore Ward, was excluded along with the twenty-three surveys com-
pleted in that slum.
B.4.3 Survey Design
The main sources for guidance on survey design were Bernard (2006), Fink (2002),
and Fowler (2009).
The survey was a structured interview, administered face to face. Face-to-face in-
terviews offer several benefits. First, they are best when it is necessary to designate the
respondent at time of  interview as with the two-stage sampling process used here. Sec-
ond, in-person interviews reduce the burden on respondents’ reading and writing skills
(Fowler 2009). In Madhya Pradesh, 16% of  urban residents over seven years old are illit-
erate, and 29% of  rural residents are illiterate (Census of India 2011 2011). Although the
majority of  respondents were likely literate, some were likely not, and excluding illiter-
ate respondents would introduce a sampling bias. Third, in-person interviews increase
response rates when potential interviewees have low motivation to participate (Fowler
2009), and I expected that respondents would not be highly motivated to participate,
partly because there were no financial incentives for doing so. Fourth, in-person inter-
views are best when there are no addresses or phone numbers for potential respondents
as was the case for many households in the surveyed slums (Fowler 2009).
Most questions in the survey were close ended. Open-ended questions are more
useful in exploratory research and when respondents’ specific wording is important
(Fink 2002). The extensive literature review that informed the survey questions partly
justifies the use of  close-ended questions. Survey pre-tests and pilots also helped ensure
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that respondents understood the questions and that responses provided reliable, valid
data.
Open-ended questions typically reduce response effects for threatening and sensitive
questions (Bernard 2006; Fowler 2009), but most questions in the survey were unlikely
to be perceived as threatening because they did not ask about socially undesirable be-
haviors. One exception was a question designed to gather data on open defecation. To
reduce response effects, the question only asked if  the respondent used an individual
toilet, a community toilet, or “other.” If  respondents answered “other,” interviewers
asked an open-ended follow-up question on what “other” meant. Everyone who re-
sponded to the open-ended question described open defecation without using that term
specifically (e.g., “going in an open field”). This survey question captured information
about open defecation without mentioning it explicitly, thus reducing response effects
associated with a question about a potentially sensitive topic.
People tend to over-report behaviors in response to close-ended questions (Schwarz
and Oyserman 2001). Questions about beneficiaries’ participation (e.g., whether they
contributed information in a given project stage) were close ended and could lead to
over-reporting. To mitigate this source of  error, an open-ended question followed each
of  these close-ended questions and asked beneficiaries specifically how they participated
(e.g., what kind of  information they provided). Also, the survey asked respondents
only whether they did a particular behavior at all and whether it was once or multiple
times because respondents struggle to recall specific instances of  repeated behaviors
(Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000; Schwarz and Oyserman 2001).
It has been shown that people adjust their responses based on their interviewers’
affiliation (Schwarz and Oyserman 2001), so I worked with field researchers who were
unaffiliated with the project organizers. When introducing the survey, field researchers
made it clear to respondents that they were an independent research team. If  respon-
dents believed that field researchers worked for the project organizers, they might have
thought that field researchers wanted to get positive feedback about the project and
consequently provided more positive responses about the project.
Respondents have more difficulty recalling an event the farther in the past it oc-
curred. Bounded recall—where subjects recall an event bounded by two other events
that occurred around the same time—improves accuracy. Additionally, cues about the
type of  event, rather than about where or when the event occurred, improve recall
(Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000). In concordance with these findings, survey
questions about respondents’ participation in each project stage defined the project
stage according to its type of  activity, bounded by the activities in prior and subsequent
project stages.
Most of  the demographic questions required no recall because they asked about en-
during properties of  the respondent, which are effectively timeless. Other demographic
questions about the value of  some parameter, such as land tenure, at the time of  the in-
terview do not require participants to recall past events (Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski
2000).
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The survey was written in English, translated into Hindi by native Hindi-speakers,
and then translated back into English by independent translators to check for translation
errors.
B.4.4 Expert Review of  the Survey Instrument
I invited experts from three NGOs in Bhopal to review the survey instrument for
structured interviews, cover letter, recruitment letter, and survey procedures because
subject-matter experts should always be involved in the development of  survey materials
(Fink 2002). Local experts had experience conducting surveys on sanitation in Bhopal
slums and, therefore, knew the types of  questions and survey procedures that would be
most effective.
B.4.5 Incentives
Unless there is a specific reason not to compensate participants, they should be com-
pensated for the time they contribute to research projects both to improve participation
rates and for ethical reasons. I initially planned to offer a small financial incentive to
participants based on the wage payment model. The wage-payment model treats partic-
ipants as unskilled laborers who should be fairly compensated for their time (Dickert
and Grady 1999). However, the experts who reviewed the survey instrument and survey
procedures objected to the use of  financial incentives. One reason was the precedent
that my offering incentives would set. Because they did not typically offer incentives,
they might have to change their survey methods if  residents expected to be compen-
sated for their participation in the future. The most compelling reason for not offering
financial incentives was that offering incentives could generate social and even physical
conflicts among slum residents or between residents and the field research team. Res-
idents who were not offered the opportunity to participate might be angry that they
had been excluded. And residents were unlikely to consider random selection and its
effects on data validity to be good enough reasons to exclude them from the survey.
Ultimately, no financial incentives were offered to survey participants.
After conducting the survey, it was clear that field researchers and residents were
safer because no financial incentives were offered. In all slums, most residents wanted to
be included in the survey even though there was no financial incentive for participating.
When the field researchers drew the survey sample, they were seen as selecting winners
and losers. This perception contributed to the confrontation between field researchers
and residents in Tagore Ward. If  financial incentives were offered, field researchers
would have been selecting winners and losers in a much more literal sense, and conflicts
with residents in other slums would have been more likely.
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B.4.6 Pre-testing with Cognitive Interviewing
Unless a survey uses culturally cross-validated questions, it should be pre-tested. By
pre-testing a survey, researchers can check whether respondents interpret the questions
as they are intended to be interpreted and whether respondents are able to give ac-
curate responses (Fink 2002). Cognitive interviewing is a recommended method for
pre-testing (Bernard 2006; Schwarz and Oyserman 2001). It helps researchers under-
stand how “targeted audiences understand, mentally process, and respond” (Willis 2005,
3) to survey materials. In a cognitive interview, the interviewer reads each question to
the interviewee and asks the interviewee to report his or her thoughts as he or she ar-
rives at an answer. Interviewers can interject probing questions to gather more useful
information.
The typical duration for a cognitive interview is one hour (Willis 2005). Because the
full survey was estimated to take one hour to complete and because cognitive interviews
last longer than the survey they are about, I used an abbreviated version of  the survey
for the cognitive interviews. The longest section, which was the section on beneficiary
participation in each project stage, was cut down to include only two project stages.
Pre-test participants should be similar to the survey’s target population (Willis 2005;
Fink 2002), but researchers should never use respondents in the pre-test for the main
survey (Bernard 2006). Field researchers took a convenience sample of  residents in
Mahavir Basti, a Project Uday slum that was not included in the full survey.
The field researchers conducted cognitive interviews in Hindi. Eleven cognitive
interviews were conducted between May 11 and May 13, 2013. The field researchers
recorded feedback about the survey and provided their own impressions.
Cognitive interviews revealed that the survey was too long, some questions had
high response effects, and respondents answered some questions that had five-point
interval scales with extreme values. Based on the results of  cognitive interviews, the
survey instrument was updated, retranslated into Hindi, and then translated back into
English to check for translation errors.
B.5 Discussion
Any researcher who conducted this case-study would have needed to contend with
obstacles like poor telephone-call quality and project organizers’ busy schedules. But
some aspects of  data collection were particular to this research project, and another
researcher might be able to collect more or better data. I suspect that a researcher with
better local contacts and who was better able to build rapport with project organizers
would have been able to collect more (and perhaps more accurate) data about Project
Uday and Project Utthan.
My lack of  local contacts slowed data collection because it was difficult to find re-
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liable translators and field researchers, although I eventually did so. If  these logistical
issues had been easier to manage, I might have been able to collect data on more slums
or with additional methods, such as focus-group interviews.
If  I had been able to build better rapport with project organizers, they might have
been more forthcoming. Many participants in semi-structured interviews were con-
cerned about others’ learning about their participation in this research project, specif-
ically about others’ learning what they said in interviews. Interviewees were mostly
concerned about saying something negative about one of  the projects that would re-
flect poorly on the government. (I do not attribute this outcome to the interviewees,
but rather to my own inability to build better rapport.) Better rapport with project or-
ganizers might have sped up the process of  scheduling and conducting semi-structured
interviews, and it might have led to more introductions and therefore more interviews.
Finally, the survey was conducted during the hottest time of  year, right before mon-
soons began. I attempted implement the survey earlier in the year when the weather was
cooler but was unable to do so. The heat may have encouraged field researchers and
survey respondents to implement the survey faster, although there is no clear evidence
that retrenchment occurred or affected the survey results. The heat did affect my own
ability to stay focused and energetic while implementing the survey.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED CASE-STUDY STATISTICAL ANALYSES
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This appendix provides more detail about statistical analyses discussed in chapter 4.
C.1 Project Effectiveness
This section discusses projects’ effectiveness at increasing access to sanitation in
Bhopal’s slums. Both Project Uday and Project Utthan shared this goal, although
Project Uday aimed for slums free of  open defecation, and Project Utthan aimed to
provide toilets for low-income households.
A Pearson chi-squared test of  independence was used to test the null hypothesis that
the proportion of  households practicing open defecation was the same in households
that received toilets and in households that did not receive toilets in each project. Table
10 is the contingency table of  open defecation and receiving a toilet from Project Uday.
The Pearson chi-squared test statistic is 2(1, n = 96) = 20, p < .001. Therefore, the null
hypothesis is rejected. The phi coefficient is 0.48, which indicates the strength of  the
relationship is low to moderate according to rules of  thumb for interpreting correlation
coefficients (Hinkle, Wiersma, and Jurs 2003).
Table 10. Contingency table for open defecation and received toilet, Project Uday
Did not receive toilet Did receive toilet
Not open defecation 33 39
Open defecation 24 0
The same test in Project Utthan yielded different results. Table 11 is the contingency
table of  open defecation and receiving a toilet from Project Utthan. The expected fre-
quencies, shown in table 12, are high enough to support a reliable Pearson chi-squared
test with all cells having values greater than five (Hanneman, Kposowa, and Riddle
2012). The Pearson chi-squared test statistic is 2(1, n = 98) = 4.6×10-31, p = 1.0.
Therefore, the null hypothesis is not rejected.
These tests suggest that while Project Uday reduced the practice of  open defecation,
and conversely increased access to improved sanitation facilities, Project Utthan did not.
Households in Project Utthan received toilets but did not necessarily use them.
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C.2 Toilet Condition
Two survey questions asked interviewees who received a toilet through either project
to rate the condition of  their toilets (see table 13). Interviewees rated initial and subse-
quent toilet quality on a five-point scale, from 0 (very poor) to 4 (excellent).
A linear regression model was used to infer whether there were differences in the
quality of  each project’s toilets in different slums. The linear model of  location ac-
counted for 37% of  the variance in initial toilet condition, R2 = 0.39, adjusted R2 =
0.37. The model, estimated from a sample of n = 80 subjects, was statistically signifi-
cant, F (3, 76) = 16, p < .001.
The linear regression model provided details about the means of  initial toilet condi-
tion in each slum because it contained only dummy variables. The reference group in
the model was Baghmugalia, so the unstandardized coefficient for the intercept was also
the mean initial toilet condition for Baghmugalia. The means for the remaining slums
were the sum of  each slum’s unstandardized coefficient and the unstandardized coef-
ficient for the intercept. The significance column shows whether the mean for each
location was statistically significantly different from the mean in the reference group,
Baghmugalia. And the 95% confidence intervals (provided in the last two columns of
table 14) show whether the means of  toilet-condition ratings in each slum were different
from each other (see figure 13).
Toilets constructed through Project Uday tended to have higher initial-quality ratings
than those constructed through Project Utthan. The 95% confidence intervals of  the
means of  initial toilet quality in Shivaji Ward (a Project Uday slum) and Jatkhedi (a
Project Utthan slum) slightly overlap (95% CIs [2.3, 3.0] and [1.8, 2.4], respectively).
Therefore, it is not possible to infer that initial-quality ratings in Shivaji Ward are higher
than in Jatkhedi. Otherwise, the Project Uday slums had higher initial-quality ratings
than Project Utthan slums.
The subsequent-quality ratings of  toilets within each project were similar. A linear
regression model was used to infer whether there were differences in the quality of  each
project’s toilets between slums at the time of  the survey. The linear model of  location
accounted for 29% of  the variance in subsequent-quality ratings, R2 = 0.31, adjusted
R2 = 0.29. The model, estimated from a sample of n = 79 subjects, was statistically
significant, F (3, 75) = 11, p < .001. Toilets constructed in Project Uday tended to be
rated more highly, at least in School Sector, and there is no clear difference in subsequent
toilet-quality ratings between slums from the same project.
Baghmugalia was the reference group in this model as it was in the linear regres-
sion model for initial quality ratings. Figure 14 shows the means of  self  reports on
subsequent toilet condition and their 95% confidence intervals.
The patterns described above for initial toilet-quality ratings are the same as for
subsequent toilet-quality ratings. Toilets constructed in Project Uday tended to be rated
more highly, at least in School Sector, and there is no clear difference in toilet quality
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Table 11. Contingency table for open defecation and received toilet, Project Utthan
Did not receive toilet Did receive toilet
Not open defecation 39 31
Open defecation 16 12
Table 12. Expected frequency table for open defecation and received toilet, Project
Utthan
Did not receive toilet Did receive toilet
Not open defecation 39 31
Open defecation 16 12
Table 13. Toilet condition survey questions and variables (reproduced)
Variable
name Survey question
Running text
synonyms Note
TOILET-
COND1-
.REV
What condition was
the toilet in when it
was first built?
initial toilet quality
rating or condition
Toilets constructed
roughly six months
before survey
TOILET-
COND2-
.REV
What condition is
the toilet in now?
subsequent toilet
quality rating or
condition
Self-report of  toilet
condition at the
time of  the survey
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Table 14. Multiple linear regression model predicting initial toilet condition with loca-
tion
Unstandardized
coefficient SE t df p 95% CI
(Intercept) 2.00 0.106 18.9 76 < .001 [1.8, 2.2]
Jatkhedi 0.111 0.161 0.688 76 .49 [-0.21, 0.43]
School
Sector
0.920 0.148 6.22 76 < .001 [0.63, 1.2]
Shivaji Ward 0.692 0.178 3.88 76 < .001 [0.34, 1.0]
Notes : SE = standard error; df = degrees of  freedom
Table 15. Multiple linear regression model predicting subsequent toilet condition with
location
Unstandardized
coefficient SE t df p 95% CI
(Intercept) 1.43 0.152 9.41 75 < .001 [1.1, 1.7]
Jatkhedi 0.0652 0.230 0.283 75 .78 [-0.39, 0.52]
School
Sector
1.09 0.211 5.14 75 < .001 [0.66, 1.5]
Shivaji Ward 0.719 0.254 2.83 75 .0059 [0.21, 1.2]
Notes : SE = standard error; df = degrees of  freedom
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Figure 13. Means of  initial toilet-condition ratings according to location
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Figure 14. Means of  subsequent toilet-condition ratings according to location
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between slums from the same project. The 95% confidence intervals for the means of
subsequent-quality ratings within the same project overlap. For example, the upper and
lower 95% confidence intervals of  Baghmugalia, a Project Utthan slum, are both within
the upper and lower 95% confidence intervals of  Jatkhedi, the other Project Utthan
slum (95% CIs [1.1, 1.7] and [1.0, 2.0], respectively). Therefore, the null hypothesis—
that the means of  initial toilet-condition ratings in both Project Utthan slums are the
same—was not rejected.
Field reserchers’ and my observations support this finding. The feedback we re-
ceived from residents in Project Uday slums and Project Utthan slums was starkly
different. Residents in Project Uday slums, especially in School Sector, felt their toi-
lets were high quality and functioned well. In School Sector, the only complaint re-
searchers received was that the hinges for one resident’s toilet door were on the wrong
side, making it awkward to open and close given the tight space constraints. In Project
Utthan slums, many residents—including those we did not invite to participate in the
survey—volunteered complaints about project toilets. Some complaints included us-
ing low-quality construction materials and not installing septic tanks. These complaints
were not universal; some residents were satisfied with their toilets, but there was a clear
difference in residents’ descriptions of  each project’s toilets.
C.3 Toilet Condition and Open Defecation
I hypothesized that people were more likely to use project toilets they rated as being
in better condition. To test whether self-reports on toilet condition predicted open
defecation, a logistic regression model was used. The logistic regression model used
self-reports of  initial and subsequent toilet condition to predict open defecation as a
dichotomous outcome. Initial toilet condition was a statistically significant predictor
of  the likelihood of  open defecation according to a Wald test, z (76) = -2.0, p = .042.
Subsequent toilet condition was a marginally statistically significant predictor of  the
likelihood of  open defecation, z (76) = -1.9, p = .062. Compared to a model containing
only initial toilet condition, a model with both initial and subsequent toilet condition
reduces deviance by a statistically significant amount, 2(1, n = 78) = 5.1, p = .024, so
both predictors were retained in the final model. The overall model was statistically
significant according to the likelihood ratio test, 2(2, n = 79) = 21, p < .001. The
c index for this model was 0.85, which indicates excellent discrimination according to
rules of  thumb for interpreting the c index from Hosmer et al. (2013).
Multicollinearity is a potential concern for the logistic regression model because the
two predictor variables—self-reports of  initial toilet condition and self-reports of  subse-
quent toilet condition—are correlated. But their correlation (r = 0.48, n = 79, p < .001)
is not high enough to cause unstable estimates of  the logistic regression model coeffi-
cients. The low standard errors of  both correlation coefficients (see table 16) provide
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further support that multicollinearity does not cause the estimates of  the correlation
coefficients to be unstable.
The model coefficients are easier to interpret when they are recalculated as odds
ratios (ORs). The odds ratio is the ratio of  the odds that the outcome happens (open
defecation in this case) to the odds that the outcome does not happen, depending on
changes in independent variables (self-reports of  toilet condition in this case). The odds
ratios for both predictor variables—along with 95% confidence intervals (calculated
based on the coefficients’ standard errors)—are provided in table 17. Assuming the
logit is linear in both predictor variables, an interviewee who rated initial toilet condition
one point higher than another had roughly one-fifth the odds (OR = 0.20) of  practicing
opening defecation. The reduction in the odds of  open defecation multiplies with each
one-point increase in self-reports of  initial toilet condition (TOILETCOND1.REV).
For example, an interviewee who rates initial toilet condition two points higher than
another had 4.0% the odds of  practicing open defecation. The odds ratio for subsequent
toilet condition (TOILETCOND2.REV) had a similar magnitude (OR = 0.31) to the
odds ratio for initial toilet condition.
Self-reports of  toilet condition helped predict whether interviewees practiced open
defecation. Other predictors, including gender, whether the household already had a
toilet before the start of  each project, and whether someone in the household requested
a toilet, did not make statistically significant predictions of  the likelihood of  open defe-
cation. These results suggest that most people in the slums wanted to use toilets rather
than defecate in the open, but only if  the toilets were built well. Poorer toilet quality in
Project Utthan seems to, at least partly, explain why Project Utthan was ineffective at
reducing open defecation.
The analysis above only considered toilets constructed through either project, but
some households had toilets before the start of  each project. It would be interesting
to investigate whether the relationships between toilet condition and open defecation
hold for non-project toilets; however, such an analysis was not possible. None of  the
households (for which the necessary data were collected) that had a toilet before the
start of  the project practiced open defecation. Some of  the already-constructed toilets
might have come from projects other than the ones investigated, so this finding does
not necessarily mean that self-constructed toilets are better at reducing open defecation.
C.4 Predictors of  Toilet Condition
Analysis based on linear regression models above showed that toilet condition var-
ied according to the slum where the toilet was located. Therefore, hierarchical linear
regression models were used to analyze the drivers of  self-reported toilet condition.
The models tested whether a given variable explained variance in self-reports of  toilet
condition above and beyond the variance explained by the slum the toilet was built in.
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The type of  water source explained variance in self-reports of  initial toilet condition
above and beyond the location of  the toilet, ∆R2 = 0.090, F (2, 74) = 6.4, p = .0027.
The full model was statistically significant, F (5, 74) = 14, p < .001, R2 = 0.48, adjusted
R2 = 0.45. Households’ water sources accounted for an additional 9.0% of  the variance
in self-reports of  initial toilet condition above and beyond the location of  the toilet.
However, it is unclear how to interpret this result because water sources that were more
convenient to use predicted lower self-reported initial toilet condition. Having a tap
water-source predicted lower self-reported initial toilet quality, and having a hand pump
predicted higher self-reported initial toilet quality. A more convenient source of  water
would seem to make both using and maintaining a toilet easier because those activities
require water for flushing and water for cleaning. There may be underlying variables
which explain both water sources and toilet condition, but it is not clear what these
variables might be, especially because the slum itself  has already been accounted for in
the model.
Next, I investigated whether requesting a toilet predicted self-reports of  subsequent
toilet condition. Self-reports of  initial toilet condition correlated with self-reports of
subsequent toilet condition, so self-reports of  initial toilet condition were included
(along with the slum) in the first level of  the hierarchical linear regression model. Re-
questing a toilet explained variance in self-reports of  subsequent toilet condition above
and beyond the location of  the toilet and self-reports of  initial toilet condition, ∆R2 =
0.096, F (1, 71) = 15, p < .001. The full model was statistically significant, F (5, 71) = 16,
p < .001, R2 = 0.54, adjusted R2 = 0.50. Requesting a toilet accounted for an additional
9.0% of  the variance in self-reports of  subsequent toilet condition above and beyond
the location of  the toilet and self-reports of  initial toilet condition.
It is also unclear how to interpret this result because requesting a toilet predicts lower
scores on self-reports of  subsequent toilet condition, unstandardized b = -0.78, t (71)
= -3.8, p < .001. I expected people who wanted toilets to rate their toilets higher than
people who were indifferent to having toilets. Perhaps, requesting a toilet interacted
with the self-report of  toilet condition such that requesting a toilet made the rating
more extreme. In such a scenario, households that requested toilets and received high
quality ones would be more satisfied with them while households that requested toilets
and received low quality ones would be more dissatisfied. Unfortunately, the sample
is too small to investigate an interaction between requesting a toilet and self-reports of
subsequent toilet condition.
C.5 Individual Participation
Beneficiaries’ individual participation in either project might predict whether they
requested a toilet, received a toilet, used the toilet they received (if  they received one),
and how they rated the condition of  their toilet. However, most individuals did not par-
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ticipate in the project, aside from contributing to the cost of  an individual household
toilet. Figure 15 shows high rates of  individual participation as contributing resources
in the fifth project stage, implement the program, for people who received toilets. In
fact, everyone living in households that received toilets through one of  the projects con-
tributed resources in the fifth project stage except for two of  the fourteen households
in Shivaji Ward that received toilets.
Slum residents’ lack of  awareness about the community group (CGCs in Project
Uday and Basti Vikas Samitis in Project Utthan) was a factor in low individual partici-
pation (see figure 16). If  individuals wanted to communicate their preferences during
a given project stage, they would have needed to communicate their preferences to
community-group members, who would then communicate them to project organizers.
For example, individuals who wanted their slum to receive community toilets rather
than household toilets would have needed to communicate that preference to members
of  the community group. But, as shown in figure 16, few residents knew of  the exis-
tence of  their slum’s community group and therefore did not have the opportunity to
share their preferences.
Low individual participation was a surprising finding. Before the start of  the sur-
vey, project organizers had given me the impression that the breadth and intensity of
individual participation was greater than indicated by the survey data. To ensure that
the data were valid, I asked the field researchers if  residents really did not extensively
participate in either project. Based on their conversations with survey respondents and
others in the slums, the field researchers described slum residents in general as being
uninformed about the project and uninterested in having a greater role. Many residents
knew about the projects, but only after construction (e.g., on roads) began. And even
if  residents had been informed earlier, many would not have been able play a greater
role because they had to leave the slum for work early in the morning and only returned
later in the evening.
Because individual participation was similar in both projects’ slums, it does not ex-
plain differences in the success of  each project with respect to reducing open defecation.
The main finding with respect to individual participation is that individuals did not par-
ticipate in either project, except to contribute money for an individual household toilet,
and a significant reason for limited individual participation is that few residents knew
about their slum’s community group.
C.6 Equitable Distribution of  Benefits
C.6.1 Need as Predictor of  Receiving a Toilet
The variable HADTOILET indicates whether a household had a toilet before the
start of  either project, so it also indicates whether each household needed a toilet. A
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Figure 15. Residents’ individual participation by slum, input type, and project stage
(reproduced)
Note: Project stages are (1) assess social problems and needs, (2) determine goals, (3)
design program alternatives, (4) select an alternative, (5) implement the program, (6)
operate the program, and (7) evaluate program outcomes.
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Pearson chi-squared test of  independence was used to test the null hypothesis that the
proportion of  households that already had toilets (HADTOILET) was the same in
households that received toilets and households that did not receive toilets in Project
Utthan. Table 18 is the contingency table of  already having a toilet and receiving a toilet
from Project Utthan. The Pearson chi-squared test statistic is 2(1, n = 98) = 44, p <
.001. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. The phi coefficient is 0.69, which
indicates a strong association between receiving a toilet and not having a toilet already.
A Pearson chi-squared test of  independence was used to test the same hypothesis in
Project Uday. Table 19 is the contingency table of  already having a toilet and receiving
a toilet from Project Uday. The Pearson chi-squared test statistic is 2(1, n = 96) = 26,
p < .001. Therefore, the null hypothesis was also rejected for Project Uday. The phi
coefficient is 0.54, which indicates a strong association between receiving a toilet and
not having a toilet already.
C.6.2 Socioeonomic Status as Predictor of  Receiving a Toilet
Hierarchical logistic regression models were used to test whether socioeconomic sta-
tus predicted receiving a toilet above and beyond needing a toilet. Table 20 summarizes
the socioeconomic status variables.
First, logistic regression models with only one of  the socioeconomic variables as a
predictor were created to test whether each variable on its own discriminated between
receiving a toilet or not receiving a toilet. In Project Utthan, CASTENG was not a
statistically significant predictor of  the odds of  receiving a toilet, z (96) = 1.2, p = .23.
But EDUCATION was a statistically significant predictor of  the odds of  receiving a
toilet, z (96) = -2.5, p = .011, as was INCOME, z (96) = -2.2, p = .026. A Pearson’s chi-
squared test of  independence has already shown a statistically significant relationship
between not having a toilet and receiving one, and the relationship held in a logistic
regression model, z (96) = -4.4, p < .001.
Next, a nested logistic regression model was used to test whether education and in-
come helped predict whether households received toilets above and beyond the variable
indicating whether they already had toilets (HADTOILET). This model is analogous
to a nested linear regression model that investigates whether additional predictors re-
duce the residual sum-of-squares. In logistic regression, deviance is analogous to the
residual sum-of-squares in linear regression (Hosmer, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant 2013).
Predictors at each level of  a nested logistic regression model should cause a statistically
significant change in the deviance; a chi-squared test is used to determine whether the
change is statistically significant.
In this case, a two-level nested logistic regression model was used with already hav-
ing a toilet (HADTOILET) in the first level and education and income in the second
level. The change in deviance from adding education and income to the model was
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Table 16. Fitted logistic regression model of  open defecation (OPENDEF) on initial
toilet condition (TOILETCOND1.REV) and subsequent toilet condition (TOILET-
COND2.REV)
Coefficient SE z df p 95% CI
(Intercept) 3.57 1.57 2.28 76 .023 [0.50, 6.6]
TOILETCOND1.REV -1.61 0.794 -2.03 76 .042 [-3.2, -0.055]
TOILETCOND2.REV -1.19 0.636 -1.87 76 .062 [-2.4, 0.060]
Notes : SE = standard error; df = degrees of  freedom; CI = confidence intervals
Table 17. Estimated odds ratios for open defecation (reproduced)
OR 95% CI
TOILETCOND1.REV 0.1997 [0.042, 0.95]
TOILETCOND2.REV 0.3055 [0.088, 1.1]
Notes : OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence intervals
Table 18. Contingency table for received toilet and had toilet, Project Utthan
Did not have toilet Did have toilet
Did not receive toilet 16 39
Did receive toilet 42 1
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Table 19. Contingency table for received toilet and had toilet, Project Uday
Did not have toilet Did have toilet
Did not receive toilet 24 34
Did receive toilet 36 2
Table 20. Socioeconomic status indicators (reproduced)
Variable name
Survey
question Responses Calculations
CASTENG What type of
caste or tribe
do you belong
to?
Five categories of
caste or tribe
The value of  this variable
is binary and has been
calculated based on
membership (or not) in
lower castes.
EDUCATION What is the
highest grade
in school that
you
completed?
Highest grade
completed
Qualitative answers
converted to grade
numbers (secondary
education = 10 years;
higher secondary
education = 12 years;
bachelors = 15 years;
masters = 17 years)
INCOME What was your
average
monthly
income over
the past year?
Value in rupees NA
176
not significant, 2(2, n = 98) = 0.82, p = .66. Therefore, the final model only includes
already having a toilet as a predictor of  receiving a toilet in Project Utthan.
The final logistic regression model predicted receiving a toilet with needing a toi-
let; the model was statistically significant, 2(1, n = 98) = 57, p < .001. The c index
for this model was 0.84, which indicates excellent discrimination (Hosmer, Lemeshow,
and Sturdivant 2013). The coefficient of  the predictor HADTOILET, which indicates
needing a toilet, was statistically significant, z (96) = -4.4, p < .001 (see table 21). The
odds of  a household receiving a toilet if  it already had a toilet were about one-hundredth
of  a household that did not already have a toilet (see table 22).
Table 21. Fitted logistic regression model of  receiving a toilet (TOILETREC) on already
having a toilet (HADTOILET), Project Utthan (reproduced)
Coefficient SE z df p 95% CI
(Intercept) 0.965 0.294 3.28 96 .0010 [0.39, 1.5]
HADTOILET -4.63 1.05 -4.39 96 < .001 [-6.7, -2.6]
Notes : SE = standard error; df = degrees of  freedom; CI = confidence intervals
Table 22. Estimated odds ratio for receiving a toilet, Project Utthan (reproduced)
OR 95% CI
HADTOILET 0.0098 [0.0012, 0.077]
Notes : OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence intervals
The final logistic regression model shows essentially the same results as those from
Pearson’s chi-squared test above: Not having a toilet had a very strong, though not
perfect, relationship with receiving a toilet in Project Utthan. The logistic regression
models also showed that socioeconomic factors did not improve predictions of  which
households received toilets above and beyond the variable HADTOILET. Education
and income predicted whether households received toilets, but it appears that these
predictors only did so because they also predict HADTOILET. That is, HADTOILET
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was correlated with higher education, higher income, and not receiving a toilet. Intu-
itively, this finding makes sense. Households that wanted a toilet and could purchase
one had already done so. But in terms of  predicting whether a household received a
toilet, already having a toilet was a better predictor than education and income.
To determine which indicators of  socioeconomic status might have affected the
chances of  receiving a toilet in Project Uday, logistic regression models with only one
of  the indicators were created. CASTENG was a statistically significant predictor of
the odds of  receiving a toilet, z (95) = 4.3, p < .001. But EDUCATION was not, z (94)
= -0.38, p = .70, nor was INCOME, z (95) = -0.62, p = .54. As in Project Utthan, a
Pearson’s chi-squared test of  independence has already shown a statistically significant
relationship between not having a toilet and receiving one, and the relationship held in
a logistic regression model, z (94) = -4.2, p < .001.
A nested logistic regression model was used to test whether being in a low caste
helped predict whether households received toilets above and beyond whether they
already had toilets. A two-level nested logistic regression model was used with already
having a toilet in the first level and caste in the second level. The change in deviance
from adding caste to the model was statistically significant, 2(1, n = 97) = 26, p < .001.
Therefore, the final model uses both already having a toilet (HADTOILET) and caste
(CASTENG) to predict receiving a toilet in Project Uday.
The final model predicting receiving a toilet in Project Uday was significant, 2(1,
n = 97) = 33, p < .001 (see table 23). The c index for this model was 0.89, which
indicates excellent discrimination. Already having a toilet was a statistically significant
predictor, z (93) = -3.7, p < .001, and being in a low caste was a statistically predictor,
z (93) = 3.4, p < .001. The odds ratios for both predictors and their 95% confidence
intervals are provided in table 24. Respondents in households that already had a toilet
had roughly one-hundredth the odds of  getting a toilet as compared to households that
did not already have a toilet. And respondents in a lower caste had roughly thirty-eight
times greater odds of  getting a toilet than respondents not in a lower caste.
The final logistic regression model shows that lower socioeconomic status, at least
as indicated by caste, was associated with greater odds of  receiving a toilet above and
beyond whether the household already had a toilet. Membership in a lower caste by
slum and whether the household received a toilet is shown in figure 17. The slums in
Project Utthan (Baghmugalia and Jatkhedi) show similar patterns between slums and
according to whether the household received a toilet. That is, there tended to be a
higher proportion of  people from lower castes. However, caste did not follow the same
pattern in Project Uday slums. In School Sector, there is a difference in caste between
households that received toilets, and those that did not. Households that received toilets
tended to be in lower castes, and households that did not receive toilets were not in
lower castes. Shivaji Ward tended to have households not in lower castes whether the
household received a toilet or not. The results for Project Uday with respect to caste
may have to do with the particular makeup of  the slums included in this study rather
than with Project Uday’s toilet distribution.
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Table 23. Fitted logistic regression model of  receiving a toilet (TOILETREC) on already
having a toilet (HADTOILET) and being in a lower caste (CASTENG), Project Uday
(reproduced)
Coefficient SE z df p 95% CI
(Intercept) -0.385 0.324 -1.19 93 .23 [-1.0, 0.25]
HADTOILET -4.49 1.20 -3.75 93 < .001 [-6.8, -2.1]
CASTENG1 3.63 1.06 3.41 93 < .001 [1.5, 5.7]
Notes : SE = standard error; df = degrees of  freedom; CI = confidence intervals
Table 24. Estimated odds ratios for receiving a toilet, Project Uday (reproduced)
OR 95% CI
HADTOILET 0.011 [0.0011, 0.12]
CASTENG1 37.71 [4.7, 300]
Notes : OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence intervals
C.6.3 Summary
The results suggest that Project Uday was effective at reducing open defecation, but
Project Utthan was not. Respondents in households that received a toilet tended to use
it (as opposed to practicing open defecation) if  they rated the toilet condition highly.
In both projects, not having a toilet (i.e., need) was the best predictor of  receiving a
toilet. In Project Utthan, education and income also predicted receiving a toilet but not
above and beyond needing one. In Project Uday, low caste predicted receiving a toilet
above and beyond needing one, but this finding might have to do with which slums
from Project Uday were studied rather than Project Uday’s toilet distribution.
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